Shyquille GRIFFIN v. Andrew LINDSEY, et al.
No. 88, Sept. Term, 2014.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Aug. 4, 2015.
119 A.3d 753
Submitted before: BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and WATTS, JJ.
PER CURIAM ORDER.
The Court having considered and granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in the above entitled case, it is this 4th day of August, 2015
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals be, and it is hereby, vacated, and the case is remanded to that Court for further consideration in light of State v. Smith, 443 Md. 572, 117 A.3d 1093 (2015). Costs in this Court to be paid by the Respondent and costs in the Court of Special Appeals to abide the result.
Russell P. Butler (Victor D. Stone, Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center, Inc., Upper Marlboro, MD; Michele McDonald, Brian S. Kleinbord, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.
Argued before: BARBERA, C.J.; HARRELL,* BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, and WATTS, JJ.
ADKINS, J.
In Maryland, a victim is not a party to a criminal prosecution. Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591, 606, 948 A.2d 30, 39 (2008).
Although not a party to a criminal or juvenile proceeding, a victim of a crime for which the defendant or child respon-dent is charged may file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from an interlocutory order or appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final order that denies or fails to consider a right secured to the victim by ... § 11-603 of this title[.]
Pursuant to
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
In May 2011, Petitioner, Shyquille Griffin, and Antonio Whitely arranged to purchase marijuana from Respondent, Andrew Lindsey. When the three met to consummate the transaction, Whitely was dissatisfied with the quantity of marijuana that Lindsey provided. Consequently, Griffin approached Lindsey, who was seated in his vehicle, and asked him “for what else he had in the car.” Whitely then approached with a handgun brandished and pointed the weapon at Lindsey, demanding “everything that he had in the vehicle.” As Lindsey drove off, Whitely shot him in the arm.
Griffin and Whitely were indicted in June 2011 on charges related to the shooting.1 On November 30, 2011, Griffin entered a plea agreement (the “Agreement“) with the State. The Agreement provided that if Griffin provided truthful testimony in the State‘s case against Whitely, the State would agree to a guilty plea for Count 4 of the indictment—Attempted Robbery—and a sentencing cap of 15 years, suspending all but 18 months. The Agreement did not mention restitution, and it contained a provision stating that it
At a plea hearing conducted on December 16, 2011, the parties presented the Agreement to the Circuit Court for Prince George‘s County. The hearing judge accepted the terms of the Agreement, concluding that there was a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea to Count 4. The hearing judge then postponed sentencing until January 2012.
After satisfying the terms of the Agreement,2 Griffin returned to court on January 13, 2012 for sentencing under the plea agreement. Acknowledging that “there [was] nothing in the plea agreement about restitution,” the State nevertheless advised the court that Lindsey was seeking $9,700 in restitution. Relying on Lafontant v. State, 197 Md. App. 217, 13 A.3d 56 (2011), the State argued that a victim has an absolute right to request restitution regardless of whether it appeared in a plea agreement. The hearing court disagreed, concluding that it could not order restitution because it would violate the Agreement by adding to the penalty. Consistent with the Agreement, the Circuit Court sentenced Griffin to 15 years of incarceration, suspending all but 18 months, and three years of supervised probation. It did not order restitution.
Invoking
Lindsey filed an “Application for Leave to Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals” (“Application“) on April 5, 2012, which was granted. The intermediate appellate court reversed the Circuit Court, holding that although the Application was untimely with respect to the Circuit Court‘s January 13, 2012 sentencing judgment, the Application was timely with respect to the Circuit Court‘s March 7, 2012 order denying Lindsey‘s CP § 11-103(e) Motion.3 The Court of Special Appeals further held that the Circuit Court abused its discretion when it denied the CP § 11-103(e) Motion because it had discretion to order restitution as a condition of Griffin‘s probation without violating the Agreement,
- Do crime victims lack statutory authority to appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration under
Maryland Code (2008, 2011 Supp.), Criminal Procedure Article § 11-103(e) , thus depriving the Court of Special Appeals of jurisdiction to review the [C]ircuit [C]ourt‘s denial of Mr. Lindsey‘s motion for reconsideration of his request for restitution? - Did the circuit court properly deny Mr. Lindsey‘s motion for reconsideration
of his request for restitution from Mr. Griffin, when the court had already accepted Mr. Griffin‘s guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that prohibited restitution, Mr. Griffin had already per-formed his part of the plea agreement, and the [C]ircuit [C]ourt had already sentenced Mr. Griffin?6
Because we answer yes to the first question, we need not address the second and shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Circuit Court ruled that Lindsey was not entitled to restitution as a matter of law. We review questions of law without deference. See Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002) (“[W]here the order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court‘s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.“).
