Gregory F. ZOELLER, Attorney General of the State of Indiana and Rick J. Ruble, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Labor, Appellants (Defendants) v. James M. SWEENEY, David A. Fagan, Charles Severs, James C. Oliver, Bryan Scofield, Earl Click Jr., and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150-AFL-CIO, Appellees (Plaintiffs)
No. 45S00-1309-PL-596
Supreme Court of Indiana
Nov. 6, 2014
19 N.E.3d 749
Dale D. Pierson, Elizabeth A. LaRose, Melinda S. Hensel, IUOE Local 150 Legal Dept., Marc R. Poulos, Kara M. Principe, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Foundation for Fair Contracting, Countryside, IL, Jeffrey S. Wrage, Blachly, Tabor, Bozik, & Hartman, Valparaiso, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
Charles B. Baldwin, Todd M. Nierman, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Amici Curiae, The Indiana Legal Foundation.
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, IN, Kenneth B. Elwood, Rhame & Elwood, Portage, IN, Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt.
Keith E. White, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Adam L. Bartrom,
Neil E. Gath, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Brief of Amicus Curiae Indiana State Building and Construction Trades Council.
Jeffrey A. Macey, Richard J. Swanson, Macey Swanson and Allman, Indianapolis, IN, Brief of Amicus Curiae United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union.
DICKSON, Justice.
This is a direct appeal from a trial court judgment declaring that two provisions of the Indiana Right to Work Law,
The State has appealed, and because the judgment declares a state statute unconstitutional in whole or in part, this appeal falls within the mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction of the Indiana Supreme Court.
The relief granted by the trial court was limited to the Union‘s claim that the challenged provisions violated Section 21. As to all other claims of constitutional invalidity, the trial court did not grant relief but rather dismissed such claims. We thus restrict our analysis to the trial court‘s judgment as to Section 21.
Before we proceed, however, we address the Union‘s argument that principles of waiver and estoppel preclude some of the State‘s arguments. The Union purports that the State has waived these arguments “because it failed to make them in the trial court.” Appellees’ Br. at 28 (citing Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 533 (Ind. 2006)). The State responds that the trial court‘s entry of declaratory judgment on the merits, rather than merely denying the State‘s motion to dismiss, “deprived the State of the opportunity to develop its second- and third-tier arguments in defense.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 19. In Cavens, the defense counsel had an opportunity to raise an argument but sought “only a clarification” and failed to “object to the trial court‘s response” to preserve the issue for appeal. 849 N.E.2d at 532-33. This case is not Cavens. Here, the trial court entered final judgment sua sponte on the State‘s motion to dismiss without providing the State—which did not move for summary judgment—the opportunity to respond. See
The trial court correctly described the issue presented as one of law, not fact. We review such questions of law de novo without deference to a trial court‘s determination. See Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269, 1272 (Ind.2014) (“Whether a statute or ordinance is constitutional on its face is a question of law and we review the matter de novo.“). Our methodology for reviewing alleged violations of the Indiana Constitution is well-established. Any statute challenged under the Indiana Constitution “stands before this Court ‘clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.‘” Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236, 237-38 (Ind.2003) (quoting Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996)). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against that party and in favor of the legislature. Id. at 238. The Union requests that this Court “[d]eclare that the Indiana Right to Work [L]aw, Indiana Code § 22-6-6 is invalid in its entirety; and of no force or effect as a violation of the Indiana Constitution.” Appellants’ App‘x at 16. In other words, the Union seeks a general declaration that the Indiana Right to Work Law is unconstitutional on its face and thus faces a heavier burden of proof. “When a party claims that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the claimant assumes the burden of demonstrating that there are no set of circumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally applied.” Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999) (emphasis added).
