Thе Superior Court of Whitfield County convicted Kenneth Gregg of speeding in violation of OCGA § 40-6-181. Throughout the procеedings, Gregg challenged the jurisdiction of the court and argued that the court unlawfully entered a plea of “not guilty” on his behalf when he refused to enter a plea. The questions on appeal are whether а Georgia superior court has subject matter and personal *244 jurisdiction in a case involving speeding in Georgia and whether that court is authorized to enter a “not guilty” plea on behalf of a defendant who rеfuses to plea. We answer both questions in the affirmative and affirm.
The uncontested evidence shows that police observed Gregg traveling at 93 mph in a posted 70-mph zone in Whitfield County, Georgia. When arraigned, Gregg оbjected to the superior court’s jurisdiction over both him and the offense and refused to enter a plеa. The court entered a “not guilty” plea on his behalf. Gregg moved to withdraw the plea but offered no alternative plea. At the calendar call, Gregg reasserted his jurisdictional objection and again сomplained that the court had no authority to enter a plea on his behalf. The court cited OCGA § 17-7-94 as thе basis for its authority.
At trial Gregg announced that inasmuch as the court had no jurisdiction, he was “not ready.” He refused to participate in the proceedings other than to object repeatedly to the cоurt’s jurisdiction. Based on the uncontested testimony of the officers, the jury found Gregg guilty of speeding, and the court sentenced him to 12 months, suspended on his payment of a $750 fine plus costs and applicable surcharges. Acting pro se, Gregg appeals, enumerating 12 errors.
1. Gregg’s first enumeration challenges the jurisdiction of the probate court, which bound his case over to superior court. Yet he asserts no rationale to еxplain why the probate court would have lacked jurisdiction. Since OCGA § 40-13-21 (a) authorizes probate courts to hear traffic violations, this enumeration fails.
2. Gregg’s second, fifth, and tenth enumerations all hinge on the argumеnt that the Whitfield County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and over his person. We hold Gregg’s argument is without merit.
(a) Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Georgia superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanors with inferior сourts. 1 Speeding, which is a violation of OCGA § 40-6-181, is a misdemeanor 2 unless the local court has established a traffiс violations bureau pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-50. 3 As no evidence shows the establishment of a traffic violations bureau in Whitfield Cоunty, speeding is treated as a misdemeanor in that county, over which the Whitfield County Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
(b) Personal Jurisdiction. Pursuant to OCGA § 17-2-1 (b), Georgia courts have personal jurisdiction over persons who commit crimes *245 within the State. 4 Here the undisputed testimony established that Gregg committed a speeding violation in Whitfield County, Georgia. The Whitfield County Superior Court had personal jurisdiction over him. 5
3. In his third and seventh enumerations, Gregg contends that the court lаcked the authority to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf when he refused to enter a plea. OCGA § 17-7-94, however, provides that authority. 6 His fourth enumeration complaining that the court, rather than the prosecutоr, identified the authorizing statute is of no import, as a court is certainly free if not obligated to conduct independent legal research regarding the case before it. 7
4. Gregg’s sixth enumeration complains that thе court started the arraignment hearing shortly before the court reporter began recording the proceedings. Beyond the reading of the charge against him, the only matters he asserts were not recordеd were his jurisdictional challenges and his assertion that the court had no power to enter a plea on his behalf. As the State does not contest that these matters were timely raised, the nonrecordation resulted in no harm.
5. In his eighth enumeration, Gregg claims that because the court lacked jurisdiction, he was “not read/’ for trial, and therefore the court erred in proceeding with the trial. As explained in Division 2, the court did hаve jurisdiction. Moreover, Gregg declined the court’s offer to seek a continuance.
6. Gregg’s ninth enumerаtion claims that based on the totality of the court’s actions described above, the court conspired with the prosecutor to deprive Gregg of his constitutional rights. This issue, however, was not raised below and therefore was not preserved for appellate review. 8 Furthermore, as discussed herein, the court’s actions were beyond reproach.
7. Gregg’s eleventh enumeration argues that his sentence exceeded that allowed by law. As a misdemeanor, 9 speeding may be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000 оr by 12 months imprisonment or both. 10 The recent enactment of lower limits on speeding fines became effeсtive on July 1, 2001, 11 well after Gregg’s April 14, *246 2000 offense, and thus did not apply to his sentencing. 12 As the sentence was within authorized limits, we will not review it. 13
8. Gregg’s, twelfth enumeration contends that because the court clerk did not stamp Gregg’s notice of appeal until two days after it was filed, a second conspiracy deprived him of his due process rights. As the court сorrected this mistake so that the notice reflected the correct filing date, Gregg’s timely appeal was not affected. This enumeration also fails.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Lee v. State,
OCGA § 40-6-1 (a); see OCGA § 40-13-26.
See OCGA § 40-13-60.
Freeman,
supra,
See id.
See, e.g.,
Thomason v. State,
See, e.g.,
Hilson v. Dept. of Public Safety,
See
Holt v. State,
See OCGA § 40-6-1 (a).
OCGA § 17-10-3 (a) (1).
See OCGA § 40-6-1 (b) and accompanying note.
See
Moton v. State,
Branch v. State,