Gregory Brandon v. Caregan Transport, Inc.Gregory Brandon v. Caregan Transport, Inc.
Case Summary
[1] Gregory Brandon worked as a truck driver for Caregan Transport Inc. (Caregan) from January 2020 until he voluntarily terminated his employment in May of that same year. In July 2021, Brandon sued Caregan to recover unpaid wages under
[2] We first hold that the trial court erred in concluding it no longer had jurisdiction. Second, we find the court should have stricken the materials submitted by Caregan in opposition to summary judgment because they were not timely filed by the response deadline. Furthermore, we conclude that Brandon is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law for $5,535.06 in actual unpaid wages. However, the court did not err insofar as it denied summary judgment on Brandon‘s request for liquidated damages, as he did not meet his burden on summary judgment to negate Caregan‘s claim that it acted in good faith. We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
[3] Caregan operates a trucking company based out of Richmond. In January 2020, it hired Brandon as a driver and agreed to pay him forty cents per mile driven. Caregan also agreed to pay $175.00 per night if Brandon had any out-of-state layovers. Brandon was paid weekly, though his pay varied from pay period to рay period depending on how many miles he drove each week. And if Brandon elected to take the week off from driving for Caregan, he would not receive a paycheck for that pay period. Brandon voluntarily terminated his employment with Caregan on May 11, 2020. After that, Caregan failed to pay him for miles driven during the weeks of April 19, April 26, May 3, and May 10.
[4] On July 14, 2021, Brandon sued Caregan under the Wage Payment Statute. He alleged Caregan failed to pay his last four paychecks, did not compensate him for layovers he had during his employment, and had “illegally deducted monies from [his] wages . . . .” Id. at 27. In its answer, Caregan admitted that Brandon was a former employee, and it had agreed to pay him pursuant to the terms outlined above. It also admitted it “failed to pay [Brandon] multiple paychecks during and following his separation of employment[,]” blaming Brandon for “fail[ing] to tender Bills of Lading to [Caregan] subsequent to delivering cargo . . . .” Id. at 27, 30. However, Caregan denied that it had not compensated Brandon for layovers, made unauthorized deductions from his wages, or failed to pay him his correct wages before he terminated his employment.
[6] Second, Brandon contended that Caregan had failed to pay $5,535.06 in wages earned. To calculate this number, he relied on assertions in his affidavit that Caregan owed him compensation for eleven nights spent on out-of-state layovers, totaling $1,925.00 in unpaid layover pay.1 To calculate his unpaid mileage, Brandon cited his attorney‘s affidavit, attached to which was a document Brandon‘s attorney claimed to have personally created “to calculate the miles driven by” Brandon. Id. at 147. Based on that document, Brandon asserted Caregan owed him $2,279.72 in unpaid mileage. That, together with the unpaid layover pay, $1,055.34 in certain bonuses and other credits Brandon
[7] Third, Brandon claimed that under the Wage Payment Statute, he was entitled to recover his unpaid wages, costs, attorney‘s fees, and liquidated damages equal to twice his actual unpaid wages.3 In total, Brandon asserted that, as a matter of law, he was entitled to judgment against Caregan “in the amount of $5,535.06 in actual wages, $11,070.12 in liquidated damages, pre-judgment interest of $1,846.42 plus $1.21 per day from June 13, 2024 to the date Judgment is entered, [and] $13,058.66 in statutory attorney fees and costs[.]” Id. at 50.
[8] On June 26, 2024, the trial court issued a summary judgment briefing schedule which gave Caregan until July 13 to respond. Before that deadline expired, Caregan requested an extension of time, which the trial court granted in an order extending the response deadline to July 19. On July 19, Caregan attempted to electronically file materials in opposition to summary judgment, but they were rejected by the Indiana Electronic Filing System (IEFS) because
- On July 19, 2024, at 11:08 a.m., [Caregan] electronically filed [several documents opposing summary judgment.]
. . . .
- For reasons imperceptible to [Caregan‘s] counsel, [IEFS] issued a “submission failure” reflecting that [one of Caregan‘s exhibits] received an “[u]nrecoverable system error[.]”
- As a result of the above system error, [IEFS] indicated that the issue “will prevent the system from submitting your envelope.”
