Lead Opinion
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Presley v. State,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the events in this case, Gregory Presley was on drug offender probation. A special condition of the probation provided, “You will abstain entirely from the use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs, and you will not associate with anyone who is illegally using drugs or consuming alcohol.”
During the early morning hours of January 29, 2015, Gainesville police officer Tar-ik Jallad conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle for a faulty taillight and a stop sign violation. Presley was one of two passengers in the vehicle. Officers John Pandak and Joshua Meurer subsequently responded to the scene based upon a request for backup due to a struggle occurring with the other passenger, who had exited the vehicle and attempted to leave. At the time of their arrival, Officer Jallad and a second officer were dealing with that passenger, who was in handcuffs and behaving belligerently. Presley and the driver were standing outside of the vehicle. Officer Pandak approached Presley and asked for his name and identification, both of which Presley provided. Presley volunteered his date of birth. Officer Pandak asked general questions, and Presley stated that the group had been at his aunt’s house. During the interaction, Presley admitted he had been consuming alcohol.
Presley filed a motion to suppress his statements and all evidence seized on the basis that he was illegally detained during the traffic stop. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that although Presley was detained, the limited nature and duration of the detention did not significantly interfere with his Fourth Amendment liberty interests. The circuit court revoked Presley’s probation and sentenced him to multiple terms of incarceration for his earlier drug crimes.
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “an officer may, as a matter of course, detain a passenger during a lawful traffic stop without violating the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Presley,
The First District recognized that in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
[A] police officer conducting a lawful traffic stop may not, as a matter of course, order a passenger who has left the stopped vehicle to return to and remain in the vehicle until completion of the stop. The officer must have an artic-ulable founded suspicion of criminal activity or a reasonable belief that the passenger poses a threat to the safety of the officer, himself, or others before ordering the passenger to return to and remain in the vehicle.
[A] command preventing an innocent passenger from leaving the scene of a traffic stop to continue on his independent way is a greater intrusion upon personal liberty than an order simply directing a passenger out of the vehicle.' Such an arbitrary interference with the freedom of movement of one who is not suspected of any illegal activity whatsoever cannot be classified as a de minimis intrusion.
Id. at 1111-12.
■The First District noted that the-Aguiar court' concluded the analysis in Wilson v. State was flawed because it failed to give sufficient deference to officer safety. Presley,
[E]ven if detaining a passenger who desires to leave is -more burdensome than directing a stopped passenger to step out of the vehicle, the infringement is minimal in light of the fact that: (1) the passenger’s planned mode of travel has. already been lawfully interrupted; (2) the passenger' has already beén “stopped” due to the driver’s lawful detention; and (3) routine traffic stops are brief in duration. ,,. Because 'the legitimate and weighty concern of officer safety can only be addressed “if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation[,]” we believe that this interest outweighs the minimal intrusion on those few passengers who might prefer to leave the scene.
Presley,
Additionally, the Aguiar court determined that two Supreme Court cases— Brendlin v. California,
This review follows.
ANALYSIS
Standards of Review
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of Florida’s Declaration of Rights both guarantee citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches a-nd.seizures. The search and seizure provision of the Florida Constitution contains a conformity clause providing that the right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; see also State v. Butler,
The holdings in Presley and Wilson v. State reach opposite conclusions on a legal issue—whether law enforcement officers may, during a lawful traffic stop, detain a passenger as a matter of course for the duration of the stop without violating the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because this is a pure question of law, the standard of review is de novo. Twilegar v. State,
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Mimms,
Supreme Court Precedent
Because the Presley and Aguiar courts concluded that the . evolution of- United States Supreme Court precedent with regard to traffic stops and passengers necessitated a reconsideration of Wilson v. State—a conclusion the State contends is also supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S.—,
In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers during a traffic stop could ask the driver to exit .the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment.
