This is an appeal by the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) of the decision of the Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) to suspend the respondent, James T. Grew, from the practice of law in New Hampshire for six months. The ADO argues that the respondent should be disbarred. We disagree and order the respondent suspended for two years effective from the date of our original order of suspension.
I
The parties stipulated to the following facts. The respondent was admitted to practice law in New Hampshire on October 26, 2004. On November 26, 2004, while backing out of the Hampton Plaza in his Ford Econoline Van (Econoline Van), the respondent hit the bumper of a parked car. The owner, Jonathan Labrie, was in his car at the time of the accident.
At the scene, the respondent gave Labrie his telephone number, current home address, and the information from his driver’s license. The respondent also told Labrie that he was unsure whether his Econoline Van was currently insured, and requested that Labrie contact him later to get the vehicle’s identification information. Labrie, however, wrote down the license plate number and a description of the Econoline Van.
*363 On November 27,2004, the respondent contacted Progressive Insurance Company and falsely reported that at the time of the accident he had been driving his green Ford Windstar Van (Ford Windstar). The respondent made this false claim because, at the time, he was carrying insurance on his Ford Windstar but not on his Econoline Van. Progressive issued a claim number, and informed the respondent that a claims adjuster would contact him at a later date. The following day, the respondent left Labrie a voicemail which stated, in pertinent part:
Hi John, it’s James Grew, the gentleman who unfortunately backed into you the other day. I just wanted to let you know the insurance company is Progressive____I’ll call Progressive today, and I will let them know that I backed into you, um, and there’s some damage to your car and that I was driving the green Ford Windstar, and, um, I will give you a call back after I talk to them, thank you.
A few minutes later, the respondent again phoned Labrie and left a voicemail which, in relevant part, stated:
Hi John, it’s James Grew again, I just want to follow up with you, um, I just called Progressive----I, uh, opened up a claim so that you can get your car repaired, quickly, I hope____I explained to the agency ... that I backed into you in the parking lot off of Lafayette ... and that, um, my van hit your front bumper, and I explained that I was driving the Ford Windstar van, which is a dark green, you may want to note that it’s a dark green van ... and again, I apologize, if you want to give me a call today, just so we can [sic] the facts straight it will help out____
On November 29, 2004, a Progressive claims adjuster called the respondent who, once again, falsely reported that he had been driving the Ford Windstar at the time of the accident. The claims adjuster then called Labrie, who informed him that not only had the respondent been driving the Econoline Van, but that the respondent had also been calling Labrie in an attempt to persuade him to falsely report that the Ford Windstar had been the vehicle involved in the accident. The next day, the respondent called Labrie yet again and left a voicemail requesting a return call so that he and Labrie could “get [their] facts straight.”
On December 14, 2004, Labrie’s insurance provider, Geico Indemnity Company, sent the respondent a formal demand letter in an attempt to recover $1,802.11 for repairing Labrie’s car. On December 16, 2004, Ralph D. Gault, a Progressive claims investigator, sent the respondent a letter requesting a conference in order to discuss “issues which have surfaced *364 regarding this loss.” Receiving no response, Gault followed up on his letter by leaving his business card with the respondent on December 21,2004.
The following day, the respondent wrote a check to Geico for $1,802.11 and sent the following email to Gault:
Thank you for leaving your card yesterday. Email is a good way to communicate, for December and January are always very busy months. I wanted to inform you that I have paid for [Labrie’s] repair out of my own pocket. His damage was minimal. Progressive is not responsible for his claim. Thank you for your assistance.
The respondent was subsequently indicted by the Rockingham County Grand Jury for one count of insurance fraud, a class B felony. However, on April 7, 2006, the respondent entered into a plea bargain that reduced the felony to a class A misdemeanor. The Superior Court (Morrill, J.) sentenced the respondent, in accordance with the plea agreement, as follows: (1) twelve months in the House of Corrections, all suspended for one year on good behavior and compliance with the terms of the sentencing order; (2) $1,000 fíne; (3) $284 in restitution to Progressive; and (4) 100 hours of community service.
On May 31, 2006, we issued an order ruling that the respondent’s conviction for class A misdemeanor insurance fraud constituted a “serious crime” under Supreme Court Rule 37(9)(b). Accordingly, we ordered the respondent immediately suspended from the practice of law, see Sup. CT. R. 37(9)(a), and referred the matter to the PCC on the issue of sanction, see SUP. Ct. R. 37(9)(d). The PCC imposed a six-month suspension, emphasizing the respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, his cooperation with the disciplinary process, his sincere remorse, and the fact that the incident “was an isolated one in [the respondent’s] personal and professional history.”
The PCC also found a letter submitted by the respondent to be “particularly significant.” In the letter, the respondent explained how, at the time of the accident, he was under extreme financial and emotional duress because: (1) he had grown up poor and incurred substantial debt in obtaining his law degree; (2) he had not been earning enough to provide for his family from his practice representing low-income clients; (3) his wife’s salary had recently been reduced because of employment restructuring; (4) his wife had also required an extended stay in the hospital due to complications during birth; (5) one of his three children had been in and out of the hospital for severe allergies; and (6) his father had recently moved in with the family because he was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. At the same time, the PCC found, the respondent’s *365 “professional life, until this incident, reflected] his integrity, commitment to serving the public, and commitment to the legal profession.” The ADO has appealed the PCC’s order, arguing that the respondent should instead be disbarred.
II
“[W]e retain ultimate authority to determine whether, on the facts found, a violation of the rules governing attorney conduct has occurred and, if so, the appropriate sanction.”
Coddington’s Case,
In assessing the propriety of a particular sanction, we look to the American Bar Association’s STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (2005) (Standards) for guidance.