DISCUSSION
The Circuit Court denied Lindsey‘s restitution request on two separate occasions: first on January 13, 2012 when it sentenced Griffin without ordering restitution and then again on March 7, 2012 when it denied Lindsey‘s CP § 11-103(e) Motion. Pursuant to
Lindsey filed his Application on April 5, 2012—more than 30 days after the sentencing judgment, but less than 30 days after the Order denying the CP § 11-103(e) Motion. Although Lindsey satisfied Rule 8-204(b)‘s 30-day deadline with respect to his CP § 11-103(e) Motion, we must address whether, when Lindsey filed his Application, victims had a right to file an application for leave to appeal the denial of CP § 11-103(e) motions. If victims did not have this right, Lindsey‘s Application was untimely and, therefore, the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider his appeal.
Any right of a victim to file an application for leave to appeal, “must originate from the General Assembly, not from this Court.” Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 230, 879 A.2d 695, 704 (2005), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hoile v. State, 404 Md. at 605, 948 A.2d at 39. When Lindsey filed his Application,
Griffin and Lindsey offer competing interpretations of CP § 11-103(b). Griffin argues that because the reconsideration provision did not appear in CP § 11-103(b), Lindsey did not have a right to file an application for leave to appeal the denial of his CP § 11-103(e) Motion. Lindsey counters that although the reconsideration provision was absent from CP § 11-103(b), a CP § 11-103(e) motion is, at its heart, nothing more than a mechanism for asking a court to review its earlier determination under CP § 11-603—the “restitution provision.” In other words, the restitution provision is embodied in a CP § 11-103(e) motion. Thus, Lindsey contends, because the restitution provision appears in CP § 11-103(b), he had a right to file an application for leave to appeal the denial of his CP § 11-103(e) Motion.
When interpreting CP § 11-103(b), we bear in mind that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571, 911 A.2d 427, 431 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In ascertaining the General Assembly‘s intent, we apply our oft-repeated canons of statutory construction:
[W]e begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute. If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute‘s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction.... We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine our interpretation of a statute‘s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.
Williams v. Peninsula Reg‘l Med. Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 580-81, 103 A.3d 658, 663 (2014) (alterations in original). Specifically, when construing statutes granting the right to appeal, we must do so narrowly. Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 98, 939 A.2d 689, 706 (2008).
Beginning with the plain meaning of the language of the statute, the reconsideration provision is clearly absent from CP § 11-103(b). This is significant because “[t]he prin-ciples of applying a plain meaning approach [to statutory construction] include consideration of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another).” Hudson v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 402 Md. 18, 30, 935 A.2d 395, 402 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This doctrine is a “fundamental principle of construction, long recognized in Maryland.” Id. Although we have stated that this doctrine should be “used with caution,”7 its application is appropriate in this case because the General Assembly must “expressly grant” the right
Consistent with this doctrine, we have held that when a certain element is not expressly stated in the language of a statute or Maryland Rule, the statute or Rule is unambiguous and does not include that element. For instance, in Rush v. State, supra, we considered whether
In State v. Manck, another case dealing with appellate rights under
Lindsey argues that we should consider a CP § 11-103(e) motion to be synonymous with an original request for restitution under CP § 11-603. But Lindsey cites no case in which we have held that a motion for reconsideration is the same as, or should be treated the same as, the action that caused the judgment subject to reconsideration. Our independent research, likewise, reveals no such case. Thus, Lindsey cannot overcome the exclusion of the reconsideration provision in CP § 11-103(b) by relying on the inclusion of the restitution provision in CP § 11-103(b).
Not only does Lindsey‘s argument defy the unambiguous language of CP § 11-103(b),
We have long held that a sentencing judgment is a final judgment for purposes of appeal.10 Thus, the January 13, 2012 sentencing at which the Circuit Court denied Lindsey‘s first request for restitution was an appealable final judgment. Applying our reasoning from Chmurny, Lindsey had 30 days to file an appeal from this final judgment. He could not “allow the time for noting an appeal from that judgment to lapse and escape the jurisdictional bar by filing a motion to reconsider the earlier ruling ... and then appealing the denial of that second motion.” Id. Lindsey filed his Application on April 5, 2012—less than 30 days after his motion for reconsideration was denied, but almost three months after Griffin‘s sentencing. Like the defendant in Chmurny, Lindsey allowed the time for noting an appeal to lapse, and he cannot cure this jurisdictional defect by appealing the denial of a subsequent motion for reconsideration.11
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that Lindsey‘s appeal was untimely because CP § 11-103(b) did not permit a crime victim to file an application for leave to appeal the denial of a CP § 11-103(e) motion. We construe grants of appellate authority narrowly, and the language of CP § 11-103(b) is unambiguous—it does not include the right to appeal from a denial of a CP § 11-103(e) motion. Griffin‘s January 13, 2012 sentencing was a final judgment, and Lindsey cannot rely on his appeal from the denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration to escape his failure to timely file his Application after the sentencing. Accordingly, because Lindsey‘s appeal was untimely, the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider it, and we reverse its judgment.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE CIRCUIT COURT‘S RULING. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.
