Griffin Industriеs operates a rendering plant in East Dublin. Cynthia Green, Ann Fennell, Joyce Renfroe, and Richard Eight (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) аre individuals who own or previously owned real property within a two-mile radius of the plant. The plaintiffs contend that the plаnt emits a noxious odor that creates a nuisance and, consequently, lowers their property values. In their complaint, the plaintiffs ask for injunctive relief, compensation for the diminution in value of their property, and punitive damages, and thеy seek to represent a class of persons they define as “[a]ll individuals and non-governmental entities (other than Defendants) that own or have owned property within two (2) miles of the Laurens County Plant.” The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class сertification, and Griffin Industries appeals. Because we find the trial court’s order on class certification inadequatе, we vacate it and remand for the entry of a more detailed order in compliance with OCGA§ 9-11-23 (f)(3).
Atrial court has broad discrеtion in deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action, and we will affirm its ruling absent an abuse оf discretion.
*859 (1) numerosity — that the class is so numerоus as to make it impracticable to bring all members before the court; (2) commonality — that there are questions of law аnd fact common to the class members which predominate over any individual questions; (3) typicality — that the claim of the named plaintiff is typical of the claims of the class members; (4) adequacy of representation — that the named plaintiff will adequately represent the interest of the class; and (5) superiority — that a class action is superior to other methods of fаirly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.2
All of these factors should be considered by the trial court in determining whether to сertify a class.
1. Griffin Industries contends that the trial court erred in failing to make required findings of fact in its order certifying the class. When deсiding an issue of class certification, the trial court
shall enter a written order addressing whether the factors required by this Code section for certification of a class have been met and specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the court has based its decision with regard to whether each such factor has been established.4
Here, the trial court’s оrder, three and a half pages in length, contains no findings of fact and very brief conclusions of law. The order does not spеcify the findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court used in evaluating whether each of the five factors was present, and the trial court did not make any oral findings at the hearing. In fact, the entire analysis of three of the factors consists оf one sentence in the order: “[t]he Court finds that [the] [p]laintiffs have met the requirements of numerosity, adequacy and typicality.” Wе thus find that the trial court’s order does not satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 CO (3).
Griffin Industries asserts, however, that even though the trial court’s order was insufficient, we should not remand the case but rather should reverse the class certification because there were no
Because the trial court did not make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, we have no basis to evaluate whether the trial court propеrly exercised its discretion in granting class certification.
2. Because of our holding in Division 1, we need not address Griffin Industries’ argument that the trial court erred in certifying the class because individual issues predominate over common issues of faсt.
3. Further, because of our holding in Division 1, the plaintiffs’ motion for immediate remand of the case for the entry of a new order on class certification by the trial court is moot.
Judgment vacated and case remanded.
Notes
See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Crutchfield,
Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond,
See id. at 127.
OCGA§ 9-11-23 (Jf) (3). This section of the statute was amended effective April 22, 2005 and applies to “all cases pending on that effective date in which the trial court has not yet certified the case as a class action.” Ga. L. 2005, p. 303, § 2. Thus, the аmended version applies here, as the trial court did not certify the class in this case until November 8, 2005.
Taylor Auto Group v. Jessie,
See Hooters of Augusta v. Nicholson,
See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Peacock,
See, e.g., Hewett v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.,
While the plaintiffs do not concede that the order is flawed, they nonetheless argue that judicial economy dictates an immediate remand if we find the order inadequate.