- Counsel left his office shortly after the above-referenced materials were electronically filed to begin a vacation.
- On Sunday, July 21, 2024, while Counsel was on vacation, he learned of the filing error, and reached out to his assistant to inquire.
- Counsel‘s assistant did not see the email from [IEFS] prior to leaving the office for the weekend on July 19, 2024.
- [Counsel‘s] assistant called [the county clerk‘s office] on Monday, July 22, 2024 to seek information about the filing error, and learned that due to a technical issue, [an exhibit] was rejected; and as a result, the entirety of [Caregan‘s summary judgment] filings were not received into the system.
[9] In that response, Caregan moved to strike the mileage calculation prepared by Brandon‘s attorney, arguing the exhibit would be inadmissible at trial and thus “should not be considered by the Court when determining whether summary judgment is appropriate . . . .” Id. at 62. Moreover, Caregan claimed that without the mileage calculation, “the Court ha[d] no evidence to support any claim relative to Brandon‘s allegations of miles driven for which he wasn‘t paid.” Id. Caregan also argued that while it did owe Brandon unpaid wages, there was a factual dispute regarding the exact amount owed because “its records do not comport with the records that Brandon‘s counsel created.” Id. at 60. According to Caregan, it owed Brandon just $1,863.43 in unpaid mileage, $416.29 less than the $2,279.72 Brandon said he was owed. Additionally, it asserted that Brandon was not entitled to liquidated damages because Caregan had acted in good faith. Specifically, “Brandon had an obligation to [report] miles driven, which produced his pay[,]” and “it was difficult to calculate Brandon‘s pay due to his routine failures in this regard.” Id. at 59. Caregan also claimed to have attempted to forward a check to Brandon through the Illinois Department of Labor to settle the wage claim, but that check had been returned “[f]or reasons unknown to Caregan[.]”4 Id. at 60. To support these
[10] On the afternoon of the 22nd, Brandon moved to strike Caregan‘s summary judgment response, relying on the “well[-]established” rule that a party cannot respond to a motion for summary judgment after the deadline to do so has passed. Id. at 67. In opposition to that motion, Caregan conceded that its summary judgment response was “not timely . . . filed due to a technical error associated with” IEFS but argued that this failure aside, its response was “submitted prior to the deadline . . . .” Id. at 72. On September 3, the trial court denied Brandon‘s motion to strike, reasoning as follows:
It is well settled that the Court may not consider summary judgment filings after the due date established by the court. See Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 2005). Indeed, this is a bright line rule that must be followed. Here, however, [Caregan] did attempt to file its Response to [Brandon‘s] Motion for Summary Judgment, Mеmorandum in Support, and Designation of Evidence with Exhibits prior to the deadline
established by the Court. They were submitted to the Indiana Court‘s Odyssey Case Management System prior to the deadline established by the Court . . . .
This court simply cannot find that [Caregan] failed to timely file its responsive materials prior to the deadline established by the Court. Counsel for [Caregan] prepared all of its responsive materials and submitted them to the State‘s filing system prior to the deadline. Indeed, they went through the electronic system, although resulting in a “system error.” The “error” from this Court‘s viewpoint was a “technical” error not associated with [Caregan] or [Caregan‘s] counsel but, rather, with the Indiana Court‘s Odyssey Case Management system. The submission and the “System Failure” response both occurred prior to the Court‘s established filing deadline.
It seems to this Court that to rule in [Brandon‘s] favor on this mattеr would be to put form over substance and is not at all in the true spirit or meaning of
Trial Rule 56 or Borsuk . . . .
Id. at 24-25.
[11] Brandon asked the court to reconsider its decision, arguing that denial of his motion to strike did not comply with
[Caregan‘s] summary judgment response was not filed due to an IEFS failure, but the failure of counsel for [Caregan] to follow the instructions to correct an incompatible PDF file and re-submit. Moreover, [Caregan‘s] Summary Judgment was not filed timely because of counsel for [Caregan‘s] failure to follow
Trial Rule 87(J) and conventionally file the pleading if correcting the PDF
would not have worked. Finally, this Court cannot sua sponte grant[] [Caregan] relief pursuant to
Trial Rule 87(J) because [Caregan] failed to request it and the summary judgment deadline is a deadline that by law cannot be extended.