GREENE and McDONALD, JJ., dissent.
GREENE, J., which McDONALD, J., joins.
I respectfully dissent.
Against the General Assembly‘s goal in enacting
As the majority has outlined in greater detail, on January 13, 2012, the state informed the trial court during sentencing that Lindsey sought restitution. This motion was denied by the court on the grounds that restitution would violate the terms of Griffin‘s plea agreement. The trial court proceeded to sentence Griffin to 15 years of incarceration, with all but 18 months suspended, along with three years of supervised probation. As the majority notes, following the trial court‘s denial of Lindsey‘s request for restitution, Respondent filed a timely motion for reconsideration pursuant to CP § 11-103(e)(2) on February 13, 2012, attaching his medical bills to the motion.3 After a hearing on the matter, conducted on March 7, 2012, the trial court, once again, denied Lindsey‘s request, asserting that ordering restitution would violate the terms of the plea agreement and would violate the Maryland Constitution. Less than 30 days later, on April 5, Respondent filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which was granted by that court. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that it had abused its discretion when it denied Respondent‘s CP § 11-103(e) Motion. On review before this Court, the majority holds, despite broad language in the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals must be reversed.
Under CP § 11-103(b), as it existed at the time, “a victim of a violent crime ... may file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from an interlocutory or final order that denies or fails to consider a right secured to the victim by ... § 11-603 of this title[.]” The “right secured” by CP § 11-603 is the right to restitution. The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) A court may enter a judgment of restitution that orders a defendant ... to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquent act, if:
* * *
(2) as a direct result of the crime ... the victim suffered:
(i) actual medical ... expenses or losses[.]
* * *
(b) A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of this section if:
(1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and
(2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section.
CP § 11-603 (emphasis added).
Although the majority is correct that CP § 11-103(e)(2)—the vehicle by which Respondent timely challenged the trial court‘s January 13, 2012 denial of the request for restitution—is not specifically
The holding of the majority leads to an odd statutory scheme, out of step with the General Assembly‘s trend in granting victims rights, see Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 230, 879 A.2d 695, 704 (2005) (Wilner, J., concurring), superseded by statute as recognized in Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591, 605, 948 A.2d 30, 39 (2008). In the majority‘s view, when Respondent‘s initial motion for restitution on January 13, 2012 was denied, he should have recognized that the denial was a final order denying a right secured to him as a crime victim. In addition, the majority suggests, he should have appreciated that the denial of a motion to reconsider restitution would not be considered a final order and therefore would not be appealable. In my view, Respondent‘s reliance on CP § 11-103(e)(2), therefore, was, indeed, a trap: by not realizing that the denial of the motion for reconsideration would not qualify as a final order denying his right to restitution, Respondent forfeited his right to appellate review. Failing to simultaneously file a motion for reconsideration and apply for leave to appeal extinguished Respondent‘s right to appeal an erroneous decision, despite state constitutional provisions and statutes that suggest that the General Assembly is committed at the very least to not erecting such barriers between crime victims and their rights. Article 47 is worded quite broadly, guaranteeing crime victims the right to “be treated by agents of the State with dignity, respect, and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process.”
A major concern of the majority appears to be that future victims, and possibly defendants as well, could “allow the time for noting an appeal from [a final, appealable] judgment to lapse and escape the jurisdictional bar by filing another, identical motion or a motion to reconsider the earlier ruling months or years later and then appealing the denial of that second motion.” Maj. Op. at 290, 119 A.3d at 760 (quoting Chmurny v. State, 392 Md. 159, 166, 896 A.2d 354, 358 (2006)). This concern, in part, appears to arise from the situation in Chmurny which the majority discusses at length. The extraordinary circumstances of Chmurny, involving the defen-dant‘s suicide between the verdict and sentencing, and the lawyer taking it upon himself to attempt to sneak in an appeal by filing an identical motion four years after the trial court denied a motion for reconsideration, make the case less than controlling and diminish its effect on the instant case.
There is no suggestion in the record that Respondent was attempting to skirt the thirty day filing requirement under CP § 11-103(b). Indeed, Respondent submitted a timely motion to reconsider the trial court‘s decision at sentencing—a decision that should not be punished. The majority‘s concern, whatever its worth might be in another case, is without merit in the instant matter because, under CP § 11-103(e)(2)(i), Respondent had only thirty days to “file a motion requesting relief.” Affirming the Court of Special Appeals would not lead to any of the consequences contemplated by Chmurny. Because the victim produced competent evidence of his medical expenses, the trial judge in the instant case was bound by law, absent extraordinary circumstances not present in this case, to order restitution and lacked the discretion to do otherwise. See CP § 11-603(b) (“A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of this section if ... the victim or the State requests restitution; and ... the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section.“).
