Aрpellant, as beneficiary, brought suit to recover proceeds under an accidental death benefit clause of a life *62 and accident insurance policy issued by appellee-IDS Life Insurаnce Co. The trial court found that the insured’s death was not within the coverage afforded by the acсidental death provisions in the policy and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer as to this issuе. We reverse the judgment.
1. Certain facts are not disputed. The insured was an entertainer residing in Augusta, Ga., who was temporarily in Raleigh, N. C., performing for a local supper club. The insured died as a result of carbоn monoxide inhalation (apparently from a defective heater) while sleeping in a friend’s guest house.
The accidental death benefits provision of the insurance policy in force at the time of the insured’s death contained a clause excluding such benefits if the insured’s death resulted from or was contributed to by ". . . poison, drugs or gas, whether taken, administered or inhaled voluntarily or accidentally or оtherwise, except in the course of the Insured’s occupation.”
The main issue presented in this appeal involves determining whether the insured met his death while "in the course of the Insured’s occupation.” If he did not, then the beneficiary would not be entitled to accidental death benefits. See
Vaughan v. Gulf Life Ins. Co.,
A. Counsel dеvote much of their argument to factually similar workers’ compensation cases discussing whether an injury аrose in the course of employment. Although other jurisdictions have relied on workers’ compensаtion cases in construing insurance policies containing language similar to the one involved here (see, e.g., Hendrix v. Nat. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 356 S2d 1199 (Ala.)), we decline to do so. Although workers’ compensation cаses may be persuasive, principles of contract law, and not those of workers’ compеnsation law, apply. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dilbeck,
B. In construing an insurance policy, "[t]he test is not what the insurer intended its words to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand them to mean. The рolicy should be read as a layman would read it and not as it might be analyzed by an insurance expert оr an attorney.”
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Collins,
C. We decline to construe this policy strictly so as to afford accidental death benefit coverage only when the death occurred in the course of employment. See
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. South,
supra, p. 657, as to the distinction between "work” and "occupation.” This policy affords coverage when death occurs "in the course of the Insured’s occupation.” As to the definition of "occupation,” see Key Life Ins. Co. v. Back,
2. "Where an insurance company seeks to invoke an exclusion contained in its policy, it has the burden of showing that the exclusion exists and thе facts of the case come within it. [Cit.]”
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
In order to show that the faсts of the case came within the exclusion, on summary judgment it was incumbent on IDS to prove that at the time оf the insured’s death, he was not in the course of his occupation.
Here, the insured was an entertainer performing away from home. We are not prepared to hold, as a matter of law, that securing lodging was not incidental to his occupation and not in the course thereof. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the insurance company.
3. The trial court properly granted summаry judgment in favor of the insurer as to plaintiffs claim of bad faith.
Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Burke,
4. In a cross appeal, IDS urges that the trial сourt erred in denying its motion for summary judgment as to a claim of another party in this litigation.
Appellant cоncedes that the interlocutory review procedure has not been followed and recognizеs that the cross appeal is procedurally improper, but urges us to consider the issue. We are without jurisdictional authority to do so. Compare
Stallings v. Chance,
Judgment reversed in part, affirmed in part, in Case No. 56680.