Id. at 79. Caregan opposed the motion to reconsider and asked the court to retroactively grant relief under
[12] On December 9, 2024, the court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment and took the matter under advisement. On January 3, 2025, the court issued an order requesting that the parties “submit additional briefing as to [Brandon‘s] position that several deductions made from [his] pay . . . , such as fees, fines, and advances [were] contrary to Indiana law and [were] impermissible[.]” Id. at 90. Brandon filed his supplemental brief on January 24, in which he argued the deductions did not comply with statutory wage assignment requirements. In Caregan‘s supplemental brief, filed February 13, it acknowledged its non-compliance with those requirements but asserted the deductions werе made “at Brandon‘s express direction.” Id. at 105. Moreover, Caregan argued for the first time that Brandon‘s wage payment claim must fail in its entirety because he had not earned a “wage“:
Caregan does not view the monies paid to Brandon as “wages“. As previously affirmed by the company president, drivers are
paid forty cents ($.40) per mile. Drivers are not required to report to work at any specific time, or at all. It is entirely up to drivers whether they attempt to earn a living through the delivery of freight. If a driver desires to work, he secures a freight load and then must deliver the same to the receiving location. Next, the driver must turn in a bill of lading so that Caregan may appropriately calculate his mileage driven.
Brandon did not earn an hourly rate. He did not clock in at a specified time each morning and then clock out at a different specified time. Payments to Brandon for employment services rendered were not regular and consistent like a normal “nine to five” employee. Further, even if this matter is dealing with “wages“, the “ten-day” requirement . . . was frustrated by Brandon due to him not complying with the bill of lading requirements.6 In any event, . . . monies [were] not earned unless Brandon “completed delivered sales“. Thus, payments were not necessarily paid on a regular basis. . . . Brandon‘s payments could vary greatly, and even include periods of time where no payments are made. As such, this Court . . . should conclude that these factors support the determination that, as a matter of law, the payments made to Brandon do not constitute “wages” under the Wage Payment Statute.
Id. at 106-07.
[13] On February 16, Brandon moved to strike Caregan‘s supplemental brief. According to Brandon, Caregan‘s assertion that he expressly authorized the deductions from his paychecks found no support in the designated evidence.
[14] After that hearing, on June 2, 2025, the trial court issued two orders on the pending motions. As to Brandon‘s motion to strike, the court found that Caregan had not designated any evidence “that Brandon expressly requested advances[,]” and ruled that any references to factual assertions not supported by the designated evidence should be stricken. Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 21. The court also agreed with Brandon that Caregan had raised issues outside the scope of the order for supplemental briefing but ruled it would not strike “case law, proper application of case law, or legal application . . . .” Id. The court further declined to strike “any inferences that can be made from properly designated evidence” or “Cаregan‘s argument as to the inapplicability of Indiana‘s Wage Payment [S]tatute as to mileage, etc.” Id.
a driver may make three (3) runs this week and none (0) the following three (3) weeks. Payment is contingent upon completing a task and not based solely on time. Moreover, . . . payment is also dependent upon submitting proof of completion of that task by way of submitting Bills of Lading.
Id. Because Caregan had not paid Brandon a “wage,” the court ruled that “his Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied and, further, under Indiana case law the Court does not have jurisdiction to proceed further, and the matter must go to the Department of Labor” (DOL). Id. at 18-19. The court applied the same logic to Brandon‘s arguments about unauthorized deductions, attorney‘s fees, and liquidated damages because “[s]uch request[s] hinge[] upon whether or not [he] was properly paid for ‘wages’ under Indiana‘s Wage
[16] Brandon filed a motion to correct errors on July 2, which the court summarily denied on August 19. Brandon now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[17] Brandon raises several issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as:
- Whether the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his wage payment claim;
- Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike Caregan‘s summary judgment response; and
- Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment.
We address these issues in turn.