Furthermore, affirming the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals would be consistent with appeals from denials of motions for reconsideration in other legal contexts. See, e.g., Wilson-X v. Dept. of Human Res., 403 Md. 667, 674-75, 944 A.2d 509, 514 (2008) (“[T]he ruling on a motion for reconsideration is ordinarily discretionary, and [] the standard of review in such a circumstance is whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion.“); Grimberg v. Marth, 338 Md. 546, 553, 659 A.2d 1287, 1290 (1995) (finding that an appeal, filed more than thirty days after judgment but fewer than thirty days after denial of motion for reconsideration, would lie and that the scope of review would be “limited to whether the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to reconsider the judgment“); First Federated Commodity Trust Corp. v. Comm‘r of Sec., 272 Md. 329, 332-33, 322 A.2d 539, 542 (1974) (appeal from order dismissing motion to vacate held timely, but scope of review limited to abuse of discretion); S. & G. Realty Co., Inc. v. Woodmoor Realty Corp., 255 Md. 684, 689, 259 A.2d 281, 283-84 (1969) (involving an appeal filed more than thirty days after the entry of judgment but within thirty days of decision on a motion to set aside or modify decree treated as an appeal solely from a decision on a motion, and abuse of discretion standard applied); State v. Bundy, 52 Md. App. 456, 460-61, 450 A.2d 495, 497 (1982) (finding jurisdiction over State‘s appeal from denial of motion for reconsideration and reviewing the denial under an abuse of discretion standard). Although, “[a]s a general rule, ‘a motion to modify or reduce a sentence is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is not appealable[,]‘” State v. Rodriguez, 125 Md. App. 428, 442, 725 A.2d 635, 642 (1999) (citation omitted), the reasons for disallowing an appeal from this sort of motion—when such appeals are disallowed—simply are not present in this case. These reasons are the same as those articulated in Chmurny: foreclosing a party‘s ability to sneak in an appeal after letting the time to appeal expire. See Thomason v. Bucher, 266 Md. 1, 4-6, 291 A.2d 437, 439 (1972) (citing similar reasons for affirming dismissal of appeal as untimely) and cases cited therein. As noted above, under CP § 11-103(e), victims have only thirty days to file a motion for reconsideration after a court‘s denial of restitution. Finally, this Court has held that “trial judges do not have discretion to apply inappropriate legal standards, even when making decisions that are regarded as discretionary in nature.” Wilson-X, 403 Md. at 675, 944 A.2d at 514. Thus, consistent with our case law and the language of CP § 11-103(b), the denial of the motion for reconsideration was appealable and was subject to review for abuse of discretion, including the abuse that “occurs when the judge ... [‘]acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.[‘]” Wilson-X, 403 Md. at 677, 944 A.2d at 515 (citation omitted). It is important to note that this approach would not, as the majority suggests, “considerably increase victims’ appellate rights.” Rather, it serves to protect an interest already granted to them by statute, namely, the ability to receive restitution.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge McDONALD has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.
null
Notes
- Under the principles of Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 7 A.3d 557 (2010), and Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604, 7 A.3d 578 (2010), does a binding plea agreement prohibit restitution when it makes no mention of restitution and purports to be the “full and complete agreement of the parties“?
- Does a trial court lack authority to grant a victim‘s request for restitution if the victim does not request restitution until after the court has already accepted a plea agreement that prohibits restitution?
- When a court has already imposed a sentence that does not include restitution, would granting a victim‘s request for restitution illegally increase the sentence?
(3)(i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, and in cases under §§ 5-602 through 5-609 and §§ 5-612 through 5-614 of the Criminal Law Article, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
(Emphasis added.)Chmurny v. State, 392 Md. 159, 167-68, 896 A.2d 354, 358-59 (2006) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).It is not in the public interest and it is not proper judicial administration or procedure to have criminal cases permanently in limbo, without even the prospect of a judgment ever being entered. Chmurny was found guilty on five counts, but, because he is dead, he cannot be sentenced....
A conviction does not occur in a criminal case until sentence is imposed on a verdict of guilty. That is when judgment is entered. A verdict of guilty alone constitutes neither a conviction nor a sentence and does not constitute a source of relevant legal authority....
Thus, as the case now stands, there is no conviction and no judgment, and, under the court‘s ruling, there never will be a conviction or judgment; the case will remain permanently open and incomplete on the docket....
Because the case can never move forward to judgment, the only way to bring closure to the case is to abate the proceeding ab initio—to vacate the verdicts and the indictment. That is what must be done in these rare cases, and that is what should be done, as a matter of course, when, upon dismissal of this appeal, the case returns to the Circuit Court.