This is an action of contract, in which the plaintiff declared specially upon the following promissory note:
“Secured by mortgage deed of premises in Bethel, Vermont, dated July 17, 1915.”
“$3,000.00 For value received, we each as principal, jointly and severally promise to pay J. A. Greenwood or order three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) on demand with interest annually at five per cent. Bethel, Vermont, July 1, 1915.
Primus P. Lamson Warren J. Beal
John W. Lamson Eugene C. Blaisdell.”
The defendants answered that there was no consideration for their signatures and that they signed otherwise than as makers. There was a judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants excepted.
The case was heard below before a superior judge, in vacation, and no exception was taken to his findings. Our review, therefore, by statutory command, is controlled by the facts found. G. L. 2259;
Conn Boston Co.
v.
Griswold,
On July 17, 1915, Warren J. Beal and Eugene C. Blaisdell made, executed, and delivered to the plaintiff the note in suit. On October '20, 1926, while the note was in the possession of the plaintiff, the defendants signed their names upon the face thereof, and slightly to the left of the signatures of the original makers. There is a finding that there was no evidence as to the circumstances under which the defendants signed their names, whether with or without the knowledge of the original makers, and that there was no evidence either way whether any consideration or benefit was received by the defendants from the plaintiff, or anyone else, for signing the note, and no evidence of demand and notice of dishonor sufficient to charge the defendants as indorsers.
“Upon the foregoing facts,” the findings state, “it is my conclusion that the defendants by signing said note assumed the obligation of maker * * *.”
We agree with the defendants that the above quoted finding is a conclusion of law and is reviewable under the exception to the judgment. The relation of the defendants to the note is controlled by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act (chapter 140 of the General Laws), and it is to be determined from the note itself, and not otherwise.
Grapes
v.
Willoughby,
On the facts found from the note as an exhibit in the case we must test the conclusion that the defendants signed as makers, and not as indorsers. The defendants’ contention that they signed as indorsers is founded upon section 17, subd. 6 (G. L. 2887, subd. VI). That subsection provides: “Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser.”
This provision, in terms, applies only to a case where a doubt arises from the ambiguous location of the signature upon the instrument, such as at the end or across the face of the instrument. It was intended to solve such a doubt, and no other.
Germania Nat. Bank
v.
Mariner,
Tbe conclusion that the defendants by signing tbe note assumed tbe obligation of makers was clearly correct.
It is a settled and well-recognized rule that a party who signs a note after its execution, delivery, and acceptance is not liable to tbe payee when there was no new or additional consideration for such signing, either in the form (1) of some advantage to some of tbe signers, or (2) of some disadvantage to the payee, or (3) of an agreement, at the time of tbe original execution and delivery, that the note would be so signed.
Persia Sav. Bank
v.
Wilson,
Other courts, since the adoption of the Act, have, apparently, taken the same view. See
Thomas
v.
Hoebel,
On the facts found, there was no error in the judgment, and it is affirmed.