1. The Trial Court‘s Jurisdiction
[18] As a threshold issue, Brandon challenges the trial court‘s determination that “it ha[d] no jurisdiction to proceed further and Brandon should proceed before
[19] “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and decide the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs.” Parkview Hosp., Inc. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 977 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Indiana courts obtain that power through the state constitution or a statute, id. at 372, and issues of subject matter jurisdiction are “resolved by determining whether a claim falls within the [court‘s] general scope of statutory authority[,]” Terry v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 17 N.E.3d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 710 (Ind. 2018).
[20] Here, the trial court was authorized by statute to hear wage payment claims. The Wage Payment Statute permits “current employees and those who have voluntarily left employment[,]” Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 401 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh‘g denied, trans. denied, to bring a claim for unpaid wages “in any court having jurisdiction of a suit to recover the amount
[21] The court‘s reasoning that it “ha[d] no jurisdiction to proceed further” in light of its conclusion that “Brandon‘s earnings do not qualify as ‘wages’ under the Wage Payment Statute” is evocative of the defunct concept of jurisdiction over the case. Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 19. Indiana‘s appellate courts used to describe “[j]urisdiction of the particular case” as “the power of the court to hear a specific case within the class of cases over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Cox v. Town of Rome City, 764 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). But the Court abolished the concept in K.S., explaining,
[W]hile we might casually say, “Judge Flywheel assumed jurisdiction,” or “the court had jurisdiction to impose a ten-year sentence,” such statements do not have anything to do with the law of jurisdiction, either personal or subject matter. Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency
adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without any service of process.
849 N.E.2d at 541-42; see also Wike v. Grandview Solar Project, LLC, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 1834349, at *8 (Ind. June 24, 2026) (“[O]ur Court has stopped talking about jurisdiction over the case.“) . Accordingly, whether Brandon can succeed on the merits of his wage payment claim is not relevant to the trial court‘s statutory authority to adjudicate it. The court erred in concluding otherwise, and we therefore reverse its determination that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter.
2. Motion to Strike Caregan‘s Summary Judgment Response
[22] Next, Brandon contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the materials filed by Caregan in opposition to summary judgment. Generally, “a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions to strike in the summary judgment context.” Arnett v. Est. of Beavins, 184 N.E.3d 679, 683-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). However, Brandon contends (and we agree) that the trial court had no such discretion here because “late responses to summary judgment motions cannot be сonsidered.” Appellant‘s Brief at 17. In support of that contention, Brandon relies on the well-established rule that
[w]hen a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under
Trial Rule 56(I) , or filing an affidavit underTrial Rule 56(F) , the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period.
[23] This bright-line rule was first clearly expressed in Desai v. Croy, where, against a backdrop of inconsistent precedent, this Court held that “a trial court may exercise discretion and alter time limits under 56(I) only if the nonmoving party has responded or sought an extension within thirty days from the date the moving party filed for summary judgment.” 805 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, cited favorably by Borsuk, 820 N.E.2d at 123 n.5. As another panel of this Court later clarified,
not only must a nonmovant file a response or request for a continuance during the initial thirty-day period, but the nonmovant “must also file a response, file an affidavit pursuant to T.R. 56(F), or show cause for alteration of time pursuant to T.R. 56(I) during any additional period granted by thе trial court.”
Miller v. Yedlowski, 916 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Thayer v. Gohil, 740 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans. denied. Said differently, “where a nonmovant timely seeks and obtains an extension of time to respond, the bright-line rule continues to apply to the new filing deadline.” Andry v. Thorbecke, 218 N.E.3d 600, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.
[24] Here, it is undisputed that Caregan failed to timely file its summary judgment materials by the July 19, 2024 deadline. Rather, Caregan contends its unsuccessful electronic filing attempt was precipitated by “an IEFS failure” and
(J) Inability to E-File.
(1) Indiana E-Filing System Failures.
(a) The rights of the parties shall not be affected by an IEFS failure.
. . . .
(c) With the exception of deadlines that by law cannot be extended, when E-Filing is prevented by an IEFS failure, the time allowed for the filing of any document otherwise due at the time of the IEFS failure is extended by one day for each day on which such failure occurs, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(d) Upon motion and showing of an IEFS failure the court must enter an order permitting the document to be considered timely filed and modify responsive deadlines accordingly.
