M. J. Griffеth executed bonds for the faithful performance of his duties as guardian of four minor сhildren named Segars. M. H. House became surety on those bonds. Griffeth' and House died. Suit in behаlf of these children was brought against the administratrix and the wife of Griffeth, alleging that deeds mаde by Griffeth to Mrs. Griffeth, conveying his half interest in two parcels of real estate described, were voluntary, without consideration, made pursuant to a conspiracy between him and his wife for the purpose of rendering him insolvent and defrauding, hindering, and delaying his creditors. In that litigation there was a verdict finding that the deeds were voluntary and should be set aside and declared void. Accordingly the trial court entered a decreе which contained the language quoted in paragraph 3, infra.
The half interest in the land was levied upon and advertised for sale as the property of the estate of M. J. Griffeth. His widow sought to enjoin the sale, alleging that she had made application to
Demurrer was sustained on the ground that the facts allegеd in the petition for injunction did not entitle Mrs. Griffeth to a year's support in the property mentioned, and injunction was refused. Petitioner excepted.
A deed made to defraud creditors, though void as to them, is good as between the grantor and the granteе, and after executing such deed the grantor has no title to the property cоnveyed; and therefore such property can not be set apart as a year’s support for the widow of the grantor, since such year’s support can only be set aside from the property of the estate of the husband. Tufts v. DuBignon, 61 Ga. 322 (5); Parrott v. Baker, 82 Ga. 364 (
The plaintiff in error formally requested this court to review and overrule McDowell v. McMurria, and Bank of Wrightsville v. Powell, supra, if these decisions are сonstrued to conflict with the contentions made by her. As shown above, these decisiоns are adverse to the contentions of the plaintiff in error, and, if there were no other decisions ruling likewise, would control the judgment. We deny the request both upon the ground that such decisions are sound and upon the further ground that they are only two of a line of decisions which have and should settle the law on the question involved.
The legal effect of the judgment cancelling the deeds does not differ in meaning from the judgments in the controlling cases
Judgment affirmed.