Bosse’s Case,
In this case, the respondent breached his ethical duty to maintain personal integrity,
see
STANDARDS,
supra
§ 5.1, by engaging in misdemeanor-level insurance fraud, which is a “serious crime” under Rule 37(9)(b). Under the STANDARDS, when an attorney engages in fraud, absent mitigating circumstances, disbarment is generally the sanction. Standards,
supra
§ 5.11. A severe sanction is called for in such cases because “the privilege of practicing law [comes with] the concomitant responsibilities of truth, candor and honesty.”
Bosse’s Case,
With respect to the second factor, the PCC found that the respondent’s “mental state was more a reflection of his initial panic over the family and financial ramifications of the accident, than evidence of a specific intent to defraud his insurance carrier.” In its finding, the PCC appears to have conflated factor two, the respondent’s mental state, and factor four, mitigating factors. The respondent’s “mental state may be one of intent, knowledge, or negligence.” STANDARDS, supra § 3.0 cmt. What is relevant to the second factor is the volitional nature of the respondent’s acts, and not the external pressures that could potentially have hindered his judgment. Therefore, even if panicked, the proper inquiry is whether the respondent acted with either: (1) the conscious objective to defraud Progressive; (2) the knowledge of the nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct; or (3) a negligent failure to notice a substantial risk that fraud would result from his actions. See STANDARDS, supra s. II, at 6.
The record here shows that respondent’s mental state was “one of intent.” STANDARDS,
supra
§ 3.0 cmt. The respondent admits that his conduct “constituted a crime.” Indeed, he pled guilty to the charge of insurance fraud and has thus acknowledged that he acted with
“intent
to injure, defraud or deceive.” RSA 638:20, II (2007) (emphasis added);
see Levy v. Assoc. of the Bar of City of New York,
As to the third factor, we note that the respondent’s conduct caused actual injuries to both the public and the legal profession.
See
STANDARDS,
supra
s. III, at 9;
Bosse’s Case,
*367
We next consider the numerous mitigating factors present in this case.
See Eshleman’s Case,
However, the respondent urges us to also consider as mitigation the fact that: (1) he had personal and financial problems that contributed to his decision to engage in a criminal course of conduct, see STANDARDS, supra § 9.32(c); (2) he was relatively inexperienced in the practice of law, see id. § 9.32(f); (3) he has suffered the imposition of other penalties; namely, his criminal conviction and one-year suspension from the practice of law in Massachusetts, see id. § 9.32(k); and (4) the incident was unrelated to his practice of law. The ADO disagrees, arguing that these factors should not be considered as mitigation. We address each asserted factor in turn.
First, we hold that the respondent’s personal and financial problems are a mitigating factor. Standards,
supra
§ 9.32(c) (“Mitigating factors include ... personal or emotional problems ....”);
see also Coddington’s Case,
Second, the respondent’s inexperience in the practice of law is not a mitigating factor in this case. STANDARDS,
supra
§ 9.32(f). Inexperience is only a ground for leniency when the attorney’s offending conduct resulted therefrom.
Compare Eshleman’s Case,
Third, the criminal penalties suffered by the respondent in response to his conviction for insurance fraud are “other penalties” that warrant mitigation.
See
STANDARDS,
supra
§ 9.32(k) (“Mitigating factors include ... imposition of other penalties or sanctions____”). While the attorney discipline system does not exist “to inflict punishment,”
Bosse’s Case,
This logic does not apply with equal force, however, to the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law in Massachusetts. If anything, when an attorney has been disciplined in another state, we typically consider that other state’s sanction in the interests of parity, see SUP. Ct. R. 37(12), and not for mitigation. Accordingly, the respondent’s criminal sentence, and not his suspension from the practice of law in Massachusetts, is a mitigating factor in this case.
Finally, we do not find the fact that the respondent was acting as a private citizen at the time of the incident to be a mitigating factor. “Even though [the respondent] engaged in this conduct in his capacity as a [private citizen], his conduct adversely reflects upon his fitness to practice.”
Bosse’s Case,
In support of its argument for disbarment, the ADO offers as an aggravating factor the fact that the respondent had a selfish and dishonest motive. See Standards, supra § 9.22(b). Although the respondent was conceivably acting under duress from the personal and financial problems he was suffering, we agree that this aggravating factor is applicable. At root, the respondent’s intent was to defraud Progressive so that he would not have to pay out of pocket for Labrie’s losses. His motive was therefore about personal pecuniary gain, which is decidedly selfish in nature.
Ill
Based upon our consideration of the foregoing mitigating and aggravating factors, we agree with the PCC that, despite a baseline sanction of disbarment, suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case. We do not agree, however, that the six-month suspension recommended by the PCC is sufficient to further “the goals of the attorney discipline system [of] protecting] the public, maintaining] public confidence in the bar, preserving] the integrity of the legal profession and preventing similar conduct in the future.”
Wolterbeek’s Case,
This sanction accords with those in prior attorney discipline cases.
See Feld’s Case,
Moreover, as noted by the PCC, the incident underlying this case is “an isolated one in [the respondent]^ personal and professional history.” This case is therefore analogous to
Bosse’s Case,
in which the disciplined attorney had forged a third party’s signature to a real estate listing document and misinformed the listing agent that “the purchase and sale agreement was ‘in effect.’”
Bosse’s Case,
Unlike in
Bosse’s Case,
however, the respondent’s conduct was the result, at least in part, of personal and financial problems.
See Bosse’s Case,
Prior to reinstatement, the respondent must comply with all requirements articulated in Supreme Court Rule 37(14). As agreed by the parties in their stipulation, the respondent is also ordered to reimburse the attorney discipline system for all expenses incurred in the investigation and enforcement of discipline in this case. See also Sup. Ct. R. 37(19).
So ordered.