Lead Opinion
Appellant, Shimeek Gridine, argues that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Florida, — U.S.-,
On April 21, 2009, Mr. Gridinе approached his victim, pointed a loaded shotgun at him and demanded he hand over whatever money аnd/or property he had on his person. When the victim attempted to run, Mr. Gridine fired the shotgun at him, “striking [him] on his face, head, neck, shoulder, side and back.” Security cameras at a nearby gas station recorded Mr. Gridine fleeing from the scene of the shooting. He was fourteen years old on the date he shot the victim.
The State filed a Certificate of Filing Direct Information on Juvenile and charged Mr. Gridine with one count of attempted first degree murder, one count оf attempted armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. He pled guilty to all three counts.
After a sentencing hearing, the trial court adjudicated Mr. Gridine guilty and sentenced him to a seventy-year prison sentence for committing attempted first degree murder and a twenty-five year concurrent sentence for committing attemрted armed robbery (the State nolle prossed the aggravated battery charge). Included in the sentence was a twenty-five year minimum mandatory for his using a firearm during his commission of the charged offenses.
Pursuant to Rule 3.800(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Gridine filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Error, arguing his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, he referenced the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, — U.S. -,
In Graham, the defendant committed armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery when he was sixteen years old. Id. at 2018. The trial court withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced Graham to concurrent terms of three yеars’ probation. One year later, Graham admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court adjudicated him guilty of the underlying offenses and sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and fifteen years’ imprisоnment. Id. at 2019-20. Graham argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 2020. Due tо juveniles’ diminished moral responsibility, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited life sentences without the possibility for parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes because life sentences impropеrly denied juvenile offenders a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity. Id. at 2029-30. Specifically, the Supreme Court held:
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What*911 the State must do, howеver, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated mаturity and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance. It bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth Amendment forbids a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender during his naturаl life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceratiоn for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nоnhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.
Graham,
Appellant asks this Court to apply Graham to his case and find that his seventy-year sentenсe is the functional equivalent of a natural life sentence. However, the Supreme Court specifically limitеd its holding in Graham to only “those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offеnse.” Id. at 2023; See also Thomas v. State,
As in Thomas, we agree that at some point, a term-of-years sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life sentence. See United States v. Mathurin,
We, therefore, AFFIRM the trial court’s imposition of judgment and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting.
As we stated in Thomas v. State,
Absent the option of parole, I am at a loss on how to apply thе Graham decision to a lengthy term of years. Is a 60-year sentence lawful, but a 70-year sentence not? Regardless, it is clеar to me that appellant will spend most of his life in prison. This result would appear to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Graham decision. I, therefore, must respectfully dissent. However, in doing so, I note that absent a legislative solution, I look for guidance from either the United States or Florida Supreme Courts.