We think it too plain for-argument that the State’s proffered justification— the safety of the officer—is both legitimate' and weighty. “Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” Terry v. Ohio, [ ]392 U.S. at 23 ,88 S.Ct. 1868 . And we have specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer-as he approaches a person seated in an automobile. “According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings—A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P.S. 93 (1963).” Adams v. Williams,407 U.S. 143 , 148 n.3,92 S.Ct. 1921 ,32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). We are aware that not all these assaults occur when issuing traffic summons, but we have before expressly-declined to accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to officers than other types of confrontations. United States v. Robinson,414 U.S. 218 , 234,94 S.Ct. 467 ,38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Indeed, it appears “that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.” Id. at 234 n.5,94 S.Ct. 467 .
Id. at 110.
The driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed. The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of the police on the latter choice not a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,” but it hardly rises to the level of a “ ‘petty indignity.’ ” Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. at 17 ,88 S.Ct. 1868 . What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.
Id. at 111.
In Maryland v. Wilson, the Supreme Court applied the holding in Mimms to passengers in vehicles that are lawfully stopped.
Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters. In 1994 alone, there were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71, 33 (1994). In the case of passengers, the danger of the officer’s standing in the path of oncoming traffic would not be present except in the case of a passenger in the left rear seat, but the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources of harm to the officer.
Id. at 413. The Supreme Court concluded the personal liberty interest of the passenger is greater than that of the driver because, while there is probable cause to believe the driver has committed a vehicular offense, “there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers.” Id. However, the Court determined that the additional intrusion in asking a passenger to exit the vehicle was minimal:
[A]s a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car. Outside the car, the passengers will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be concealed in the interior of the passenger compartment. It would seem that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop. And the motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the driver.
Id. at 413-14. The Supreme Court quoted Michigan v. Summers,
[In Summers,] the police had obtained a search warrant for contraband thought to be located in a residence,' but when they arrived to execute the warrant they found Summers coming down the front steps. The question in the case depended “upon a determination whether the officers had the authority to require him to re-enter the house and to remain there while they conducted their search.” Id. at 695,101 S.Ct. 2587 . In holding as it did, the Court said:
Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.
Maryland v. Wilson,
The Supreme Court rejected Wilson’s contention that, because the Court generally eschews bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context, it should not adopt a bright-line rule with regard to passengers during' lawful traffic stops: “[T]hat we typically avoid per se rules concerning searches and seizures does not mean that we have always done so; Mimms itself drew a bright line, and we believe the principles that underlay that decision apply to passengers as well.” Id. at 413 n.1,
In Brendlin, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a traffic stop seizes both driver and passengers for Fourth Amendment purposes, such that a-passenger may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.
• In concluding that passengers are seized during a traffic stop for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court first noted the general proposition that:
[a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, “‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ ” terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, Florida v. Bostick,501 U.S. 429 , 434,111 S.Ct. 2382 ,115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16,88 S.Ct. 1868 ,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), “through means intentionally applied,” Brower v. County of Inyo,489 U.S. 593 , 597,109 S.Ct. 1378 ,103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (emphasis in original). Thus, an “unintended person ... [may be]' the object of the detention,” so long as the detention is “willful”' and not merely the consequence of “an unknowing act.” Id. at 596,109 S.Ct. 1378 .
Id. at 254,
We think that in these circumstances any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission.
A traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger has chosen just as much as it halts the driver ,,. and the police activity that normally amounts to intrusion on “privacy and personal Security” does not normally (and did not here) distinguish between passenger and driver. An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and a sensible person would not expect a police officer to allow .people to come and gq. freely from the physical focal point of an investigation into faulty behavior or wrongdoing. If the likely wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion owing to close association; but even, when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, the passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would, be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.
It is also reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene .of a crime,'arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety. In Maryland v. Wilson, [] we held that during a lawful traffic stop an. officer may order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a safety risk. In fashioning this rule, we invoked our earlier statement that “ ‘[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’ ” Wilson, [ 519 U.S.] at 414,117 S.Ct. 882 (quoting Michigan v. Summers,462 U.S. 692 , 702-703,101 S.Ct. 2587 ,69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)). What we have said in these opinions probably reflects a societal expectation of “‘unquestioned [police] command’ ” at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free.to leave, or to terminate the personal encounter any other way, without advance permission.
