Gregory E. Lewis v. E.A. McDormanGregory E. Lewis v. E.A. McDorman
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of thе Fourth Circuit.
Gregory E. LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
E.A. McDORMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 93-1736.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 13, 1994.
Decided July 19, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. B. Waugh Crigler, Magistrate Judge. (CA-91-22-H)
Argued: Sa'ad El-Amin, El-Amin & Crawford, P.C., Richmond, VA, for Appellant.
Argued: James Walter Hopper, Richmond, VA. On brief: Beverly D. Crawford, El-Amin & Crawford, P.C., Richmond, VA, for Appellant.
W.D Va.
AFFIRMED.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, and HARVEY, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
OPINION
HARVEY, Senior District Judge:
Appellant Gregory Lewis filed suit under
The parties having consented pursuant to
* In January of 1990, Sylvester Strother, an admitted crack cocaine addict, was approached by Detective MсDorman and asked to serve as an undercover informant. Strother agreed to cooperate and was directed by McDorman to attempt to make a controlled purchase of cocaine from Gregory Lewis,1 whom Strother knew. McDorman gave Strother $100 in pre-marked bills and fitted him with a hidden microphone and transmitter.
Strother met with Lewis at the latter's home on January 9, 1990. McDorman and Detective Tom Hoover, another Harrisonburg pоlice officer assigned to the case, were unable to observe Strother and Lewis the entire time that they were together. However, the detectives were able to listen to what transpired by way of the transmitter hidden on Strother. In the course of monitoring the conversation between Strother and Lewis, both McDorman and Hoover believed that they overheard incriminating statements indicating to the detectives that Strother and Lewis had engagеd in an illegal drug transaction.
Strother later met McDorman at a pre-arranged location and told McDorman that he had been successful in his attempt to purchase cocaine from Lewis with the $100 which McDorman had given him.2 Strother then produced a plastic bag containing a white, powdery substance, which Strother represented to be the cocaine he had just purchased from Lewis.
McDorman then referred the matter to the Officе of the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Harrisonburg and Rockingham County, Virginia, for prosecution. Thereafter, McDorman sent the plastic bag given to him by Strother to the state forensic science laboratory in Roanokе, Virginia. The white, powdery substance in the bag was analyzed by a state chemist, who set forth her findings in a Certificate of Analysis dated February 15, 1990. The Certificate indicated that the substance submitted for analysis did not contain cocaine nor any other controlled substances. Copies of the Certificate were sent both to McDorman and to the Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney.
On March 19, 1990, nearly a month after he had received a copy of thе Certificate, McDorman appeared and testified before a Rockingham County grand jury which was investigating the narcotics charge against Lewis. That same day, the grand jury returned a sealed indictment against Lewis for "knowingly, intentionally and feloniously distribut[ing] a Schedule II controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine," in violation of Va.Code Ann. # 8E8E # 18.2-248.A, 54.1-3448.1. In April of 1990, Lewis was arrested and charged under the indictment. Following his arraignment, Lewis spent three days in jail before he was released on a $2500 bond.
Lewis was never tried on the indictment. In December of 1990, the prosecutor, because of growing doubts concerning the credibility of Strother and because the substance turned over to McDorman had turnеd out not to be cocaine, amended the indictment to charge Lewis with attempted distribution of a Schedule II controlled substance. A month later, all charges against Lewis were dismissed pursuant to an Order of nolle prosequi entered by the Circuit Court of Rockingham County.
II
Lewis first argues that the magistrate judge below erred in denying his motions for judgment as a matter of law, which were timely made during and after the trial pursuant to Rule 50, F.R.Civ.P. Relying on the negative findings contained in the Certificate and on evidence produced at the trial concerning the unreliability of Strother as an informant, Lewis argues that McDorman could not reasonably have believed at the time of his grand jury testimony that Lewis had engaged in an illegal drug transaction with Strother on January 9, 1990. According to Lewis, the evidence produced at the trial convincingly established that appellee McDorman withheld exculpatory evidence from the grand jury аnd that he did so with the intention that Lewis be arrested and prosecuted for a crime which he did not commit.
In reviewing the denial by the magistrate judge of Lewis' motions for judgment as a matter of law, this Court must affirm if, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to appellee McDorman, there are any reasonable grounds to support the jury's verdict. Goodwin v. Metts,
After reviewing the evidence presented at the trial below in a light most favorable to McDorman, we conclude that substantial evidence was prеsented to support the verdict returned by the jury in favor of McDorman on all counts. Lack of probable cause was an essential element of each of the causes of action alleged by Lewis. See Goоdwin v. Metts,
Heavy reliance is placed by appellant Lewis on the negative findings in the Certificate. However, the fact that testing of the substance revealed that it was not cocaine was brought to the attention of the grand jury by McDorman. Moreover, conversations which McDorman overheard betwеen Lewis and Strother could "excite the belief in a reasonable mind" that an illegal drug transaction had taken place. See Clarke v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Although counsel for Lewis vigorously cross-examined McDorman at the trial and disputed his characterization of his grand jury testimony and in particular his explanation to the grand jury that the negative findings in the Certifiсate could be explained as indicated hereinabove, the jury was entitled to credit other portions of McDorman's testimony indicating that he had probable cause to believe that Lewis had committed the crime charged. It was for the jury to determine the credibility of McDorman and the other witnesses who testified at the trial. On the record here, the jury could have reasonably concluded that McDorman acted in good faith in testifying befоre the grand jury and that he possessed probable cause to believe that Lewis had committed the offense with which he was charged.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's vеrdict and that the magistrate judge did not err in denying Lewis' motions for judgment as a matter of law.
III
In view of our conclusion that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict and that judgment was properly entered in favor of аppellee, we need not address the other argument advanced by Lewis in this appeal, namely that the magistrate judge erred in denying prior to trial Lewis' motion for summary judgment. The denial of a pretrial motion for summary judgment hаs generally been held not to be a proper point for consideration on appeal from a final judgment rendered after a full trial on the merits of the case. See, e.g., Boyles Galvanizing & Plating Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
To grant rеview of an earlier order denying the losing party's motion for summary judgment following a full trial on the merits would be unjust to the party who prevailed at the trial. Such an approach would permit a decision based on less evidenсe to prevail over a decision based on more evidence and would impermissibly interfere with the factfinder's proper role in our legal system. See R.F. Chase, Annotation, Reviewability of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment,
IV
Beсause we find that there was substantial evidence of record to support the jury's verdict, we conclude that the magistrate judge did not err in denying Lewis' motions for judgment as a matter of law. We further conclude that appellаnt Lewis is not entitled in this appeal to challenge, following trial, the earlier denial by the magistrate judge of his motion for summary judgment. The judgment below is accordingly affirmed in all respects.
AFFIRMED
Notes
Lewis had previously served time in state prison, having been convicted of several felonies including a narcotics offense. He was on probation in January of 1990
Strother later testified at the trial that he had lied to McDorman
Were the issue properly beforе us on this appeal, the magistrate judge's denial of Lewis' motion for summary judgment would be affirmed. There were clearly disputed issues of material fact in the record then before the magistrate judge, precluding the entry of summary judgment at that earlier stage of the case