Grider v. Administrator, Department of Employment SecurityGrider v. Administrator, Department of Employment Security
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Norris, Fred W. Jones Jr., Hightower
In this unemployment compensation case, the claimant, Richard Grider, appeals the district court‘s judgment affirming the denial of his claim for benefits. He argues that the trial court erred in not finding that he left his job for good cause connected with his employment. Grider further contends, in essence, that the prior-claim requirement of
FACTS
Grider was hired by Moon Tree Services in Shreveport, Louisiana as a tree climber. He worked from February 1987 to September 1987, averaging about 40 hours a week at $6.75 an hour рlus overtime. On September 14, 1987, he notified his employer that he was leaving his job to accept another job with better pay and hours of work. Because he started the second job immediately, he filed no claim for benefits. At his second job, he stated he earned about $399.80 a wеek. He was later laid off on
On November 8, 1987, Grider filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Caddo Parish Agency. The agency denied his claim. He appealed to the Administrative Law Judge, who affirmed the decision of the agency. The judge held that Grider‘s action in leaving Moon Tree Services to accept other employment for increased pay was not good cause connected with the employment; thus Grider was disqualified and had not requalified for benefits. Grider then appealed to the Board of Review. The Board affirmеd. Pursuant to
Grider took the instant appeal, which the Agency initially opposed. However, while the case was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Cоurt decided Pierre v. Adm‘r, La. Off. of Emp. Sec., 553 So.2d 442 (La.1989), discussed infra; at oral argument the Agency conceded that Pierre mandated reversal of the judgment.
GOOD CAUSE ARGUMENT
Because we are compelled to consider all non-constitutional arguments before passing upon the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, we will first discuss whether Grider left his first job under disqualifying cirсumstances. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972); State v. Stripling, 354 So.2d 1297 (La.1978).
A claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he has left his employment without good cause connected with his employment.
The cause of Grider‘s resignation had no connection with his employment. Grider chose to resign for purely personal reasons, to accept a better paying job. Grider‘s employer did nothing to induce or influence him to resign. Although his resignation may have been “reasonable,” as he suggests, it nevertheless was without good cause in connection with his employment. For this reason, this assignment is without merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
Grider argues that the prior-claim requirement of
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(1) If the administrator finds that he has left his employment from a base period or subsequent employer without good cause connected with his employment. Such disqualification shall continue until such time as the claimant (a) can demonstrate that he has been paid wages for work subject to the Louisiana Employment Security Law or to the unemployment insurance law of any other state or the United States equivalent to at least ten times his weekly benefit amount subsequent to a claim for a compensable week for unemployment benefits under this Act and (b) has not left his last work under disqualifying circumstances. A compensable week is defined as a week for which benefits would otherwise be payable except for the disqualification imposed by this Paragraph or by the provisions of
R.S. 23:1600(4) ; however,if the claim for a compensable week is filed subsequent to six months from the date of any disqualifying separation under this Paragraph and the сlaimant has earned ten times his weekly benefit amount subsequent to the separation and has not left his last work under disqualifying circumstances, the disqualification imposed by this Paragraph shall no longer apply. * * *
Thus, an employee who voluntarily leaves his employment will be disqualified from rеceiving unemployment benefits but the statute also provides two methods for removing the disqualification. Under the first method, a disqualified claimant can requalify for benefits if he files a claim after leaving his first job, goes to a second job and earns wages equal to ten times his weekly benеfit amount, and then leaves his second job under non-disqualifying circumstances. The second method covers a disqualified claimant who fails to file a claim after leaving the first job. Such a claimant also can requalify, but only by earning the requisite amount of wages, leaving his last job for non-disquаlifying reasons, and waiting six months after the disqualifying separation.
Grider argues that
The state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection mandate that state laws affect alike all persons and interests similarly situated.
When a state law does not classify individuals by race, rеligion, birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas, but does so on any other basis,
The Louisiana Supreme Court was recently presented with a similar issue in Pierre v. Adm‘r, supra. In Pierre, the plaintiffs were discharged from their first employment due to misconduct and thus disqualified from receiving benefits under
Because the plaintiffs were discharged for misconduct, their claims were controlled by
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(2) If the administrator finds that he has been discharged by a base period or subsequent employer for misconduct connected with his employment. Such disqualification shall continue until such time as the claimant (a) can demonstrate
that he has been paid wаges for work subject to the Louisiana Employment Security Law or to the unemployment insurance laws of any other state or of the United States equivalent to at least ten times his weekly benefit amount subsequent to a claim for a compensable week for unemployment benefits under this Act and (b) has not left his last work under disqualifying circumstances. A compensable week is defined as a week for which benefits would otherwise be payable except for the disqualification imposed by this Paragraph or by the provisions of R.S. 23:1600(4) .
Each plaintiff earned ten times his weekly benefit amount, but their claims were denied because the wages were not earned “subsequent to a claim for a compensable week for unemployment benefits.” Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
The court did not address the similar prior-claim requirement of
The constitutionality of
Gunter v. Louisiana Dept. of Labor, supra, cited in brief by the Agency, is not apposite. In Gunter, the plaintiff argued that the prior-claim requirement of
In light of Pierre, we have no trouble concluding that the prior-claim requirement creates two classes of disqualified claimants who seek to requalify for benefits. The clаss of claimants who file prior claims requalify immediately upon meeting the other criteria, while those who do not file a prior claim for benefits suffer a six month waiting period. The statute therefore creates a classification scheme where one similarly situated clаss receives unequal treatment.
The Agency initially contended that the state purpose of the six month waiting period is to discourage “job-hopping.” While we question the validity of this contention, we note that the Agency has advanced no legislative purpose for the prior-claim requirement. In fact, we do not find that the prior-claim requirement suitably furthers any appropriate state interest or that it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. This finding is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s decision in Pierre v. Adm‘r that the prior-claim requirement of
The unconstitutional provision “subsequent to a claim for compensable week for unemployment benefits under this Act” was added to
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(1) If the administrator finds that he has left his employment without good cause connected with his employment. Such disqualification shall continue until such time as the claimant (a) can demonstrate that he has been paid wages for work subject to the Louisiana Employment Security Law or to the unemployment insurance law of any other state or the United States, equivalent to at least ten times his weekly benefit amount following the week in which the disqualifying act occurred and (b) has not left his last work under disqualifying circumstances.
Though counsel for the Agency conceded this conclusion at oral arguments, he urged that the record is insufficient to show that Grider earned “ten times his weekly benefit amount following the week in which the disqualifying act occurred.” For this reason, he requеsts a remand for this determination. We agree. Our review of the record fails to reveal Grider‘s weekly benefit amount, as calculated under
CONCLUSION
In sum, the 1981 amendment to
Because we reverse and remand on this basis, we need not specifically address Grider‘s due process argument. Costs are not assessed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.