Grey v. Tubbs

43 Cal. 359 | Cal. | 1872

By the Court,

Rhodes, J.:

The contract of sale which the plaintiffs, who are the assignees of the purchaser, seek to have specifically enforced, provides that the interest on the purchase money shall be paid quarterly in advance, on the first days of January, April, July, and October. The principal sum was to be paid on or before July 1st, 1870—three years from the date of the contract. The interest up to January 1st, 1868, was paid in advance, but the interest for the next quarter was not tendered until the last day of February, 1868. The defendant refused to receive the money and stated to the purchaser that he had forfeited his contract. The plaintiff, in December, 1868, before the commencement of the action, tendered to the defendant the principal sum and all the interest then due, according to the terms of the contract.

The fact that the purchaser did not tender the amount which became due on the first of the two quarters succeeding January 1st, 1868, is not material; for if a Court of equity can excuse the delay in tendering the money which became due on the last mentioned day, the failure to tender the interest for the next two quarters at the times mentioned in the contract is, under the circumstances, readily excusable.

The contract contains the following covenant: “In the event of failure to comply with the terms hereof by the party of the second part [the purchaser] the party of the first part shall be released from all obligations, in law or equity, to convey said property, and said party of the second part shall forfeit all right thereto.” The plaintiffs rely upon the rule which has so frequently heen applied by Courts of equity, that time is not of the essence of the contract, or as it is better expressed by Parsons in his excellent work on Contracts, that time is not necessarily of the essence of a contract. The defendant, while denying the applicability of the rule to contracts for the sale of property of the character of that in controversy—city or town lots—particularly in this State, where such property is as marketable and as subject to fluctuations in value, and is bought and sold with the same facility as personal property, yet he relies more upon a necessary qualification of the rule: which is that time is of the essence of a contract, if it be made so by the parties themselves, or by the circumstances of the case. He insists that the clause of the contract above cited, shows that the parties intended that the time for the performance of the contract on the part of the purchaser should be material, and of the essence of the contract. The parties agreed that a failure on the part of the purchaser “to comply with the terms hereof”—that is to say, to pay the money according to the terms of the contract—should operate as a release of the vendor from all obligation to convey the premises to the purchaser or his assignees; and to make the matter still clearer, and to show that the parties intended to make time essential, it was agreed that such failure should release him from all obligation “m law or equity” to convey the premises. The parties*further agreed—as if to place the matter beyond all doubt—that in case of such failure on the part of the purchaser he should forfeit all right to a conveyance. It would be difficult to express with greater clearness and certainty, than the parties did in this contract, that time is of the essence of the contract, except it were done by the insertion of those very words in the instrument. Courts of equity have not the power to make contracts for parties, nor to alter those which the parties have deliberately made; and whenever it appears that the parties have in fact contracted, that if the purchaser make default in the payments, as agreed upon, he shall not be entitled to a conveyance, and shall lose the benefit of his purchase; and when it also appears that the purchaser is without excuse for his delay, the Courts will not relieve him from the consequences of his default. They will not inquire into the motive or the sufficiency of the motive that induced the parties to contract, that time should be essential in the performance of any of the agreements contained in the contract of purchase; but if it appears that the parties have thus contracted, the Courts of equity will not disregard the contract in order to give effect to some vague surmise, that all that the vendor intended to secure by the contract, was the payment of the purchase money, with interest, at some indefinite time.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

Mr. Justice Crockett did not sit in this case.