Id. at 257-58,
In Johnson—another unanimous Supreme Court decision—members of a gang task force stopped a vehicle when a license plate check revealed the registration had been suspended.
After being charged with possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor, Johnson moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search. Id. at 329,
Terry established the legitimacy of an investigatory stop “in situations where [the police] may lack probable cause for an arrest.” [392 U.S. at 24 ,88 S.Ct. 1868 ]. When the stop is justified by suspicion (reasonably grounded, but short of probable cause) that criminal activity is afoot ... the police officer must be positioned to act instantly on reasonable suspicion that the persons temporarily detained are armed and dangerous. Ibid. Recognizing that a limited search of outer clothing for weapons serves to protect both the officer and the public, the Court held the patdown reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 330,
[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition—a lawful investigatory stop— is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the .case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.
Id. at 327,
The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Arizona Court of Appeals that, although Johnson was lawfully detained incident to the legitimate traffic stop, once the officer began to question him on matters unrelated to the stop, the authority to conduct a frisk ceased in the absence of reasonable suspicion that Johnson was engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal activity. Id. at 332,
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. See Brendlin,551 U.S. at 258 ,127 S.Ct. 2400 . An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.
In sum, as stated in Brendlin, a traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will. Nothing occurred in this case that would have conveyed to Johnson that, prior to the frisk, the traffic stop had ended or that he was otherwise free “to depart without police permission.” Officer Trevizo surely was not constitutionally required to give Johnson an opportunity to depart the scene after he exited the vehicle without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting a dangerous person to get behind her.
Id. at 333-34,
Lastly, in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court articulated a limitation on traffic-stop detentions. There, a K-9 officer observed a vehicle veer onto the shoulder of a road and then jerk back onto the road.
After being indicted in federal court, Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officer who initiated the stop prolonged it without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff. Id. The Supreme Court agreed, explaining:
Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been— completed.
Id. at 1614 (citations omitted).
The seizure remains lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But ... he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.
Id. at 1615 (citations omitted). According to the Supreme Court, the officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop—such as checking the driver license, checking for outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance, all of which serve the same goal as enforcing the traffic code: “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id.
The Supreme Court then distinguished the dog sniff as a measure directed at detecting evidence of criminal wrongdoing—something which is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop, or part of the officer’s traffic mission. Id. The Supreme Court elaborated:
Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself. Traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police officers,” Johnson,555 U.S. at 330 ,129 S.Ct. 781 (internal quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely. On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis. Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular..
Id. at 1616 (citations omitted).
Analysis
The evolution of these cases—primarily the statements in Brendlin,
As previously discussed, both the First and Fifth Districts concluded that, even if asking a passenger to remain at the scene is more burdensome than merely asking the passenger to exit the vehicle, the intrusion upon personal liberty is de minimis because (1) the method of transport has already been lawfully interrupted by virtue of the stop, (2) the passenger has already been stopped by virtue of the driver’s lawful-detention, and (3) routine traffic stops are brief in duration. Presley,
As reflected by Rodriguez, however, the length of detention during a traffic stop is not subject to' the unfettered discretion of. law enforcement. Instead, “[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate tli[at] purpose,” and the “[authority for the seizure ... ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez,
The Present Case .
