Trоy Gregory was convicted by a jury of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Gregory appeals these convictions on several grounds, but we address only two:
1) The Superior Court’s failure to suppress evidence collected during the search because, in the absence of any discemable exigent circumstances, the police’s failure to wait longer than 3-5 seconds before forcing entry to the apartment violated the constitutional requirements of knock and notice; and
2) The Superior Court’s failure under D.R.E. 609(a)(2) to determine whether defendant’s prior narcotics-related convictions involved “dishonesty or false statement” or else balance their probative value against their prejudicial effect before permitting the State to use them to impeach Gregory during cross-examination.
These are fundamental errors mandating reversal.
I.
On November 8, 1990, members of the Wilmington Police Department’s Drug and Organized Crime Unit, obtained a search warrant for 702 N. Adams Street, Wilmington, Delaware. This is a three story building with two separate apartments. The warrant authorized a search of Apartment 2 for cocaine and any drug-related paraphernalia used to process, package or consume illegal drugs. That apartment was located on the second and third floors of the building.
In the late afternoon of November 8th, three detectives arrived at the premises to serve the warrant. The officers approached the front door of the building, located at the ground level just outside of Apartment 1, without detection. One detective knocked on the door and called “Police, we have a search warrant.” Only 3-5 seconds later, and hearing no noise from inside the apartment, the detectives broke down the front door with a sledge hammer. Once inside, they located and arrested Gregory in a third floor bedroom. After a search, cocaine and various items of drug paraphernalia were found throughout that bedroom.
II.
A.
Gregory claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence collected during the search. Defendant argues that in the absence of any discemable exigent circumstаnces, the police’s failure to wait longer than 3-5 seconds before forcing entry to the apartment violated the constitutional requirements of knock and notice. We review the trial court’s refusal to grant a motion to suppress, after an evidentiary hearing, under an abuse of discretion standard.
Alston v. State,
Del.Supr.,
B.
Gregory bottoms his knock and notice argument on the principles of
Ker v. California,
The State contends that Gregory waived his right to challenge the entry by failing to object at trial. Although the failure to object to the admission of evidence or to move timely to suppress evidence constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal, Brooks v. State, Del.Supr., 229 *1201 A.2d 833, 836 (1967) (emphasis added); Del.Supr.Ct.R. 8; Del.R.Evid. 103(a)(1), the record conclusively establishes that the objection was properly raised. The issue of the entry arose at the suppression hearing and during cross-examination of Detective Pacheco by defense counsel. The motion to suppress, standing alone, preserved the issue on appeal.
C.
The State argues that exigent circumstances exist whenever the police are serving a warrant for powder-based narcotics, including cocaine. Because any delay could result in loss of evidence, the State contends that the detectives’ token compliance with the knock and notice rule is justified. Had the State developed a factual basis for the claim of exigent circumstances, this might be a very different case. Instead, the State essentially asks us to adopt a per se rule that every search for narcotics is inherently exigent. Adopting that rationale would create the exception that swallowed the rule. It has no constitutional basis whatever.
In
Marvel v. State,
Del.Supr.,
In
Tatman v. State,
Del.Supr.,
The dual purpose of the rule is to protect the privacy of the resident as well as to reduce the possibility of danger to officers and citizens alike. Its requirements can be avoided only when the police have a
good faith belief
that compliance with knock and notice will increase their peril, frustrate the arrest or permit destruction of evidence.
Id.
at 751, (emphasis added);
compare State v. Wisneski,
Del.Super.,
Our subsequent cases recognize that the facts and circumstances test of
Marvel
has been modified by
Tatman
to require police to possess a good fаith belief that an exception exists before forcing entry to a residence in violation of the rule. In
Wilson v. State,
Del.Supr.,
Finally, in
Potts v. State,
Del.Supr.,
The record in this case is totally devoid of evidence that the police either articulated any exigent circumstances or expressed concern about the destruction of evidence before or after the search. Thus, the facts here are identical to those in Harper. The police simply rushed the premises and, virtually contemporaneous with their arrival, battered down the door with a sledge hammer. Unlike Potts, Dunfee or Wilson, the police were not confronted by occupants fleеing upon their approach. Just like Tatman and Wisneski, no judicially recognized exception to the knock and notice rule was present. Under the circumstances a wait of only 3-5 seconds was per se unreasonable. Any other result would vitiate the knock and notice rule which has as its fundamental purposes the basic safeguards — sanctity of one’s home, and the prоtection of both the residents and police from unnecessary harm. Such a constitutional violation cannot be dismissed as harmless error.
III.
Another serious problem occurred at trial. Gregory testified in his own defense. On direct examination he admitted to using drugs, but denied the drugs found in the bedroom belonged to him. Gregory also admitted having been convicted of “more than оne” felony in 1981 and 1986, but did not further describe them. On cross-examination the prosecutor embarked on a series of improper questions, compounded by the fact that they were based on the factually incorrect premise that Gregory had admitted to only a “couple of felonies”. Without objection the prosecutor asked Gregory if he had actuаlly been convicted of six separate felonies, then detailed them one by one: two counts of Forgery, Delivery of Marijuana and two counts of Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana. 1 The jury later found Gregory guilty as charged.
*1203 A.