Section 21 of the Indiana Bill of Rights,
Under current federal labor law, an exclusive-agency union must represent the interests of all employees in the unit regardless of whether they are union members; non-union members receive the same wages and other benefits negotiated by the union for its members. See
The first challenged provision of the Indiana Right to Work Law prohibits employers from requiring union membership or the payment of monies as a condition of employment:
A person may not require an individual to:
- become or remain a member of a labor organization;
- pay dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; or
- pay to a charity or third party an amount that is equivalent to or a pro rata part of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges required of members of a labor organization;
as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
On appeal, the State and the Union dispute whether the challenged provisions of the Indiana Right to Work Law constitute a demand by the State for particular services under Section 21. The State argues that, literally, state law has not demanded the Union to do anything. The Union responds that its services are indirectly demanded by the State because the State is “charged with the knowledge of the existence of the federal law which requires unions to represent every individual employee fairly,” Appellees’ Br. at 23, and has enforced the federal law in state courts. The Union cites Sonnenburg for the proposition that “a request becomes a ‘demand’ when it is backed up with the use or threatened use of physical force or legal process which creates in the citizen a reasonable belief that he is not free to refuse the request.” 573 N.E.2d at 417. Sonnenburg, however, did not address the question whether enforcement, by itself, could be a “demand” under Section 21 but rather addressed “how coercive the State‘s request for services must be to become a ‘demand.‘” Id. (emphasis added). On the face of the Indiana Right to Work Law, there is no state demand for services; the law merely prohibits employers from requiring union membership or the payment of monies as a condition of employment.
The Union responds that the “plain language of
The Indiana Constitution does not grant government an absolute, limitless state power and then withdraw discrete portions of it by specific excision. The individual guarantees in our Bill of Rights merely help to highlight some of the particular contours of the state power as it has generally been delegated. The particular guarantees of liberty in the Indiana Bill of Rights are but concrete manifestations of the abstract limiting principle that state power may only be exercised to advance the peace, safety, and well-being of Hoosiers. They merely describe with greater particularity some of the personal freedoms the restriction of which would not, in the framers’ view, tend to advance those permissible state goals.
Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 n. 6 (Ind.1996) (emphasis added). Provisions within Article 1 limit state, not federal, power. Our case law is consistent with this interpretation. See, e.g., Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1226 (Ind.2013); Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1368-69. “Because it is federal law that provides a duty of fair representation, Indiana‘s right-to-work statute does not ‘take’ property from the Union....” Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666 (emphasis in original). In sum, Article 21 requires just compensation when the state demands particular services, not when the federal government does so.
The State further argues that, in any event, there is no demand for services at all because the Union can choose not to be an exclusive-agency union and become a members-only union. The Union responds that “[c]hoosing to represent members-only bargaining units is not an option under the [National Labor Relations Act]” because the “[National Labor Relations Board] will not process a representation petition by a union seeking a members-only bargain unit” and “a union that proposes to represent a minority of the bargaining unit has no remedy if the employer refuses to bargain with it.” Appellees’ Br. at 32, 34. We disagree. The Union‘s federal obligation to represent all employees in a bargaining unit is optional; it occurs only when the union elects to be the exclusive bargaining agent, for which it is justly compensated by the right to bargain exclusively with the employer. See
Conclusion
We conclude that
RUSH, C.J., and DAVID and MASSA, JJ., concur.
RUCKER, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
RUCKER, Justice concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to emphasize the significance of the Union seeking “a general declaration that the Indiana Right to Work Law is unconstitutional on its face....” Op. at 751. As the majority points out, “[w]hen a party claims that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the claimant assumes the burden of demonstrating that there are no set of circumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally applied.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999)).
This case was decided on the strength of the Union‘s complaint alone. No testimony or documents were introduced into evidence. More precisely the Union filed its complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the “Right to Work Law” violated various provisions of the Indiana Constitution. Without responding to the merits of the complaint by way of answer, the State moved to dismiss the complaint under the provision of
The Right to Work statute provides that the terms of union contracts in effect on March 14, 2012 remain valid. See
What is not at stake in this case is an “as applied” constitutional challenge to the statute. Unlike the heavy burden placed on a party seeking to challenge a statute on its face, an “as-applied” constitutional challenge asks “only that the reviewing court declare the challenged statute or regulation unconstitutional on the facts of the particular case.” Donnelly v. City of Jeffersonville, 907 N.E.2d 553, 558 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (emphasis added), trans. denied (quoting Sanjour v. E.P.A., 56 F.3d 85, 92 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.1995)). And here the Union
The National Labor Relations Act and subsequent federal legislation permit employees to unionize and provide a mechanism for a particular union to serve as the exclusive representative of all employees on the vote of a majority of employees in a bargaining unit. This is termed “exclusive representation.” See
In essence there may very well exist a set of facts and circumstances that if properly presented and proven could demonstrate that a union has actually been deprived of compensation for particular services by application of the Right to Work Law. And thus as to that union the statute would be unconstitutional as applied. However, this is not that case.