Despite our previous explanation as to what constitutes a reasonable period of time to detain passengers during a routine traffic stop, the facts of this case present a situation that was anything but routine. Instead, a stop that was initiated for basic traffic violations
Here, the traffic stop commenced when Officer Jallad pulled the vehicle over for a faulty taillight and a stop sign violation. It is not clear from the record how much time elapsed between the stop and the arrival of Officers Pandak and Meurer in response to the request for assistance. However, the circuit court found that from the time Officers Pandak and Meurer arrived, to the time they were notified that Presley was on probation, thereby providing probable cause for Presley’s arrest, “only a matter of minutes had passed.” This conclusion is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Twilegar,
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we approve both the decision below and Aguiar. We hold that, as a matter of course, law enforcement officers may detain a vehicle’s passengers for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment. We disapprove of the Fourth District’s decision in Wilson v. State, and any cases that rely upon Wilson v. State for the proposition that law enforcement officers under the Fourth Amendment are precluded from detaining passengers for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.
Notes
. In reaching this holding, we expressly decline to address whether law enforcement may detain passengers during a traffic stop of a common carrier or a vehicle that, at the time of the stop, is being utilized as part of a transportation-based business.
. Officer Meurer could smell alcohol on Presley, and he heard Presley say he had been "drinking all day.”
. The Supreme Court also noted "[t]he hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver's side of the vehicle may also be appreciable in some situations.” Id. at 111,
. The State of California conceded the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop on this basis. Id. at 253 n.2,
. The Supreme Court rejected the State of California's contention that, under this holding, "all taxi cab and bus passengers would be 'seized' under the Fourth Amendment when the cab or bus driver is pulled over by the police for running a red light.”
[T]he relationship between driver and passenger is not the same in a common carrier as it is in a private vehicle, and the expectations of police officers and passengers differ accordingly. In those cases, as here, the crucial question would be whether a reasonable. person in the passenger's position would feel free to take steps to terminate the encounter.
Id.
. The Supreme Court has further explained:
Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion, we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.
United States v. Sharpe,
. Presley does not challenge the bases asserted by Officer Jallad for the initiation of the traffic stop.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
' This Court is bound by the precedent of the United States Supreme Court when interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. Consistent with that precedent, the majority is correct that “as a matter of course, law enforcement officers may detain a vehicle’s passengers for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment.” Majority op. at 107. In this case, the defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of the duration of the traffic stop, and I agree with the majority that “under the specific facts of this case,” the stop was reasonable when “it was prolonged not by law enforcement, but by the fact that one of the passengers” was belligerent and had to be secured. Majority op. at 107.
I also fully appreciate that officer safety is a reason the United States Supreme Court has concluded “that the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to order passengers out of a vehicle.” Majority op. at 101. However, when the traffic stop does not give rise to a need to question passengers or ask for their identification, I fail to comprehend why the interrogation of passengers on matters unrelated to the traffic stop, “so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop,” does not intrude on the constitutional guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Arizona v. Johnson,
In this case, similar to the conflict case, Aguiar v. State,
[T]he totality of circumstances ... late at night, one person already left the— left the car, which was suspicious in and of itself, high-crime, high-drug area, numerous other people walking around, officer safety ... for me to feel comfortable with this person leaving a potential crime scene and getting away with something, and/or destroying evidence, or coming back to harm me and my fellow officers. So yes, he was not free to leave.'
Because under the Fourth Amendment it does not matter whether the traffic stop was pretextual, see Whren v. United States,
As Justice Sotomayor has eloquently explained, it is a real concern that these expanded rules regarding lawful seizures will adversely impact minorities:
This Court has given officers an array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we condone officers’ use of these devices without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our communities as second-class citizens.
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As the Justice Department notes, ... many innocent people are subjected to the humiliations of these unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated in this manner. See M. Gott-schalk, Caught 119-138 (2015). But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The New Jim Crow 95-136 (2010). For generations, black and brown parents have given their children “the talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); J. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates, Between the World and Me (2015).
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We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. See L. Guilder & G. Torres, The Miner’s Canary 274-283 (2002). They are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.
Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —,
In this case, the majority announces a bright-line rule for cases involving a routine traffic stop but then explains how the facts of this case were anything but routine. See majority op. at 107. Regardless, I agree that “under the specific facts of this case,” id. at 108, the length of the traffic stop was reasonable, and subsequent United States Supreme Court precedent requires that we disapprove of Wilson v. State,