129 So. 42 | Ala. | 1930
Appellant had judgment against appellee for the purchase price — which was the fair market value, according to appellant's testimony — of a carload of lumber used in the erection of a schoolhouse. A contractor had undertaken to build the schoolhouse and had applied to appellant for the lumber. Appellant's case was that he had refused to extend credit to the contractor, and had furnished the lumber to the contractor on the sole credit, and in pursuance of the express agreement, of the county board to pay for it. The jury returned a verdict for appellant, and there was judgment accordingly; but, on appellee's motion, that judgment was set aside. From the last-mentioned ruling this appeal is taken. The language of the ruling was: "Motion granted on considerations other than weight of evidence." The evidence in respect of the question to whom credit for the lumber was extended, whether to the contractor or to the county board, was in conflict. We think, in agreement with the trial judge, the judgment could not properly have been set aside on the ground that the verdict was not sustained, to use the language of the statute, section 9518 of the Code, by the great preponderance of the evidence. It remains, then, to inquire whether that action of the court should be reversed on any other ground. It is conceded that, if it can be affirmed on any ground assigned in the motion that the verdict, and the judgment in pursuance thereof, were infected with error, the ruling on the motion must be approved. *484
We reaffirm what was said by this court on the former appeal. Greeson Mfg. Co. v. County Board of Education,
In the present case the carload of lumber was delivered to the contractor for use in the school building, but, according to the testimony of appellant, it was delivered on the credit of the board. True, McInish had a contract for the complete building; but, on the other hand, and according to appellant's testimony (accepted, evidently, by the jury, and very reasonable in itself), McInish could not perform the contract — at least, did not — unless the board would lend its help by purchasing the carload of lumber the price of which is here in suit.
Our conclusion is that no rule of public policy stood in the way of appellant's recovery, nor can we affirm that the jury made a mistake in its consideration of the effect of the evidence.
The order setting aside the verdict is reversed, and the judgment in favor of appellant is reinstated.
Reversed and rendered.
ANDERSON, C. J., and THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., concur.