[25] We first note that “[i]nterpretation of our trial rules is a question of law that we review de novo.” Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019). “When construing a trial rule, we employ . . . standard tools of statutory
[26] When Caregan tried to submit a document with certain formatting that IEFS could not process, IEFS operated as intended. It rejected the envelope and sent a “Submission Failure” email to Caregan‘s attorney one minute after he submitted it with instructions to “try re-saving or re-creating the document[] as a PDF or printing and scanning the document[] as a PDF, and re-file the envelope with the recreated document[].” Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 158. The E-Filing User Guide instructs e-filers to “monitor [their] [p]ending filings” and “[p]ay special attention to messages with [certain] subject lines after [they‘ve] submitted a filing . . . ,” including the subject line: “Submission Failed for Envelope Number[.]”9 Caregan‘s attorney didn‘t follow those instructions, and he can‘t
[27] We are sympathetic to the trial court‘s concern that striking Caregan‘s summary judgment materials would be harsh under the circumstances. But the bright-line rule is just that, and it leaves us with no option but to hold that the trial court should have stricken Caregan‘s untimely response. That said, “a trial court is not required to grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment.” Murphy v. Curtis, 930 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
3. Brandon‘s Motion for Summary Judgment
[28] We review a decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the trial court. Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025). Pursuant to
[29] Brandon‘s summary judgment motion raised three categories of unpaid compensation that require separate analyses: (1) his mileage compensation, (2) his layover pay, and (3) unauthorized deductions, performance bonuses, and other credits he says were never paid. Within each of those categories, Brandon also requested liquidated damages, which we address separately.
3.1. Mileage Compensation
[30] Despite Caregan‘s admission that it failed to pay Brandon $1,863.43 in mileage pay, the trial court concludеd that Brandon‘s complaint must fail because his “mileage pay does not qualify as ‘wages’ in order to implicate the Wage Payment Statute.” Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 17. We do not agree, as our precedents make clear that “wages” under the Wage Payment Statute are “the wages paid on a regular periodic basis for regular work done by the employee . . . .” Gress v. Fabcon, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Wank v. St. Francis Coll., 740 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied). Several considerations lead us to conclude that Brandon‘s forty-cent-per-mile compensation satisfies that standard.10
[31] The Wage Payment Statute “governs both the amount and the frequency with which an employer must pay its employees.” Bragg, 52 N.E.3d at 919. It provides that an employer must “pay each employee at least semimonthly or biweekly, if requested, the amount due the employee.”
[32] Though the Wage Payment Statute does not define “wages[,]” our Supreme Court has applied the definition from the “closely associated” Wage Claims
[t]he name given to the method of compensation is not controlling. Gurnik v. Lee, 587 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Rather, we will consider the substance of the compensation to determine whether it is a wage, and therefore subject to the Wage Payment Statute. Id. . . . [I]f compensation is not linked to the amount of work done by the employee or if the compensation is based on the financial success of the employer, it is not a “wage.” Pyle v. Nat‘l Wine & Spirits Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
[33] In determining that Brandon‘s mileage pay was not a “wage” under the Wage Payment Statute, the trial court relied extensively on Bragg, where a panel of this Court reasoned that an employee‘s commission pay “did not qualify as wages . . . .” 52 N.E.3d at 912. As Bragg exemplifies, our appellate courts have developed several factors to determine whether commissions, bonuses, or similar forms of compensation fall undеr the Wage Payment Statute‘s ambit, including whether they are (1) linked to a contingency outside the employee‘s
[34] Under the Bragg factors, Brandon‘s mileage pay—which was directly tied to the amount of work he performed for Caregan—constituted a wage. But we question the need to apply the Bragg factors at all. The trial court here was not asked to analyze a bonus or commission structure that didn‘t obviously satisfy the statutory definition of “wages.” Instead, Brandon‘s mileage compensation fits neatly into the plain and unambiguous text of
[35] Moreover, we reiterate that Caregan did not dispute that it owes Brandon unpaid mileage compensation, and the parties’ positions on the amount owed are not that far off. Brandon asserts that he is owed $2,279.72 in unpaid mileage, while Caregan says it owed Brandon just $1,863.43.12 Even if a $416.29 difference between the parties’ positions could create a genuine issue of material fact in the first place, the fact that Caregan‘s designated materials must be stricken leaves Brandon‘s uncontested evidence that he is owed $2,279.72 in unpaid mileage. We therefore reverse the trial court‘s denial of Brandon‘s motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Caregan‘s liability for unpaid mileage in that amount.
