Grеgory Kelley, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 03-3255
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
June 17, 2004
Submitted: March 11, 2004
MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
1Gregory Kelley appeals the district court‘s2 order affirming the Commissioner‘s determination that he was not disabled. We affirm.
I.
Kelley applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act“),
The ALJ determined that Kelley‘s physical and mental impairments, individually and collectively, were not severe. In reaching this determination, the ALJ discounted Kelley‘s complaints as well as Kelley‘s personal descriрtions of his limitations. The Appeals Council declined further review, and the ALJ‘s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. The district court affirmed. On appeal, Kelley argues that thе ALJ failed to consider certain evidence favorable to a finding of a severe impairment, namely, the opinion of a consulting, non-treating psychiatrist, Dr. Scott Morrison. Kelley argues spеcifically that, in light of Dr. Morrison‘s opinion, there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ‘s determination. We address below the evidence in support of the ALJ‘s findings as well as Dr. Morrison‘s opinion.
Kelley‘s past relevant work experience was as a machine operator at a factory. Kelley lost his job as a machine operator in 1999 when his employer‘s business closed. He then worked briefly as a production laborer until he was laid off. Kelley did not leave employment due to his medical condition.
Kelley testified he was on medication for itching, insomnia, and deprеssion, the medications helped “a little bit,” and they caused no adverse side effects. He claimed to have lesions on his neck, back, hands, and feet and claimed this skin condition affectеd his ability to work. He described his ability to work as limited because he could only sit for one to two hours at a time, stand for one hour at a
Kelley‘s history of medical treatment containеd many instances of missed or canceled appointments and repeated failures to take prescribed medicines. He sought treatment for a rash in August of 2000, received treatment, and in October 2000, showed improvement. He sought treatment for a right ganglion cyst in 2002 and declined the suggested treatment, stating that the cyst really did not bother him too much at the time. In addition, he failed to fill certain skin trеatment prescriptions.
He sought psychiatric treatment in January 2001, was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder secondary to his general medical condition, and received a course of treatment that continued through May 2002. His psychiatrist noted numerous canceled appointments, a general improvement in Kelley‘s condition when he took his medications, and a general decline in Kelley‘s condition when he failed to take his medications. The ALJ concluded, “[T]reatment has been minimal considering claimant‘s allegations of a disabling medical condition.”
A consulting physician examined Kelley in April 2002 and found Kelley‘s ability to perform work-related functions such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, handling objects, hearing, speaking, and traveling unlimited. Consulting psychiatrist, Dr. Scott Morrison, M.D., also examined Kelley in April 2002. Although Kelley argues that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Morrison‘s opinion, the record belies Kelley‘s claim. The ALJ stated in his findings:
[Dr.] Morrison . . . indicated that it was impossible for him to perform а very thorough examination of claimant because of his profound sleepiness, much of the time, claimant seemed not to be paying attention. Overall, Dr. Morrison noted that it was impossible for him to make a definitive diagnosis in claimant‘s case.
Kelley focuses on a different portion of Dr. Morrison‘s opinion. In particular, Kelley points to a Medical Source Statement that Dr. Morrison completed in which he checked answers to standard questions to indicate: (1) Kelley had moderate restrictions on his ability to understand, remember, and carry out short, simple instructions; (2) Kelley had marked restrictions on his ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; and (3) Kelley had marked restrictions on his ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, co-wоrkers, and work pressures in a usual work setting.
II.
We review de novo the district court‘s decision to uphold the denial of social security benefits. Pettit v. Apfel, 218 F.3d 901, 902 (8th Cir. 2000). Our review of the Commissioner‘s decision, however, is deferеntial, and we do not substitute our own view of the evidence for that of the Commissioner. See id. Rather, we affirm the Commissioner‘s decision if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 2003); Grebenick v. Chater, 121 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Chater, 109 F.3d 1255, 1258 (8th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would find as adequate to support a decision, considering evidence that detracts from
In evaluating claims for disability, we conduct a five step sequential evaluation: (1) is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) does the claimant have sevеre impairment(s); (3) does the impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P,
The absencе of supporting medical evidence is relevant to the consideration of a claimant‘s subjective medical complaints. See Wilson v. Chater, 76 F.3d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1996);
Here, more than substantial evidence supports the Commissioner‘s decision. The infrequency of Kelley‘s attempts to treat his condition and his failure to follow his prescribed treatments were actions inconsistent with the severity of his complaints. Kelley left work for reasons unrelated to his medical conditions. Kelley‘s own description of his work limitations were out of proportion with those described by the consulting physician and out of proportion with any evidence provided by the records of treating physicians. In light of these inconsistencies, it was permissible for the Commissioner to discount Kelley‘s subjective complaints. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). Having discounted these complaints, the medical records, the conclusions of the consulting physicians, and Kelley‘s work history provided substantial evidence to suрport a finding of no severe impairment(s).
Although the responses that Dr. Morrison provided on the Medical Source Statement
We affirm the judgment of the district court.