That cross-examination was plain error. Under D.R.E. 609(a)(2) evidence of defendant’s felony convictions may be admitted without balancing their prejudicial effect against their рrobative value only if the prior convictions involved dishonesty or false statement. The trial court, clearly, was required to determine whether prior convictions for delivery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver are crimes within the meaning of Rule 609 involving dishonesty or false statement. Without such a determination, or the alternative balancing, past convictions for narcotics offenses created a substantial risk that the jury would draw the character inference, forbidden by D.R.E. 404(b), that the defendant acted in conformity with a character predisposed to selling drugs. That failure was clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.
Wainwright v. State,
Del.Supr.,
B.
Under Delaware law, all relеvant evidence is admissible except as otherwise restricted by statute, the rules of evidence, or other rules of court. D.R.E. 402. Relevant evidence means any evidence having any tendency to make more or less probable a fact of consequence. D.R.E. 401. Proof of a defendant’s prior convictions is relevant when the defendant testifies beсause they bear upon questions of credibility. But because there is a risk that evidence of prior crimes can be misunderstood by the jury, D.R.E. 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith.
Of course, in the past we have recognized exceptions to this rule of exclusion according to the test set forth in
Getz v. State,
Del.Supr.,
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only t/the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 2 years under the. law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
D.R.E. 609(a) (Emphasis added). Thus, the rule provides two means by which evidence of criminal convictions may be used for purposes of impeachment. First, prior convictions for any crime punishable in excess of two years imprisonment shall be admitted if the court determines the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudi *1204 cial effect. 3 D.R.E. 609(a)(1). Alternatively, evidence of a prior conviction for any crime may be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement. D.R.E. 609(a)(2). Because nothing in the record shows that the trial court either explicitly or implicitly bаlanced the probative value of Gregory’s prior convictions against their prejudicial effect, this effectively foreclosed admission of any crimes save those involving dishonesty or false statement.
C.
What then constitutes a crime involving dishonesty and false statement as contemplated by D.R.E. 609? The notes to FED.R.EVID. 609(a)(2), which is virtually identical to the Delaware rule, defines such crimes as those involving “perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of
crimen falsi,
the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.” Fed.R.Evid. 609, Notes of Conference Committee, H.R.CONF.REP. No. 93-1597 (1974),
reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A. 7051, 7098. By comparison, we have сonstrued the phrase “dishonesty or false statement” in D.R.E. 609 to mean that crimes involving dishonest conduct as well as crimes involving false statements are admissible for impeachment purposes,
Tinnen v. State,
Del.Supr.,
In a purely philosophical sense it can be said, understandably, that all violations of the law, by their very nature, involve some element of dishonesty. Thus, one could argue that jay walking, spitting on a sidewalk, running a red light or a stop sign, and exceeding the speed limit, however slightly, are “dishonest” because they involve acts for which one can be punished by the State or its subdivisions; Those transgressions, however, are not the type which Rule 609(a)(2) contemplates. There must be something more than the act itself of violating the law. Thus, drug-related offenses generally do not fall within the rubric of D.R.E. 609(a)(2). For example, the elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver are (1) possession of a controlled substance and (2) an intent to manufacture or delivеr it.
Kelson v. State,
Del.Super.,
D.
Based on
Green v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Exp., Inc.,
Thus, federal authorities support our conclusions in Tinnen, that drug-related offenses can be used to impeach a defendant in a criminal case only when the balancing required under D.R.E. 609(a)(1) occurs.
Accordingly, we REVERSE Gregory’s convictions and REMAND for further proceеdings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The specific questions asked Gregory on direct examination were:
Q. Have you ever been convicted of a felony? A. Yes.
Q. More than one?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have those convictions occurred here in Superior Court?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you remember when they occurred?
A. '81 and '86.
Apparently, this prompted the following cross-examination, based not only on a faulty premise, but far transcending the proper scope of such an inquiry:
Q. Now you indicated to Mr. Kennedy, I believe, at the beginning of your testimony, that you were convicted of a cоuple of felonies: is that right?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Well, it’s, in fact, six separate felonies that you have been convicted of; is that true?
A. No, I don’t believe so.
Q. Six—
A. I don’t believe it was six straight felonies.
Q. You don’t believe there’s six separate felonies?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Let’s go through them. Do you recall having been convicted, back in 1982, of Burglary?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. that’s number one. Do you recall having been convicted, in 1986, of Forgery in the 2nd Degree?
A. Yes, ma’am
Q. And you were convicted of two forgeries in the second degree; correct?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. That’s two and three. Do you recall, in 1987, being convicted of Delivery of Marijuana?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. That’s number four. Do you recall, in 1987, being convicted of Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. You do not recall that?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. And you don’t recall, I guess, being convicted twice of Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana, which would make it six?
A. No.
Q. You don’t?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Okay. I’m going to show you a document, that’s the Court docket sheet.
*1203 A. Yes.
Q. See if this refreshes your recollеction, where on December 2nd, 1986, you entered a guilty plea in front of Judge Gebelein to Possession with Intent to Deliver; do you remember that?
A. You say a guilty plea?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. That’s a conviction, isn’t it?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. So now you recall that conviction?
A. A guilty plea with the plea bargain they nolle prossed some charges, which means they dismissed some of the charges.
Q. But not that one; you pled guilty to that one?
A. Yes.
Q. You pled guilty to two counts of Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana, correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. So that makes six felony chаrges that you been convicted of over that span of years; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. So it’s more than a couple, correct?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. I mean six is more than a couple?
A. Yes, ma’am.
. The State’s reliance on
Waller v. State,
Del.Supr.,
. In construing a statute, use of the word "shall" has a settled meaning signifying a mandatory requirement.
Bartley v. Davis,
Del.Super.,