[36] Brandon further argues that he is entitled to $1,925.00 in unpaid layover pay. We first note that though Caregan asserted on appeal that Brandon‘s mileage pay was not a wage, it provided no such argument related to Brandon‘s layover pay. As “[w]e will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on [a party‘s] behalf,” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023), we assume for the purposes of this discussion that unpaid layover compensation is actionable under the Wage Payment Statute. Moreover, Brandon‘s affidavit satisfied his initial burden to show an absence of an issue of fact about whether he is owed unpaid layover compensation. While Caregan‘s president affirmed in his affidavit that “Brandon has been paid for all times that he ha[d] been subject to a layover[,]”13 that affidavit was among the late-filed materials that should have been stricken. Thus, we reverse the trial court‘s denial of Brandon‘s motion for summary judgment on the portion of his claim seeking to recover layover pay.
3.3. Deductions, Performance Bonuses, and Other Credits
[37] Next, Brandon argues that as a matter of law, he “is entitled to $275.00 in illegally deducted wages.” Appellant‘s Br. at 31. According to Brandon, these deductions were not authorized by statute because they were made “[w]ithout a
[38] Caregan did not address the deductions, bonuses, or credits in its arguments on appeal, and Brandon has shown at least prima facie error in the trial court‘s decision to deny summary judgment on the that portion of his claim. See Evansville Auto., LLC v. Labno-Fritchley, 207 N.E.3d 447, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“An appellee‘s failure to respond to an issue raised by an appellant is akin to failure to file a brief, and subjects the appellee to reversal upon the appellant‘s showing of prima facie error on that issue.” (quoting Hacker v. Holland, 575 N.E.2d 675, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), denying reh‘g, trans. denied), trans. denied. Indeed, Caregan acknowledged below that it deducted sums from
3.4 Liquidated Damages
[39] Finally, Brandon asserts he is entitled to liquidated damages on all three categories of unpaid wages because “Caregan has not demonstrated a good faith reason” why those wages were not paid. Appellant‘s Br. at 26, 33. But this assertion turns the
[40] Brandon did not meet that initial burden, as he designated no evidence beyond Caregan‘s mere failure to comply with the Wage Payment Statute to support his argument that Caregan didn‘t act in good faith. In fact, he designated evidence that Caregan did have a good faith reason for not paying his mileage pay. Caregan explained in its interrogatory answers that after Brandon voluntarily terminated his employment, Caregan “discovered that [Brandon‘s] failure to timely turn in bills of lading resulted in [Brandon] being owed the sum of $1,853.43, which Caregan . . . , through its attorney, has already agreed to pay.” Appellant‘s App. Vol. 2 at 134. We cannot say, based on the record before us, that Brandon satisfied his initial burden on summary judgment to show that Caregan failed to act in good faith. We thus affirm the trial court‘s denial of Brandon‘s motion for summary judgment on his claim for liquidated damages.15
[41] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court‘s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over Brandon‘s claim under the Wage Payment Statute. Furthermore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Brandon‘s motion for summary judgment, as (1) there is no genuine issue of mаterial fact that Caregan is liable to Brandon for $5,535.06 in actual unpaid wages, but (2) there are issues of fact about whether Brandon is entitled to liquidated damages. We remand with instructions for the trial court to enter partial summary judgment in Brandon‘s favor as set forth above, deny Brandon‘s motion for summary judgment in all other respects, and conduct further proceedings consistent with this decision.
[42] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Ronald E. Weldy
Weldy Law
Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Andrew J. Sickmann
Boston Bever Forrest Cross & Sickmann
Richmond, Indiana
Notes
[t]he court shall order as costs in the case a reasonable fee for the plaintiff‘s attorney and court costs. In addition, if the court in any such suit determines that the person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or association that failed to pay the employee . . . was not acting in good faith, the court shall order, as liquidated damages for the failure to pay wages, that the employee be paid an amount equal to two (2) times the amount of wages due the employee.