Grеgory L. DONALD, Appellant, v. Balfour J. RAST, Anthony D. Hogan, Allen S. Beach; and Board of Police Commissioners for the City of Kansas City, Missouri, Appellees.
No. 89-2481.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 8, 1990. Decided March 1, 1991.
379
Sanchez’ final claim is that the district court erred when it denied her motion for production of the affidavits signed by Rangel and filed with the INS. Even assuming the district court erred, we affirm Sanchez’ convictions because the error was harmless. As this court stated in United States v. Roberts, 848 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1988), “In the absence of either bad faith on the part of the government or prejudice to the defendant, a failure to disclose Jencks Act material ordinarily will not result in reversal.” Id. at 908. There is no evidence that the government acted in bad faith. The additionаl affidavits referred to by the government witness did not enhance his credibility, nor did they in any way bear on the question of Sanchez’ guilt. These affidavits would not have helped impeach the witness, since he had аlready admitted to signing them. Furthermore, the affidavits at issue in Sanchez’ trial were admitted as evidence. Therefore, since there was no bad faith and no prejudice, reversal would be impropеr.
For the reasons given, we affirm the appellant‘s convictions.
Russell D. Jacobson, Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.
Before BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Gregory L. Donald appeals from the district court‘s1 denial of his motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of police officers Bаlfour J. Rast, Anthony D. Hogan, and Allen S. Beach in Donald‘s suit brought under
I.
Officer Rast, driving a police van, collided with Donald‘s vehicle on Interstate 70 near Kansas City. Officer Hogan investigated the accident and took Donald to the station for a breathalyzer test. Officer Beach administered the test, using a breathalyzer that can be manipulated by the operator. Hogan issued Donald one citation for driving а motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating beverage (DUI) and a second citation for careless driving.
Donald testified at trial that he had consumed one and one-half cans of beer on the morning of the accident but had played basketball all afternoon with nothing further to drink. Donald contended that Beach pushed the needle on the breathalyz
II.
Donald makes a number of arguments attacking the propriety of the district court‘s evidentiary rulings at trial. We give substantial deference to the district court‘s rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not find error in the absence of a clear shоwing of abuse of discretion. Harris v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 886 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1989).
Donald claims that the district court unduly limited the scope of discovery when it refused to require the officers to produce their entire personnel files for Donald‘s review. Donald agreed to the district court‘s in camera review of the personnel files. At a pretrial conference, the district court read to Donald four potentially relevant documеnts from the personnel files. We agree with the district court that given the confidential nature of the information contained in a police officer‘s personnel file, this course of discovery wаs prudent and, moreover, was agreed to by Donald. Limiting the scope of discovery to in camera review of the personnel files was well within the district court‘s discretion, and we will not disturb its decision to read potentially relevant documents to Donald rather than to allow inspection of the documents themselves.
Donald asserts that the district court erred in denying admission of an administrative law judge‘s findings and order rescinding the suspension of Donald‘s drivers license. Public records are not admissible under
Donald‘s DUI charge was dismissed when the city counselor failed to appear at Donald‘s trial. Donald argues that the district court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the dismissal in the present case. We agree with the district court‘s conclusion that the dismissal of charges for want of prosecution had no relevance to Donald‘s suit against Beach and Hogan.
Donald contends that thе district court erred in suppressing evidence that Hogan had been reprimanded in the past for not being wholly truthful to his sergeant in his account of an earlier vehicular accident. Donald argues that the previous reprimands are admissable under Rule 405(b) as evidence of a trait of character that is at issue. We agree with the district court that Hogan‘s character was not at issue and that the admission of previous reprimands would only go to prove conformity with a certain character trait on the date of the collision. Rule 404(b) proscribes use of “other act” evidence for this purpose.
Donald argues that the district court erred in suppressing evidence that Beach had been reprimanded on several occasions. Donald argues that this would prove that Beаch had knowledge that Rast could be disciplined for damaging Donald‘s vehicle, giving Beach a motive to falsify the breathalyzer test results in order to protect his fellow officer. The district court ruled thаt the evidence of past disciplinary action against Beach was not admissible under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusiоn of the issues. Recognizing the wide discretion placed in, and the deference that must be given to, a trial judge in making a ruling under Rule 403, Hicks v. Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1987), we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered еvidence.
Finding no clear error in the district court‘s evidentiary rulings, we therefore affirm the judgment.
ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Appellant Gregory L. Donald contends that on February 7, 1987, Officer Rаst, who was driving a police van, negligently collided with appellant‘s vehicle. Appellant contends that Officer Hogan, who investigated the accident, falsely arrested appellant and charged him with driving while under the influence of alcohol. Furthermore, appellant contends that Officer Beach deliberately falsified the results of a breathalyzer test to show an erroneous bloоd alcohol content of .13 to support the false DUI charge. Appellant‘s theory of case is that the police officers took these actions in order to protect Officer Rast from possible departmental disciplinary action based on the fact that the February 7, 1987 accident was the second time that Officer Rast was involved in an automobile accident with a pоlice vehicle in three months. The first incident occurred in November 1986 and, as a result of that incident, Officer Rast received a letter of reprimand from the chief of police.
Appellant wаs denied his request to introduce several key pieces of evidence tending to prove his theory of the case. Among them, appellant sought to introduce the findings of the ALJ in appellant‘s liсense suspension proceeding wherein the ALJ stated that the breathalyzer test results were unreliable because “the needle mark did not appear realistic.” The ALJ also questioned the conclusion that appellant‘s blood alcohol content was .13 because such level was inconsistent with appellant‘s activities prior to the collision.
The appellant also sought to introduce state court records showing that the DUI charges against him had been dismissed for want of prosecution when the city prosecutor failed to appear for trial. Appellant wаs also denied the opportunity to introduce evidence that Officer Hogan had been suspended from the force on at least two occasions, including an incident in which he was reprimanded for not being wholly truthful in his account of a vehicular accident in which he was involved.
Given the highly questionable nature of the events herein, I believe that appellant was deprived of the opрortunity to present his theory of the case and was, therefore, denied the opportunity of a fair trial. I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that this evidence was properly excluded and, accordingly, I dissent.