GREENWOOD LEFLORE HOSPITAL AND JOHN F. LUCAS, III, IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY v. ROXANNE WATSON
NO. 2020-IA-00037-SCT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
09/09/2021
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/26/2019
HON. CAROL L. WHITE-RICHARD
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CHYNEE ALLEN BAILEY, TOMMIE GREGORY WILLIAMS, JR, TOMMIE G. WILLIAMS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: HARRIS FREDERICK POWERS, III, TOMMIE GREGORY WILLIAMS, JR, TOMMIE G. WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CHYNEE ALLEN BAILEY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 09/09/2021
BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
¶1. Roxanne Watson filed two successive lawsuits against Greenwood Leflore Hospital and Dr. John Lucas III (collectively, “GLH“), alleging medical negligence. Watson‘s first complaint was dismissed without prejudice because a notice of claim was not filed with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity at least ninety days before instituting suit as required by
FACTS1
¶2. Watson was a patient at GLH on May 22, 2017, when she underwent a surgical procedure on her thyroid performed by Dr. Lucas. Watson filed her initial complaint alleging medical malpractice on June 5, 2018. Before filing the complaint, Watson sent a notice of claim letter to GLH and Dr. Lucas on April 6, 2018, pursuant to
¶3. Watson filed a second, identical complaint on March 14, 2019. GLH, in turn, filed a second motion to dismiss, contending that the second complaint was not in compliance with
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. “This Court reviews de novo a trial court‘s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss.” Johnson v. Rao, 952 So. 2d 151, 154 (Miss. 2007) (citing Harris v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 873 So. 2d 970, 988 (Miss. 2004)). Additionally, this Court reviews the application of the MTCA de novo. Lee v. Mem‘l Hosp. at Gulfport, 999 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Miss. 2008) (citing City of Jackson v. Brister, 838 So. 2d 274, 278 (Miss. 2003)). As a question of law, statutory interpretation is also reviewed under a de novo standard. Page v. Univ. of S. Miss., 878 So. 2d 1003, 1004-05 (Miss. 2004) (citing Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So. 2d 161, 165 (Miss. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
1. Whether Watson was required to provide a second presuit notice before filing her second complaint.
¶5. GLH argues that Watson was required to file a second notice of claim after the trial court dismissed her first suit before filing a second complaint.
After all procedures within a governmental entity have been exhausted, any person having a claim under this chapter shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity, except that at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.
¶6. “This Court repeatedly has applied the same standards of construction and application to the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act as those applied to the [MTCA].” Arceo v. Toliver, 19 So. 3d 67, 71 (Miss. 2009). “Like the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which also is strictly applied.” Id. at 72 (citing Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928 So. 2d 815, 820-21 (Miss. 2006)).
¶7. But here it is uncontested that Watson provided adequate presuit notice that met the statutory requirements under MTCA before filing her first complaint. The first complaint was dismissed, however,
¶8. The facts in Toliver are notably different from the facts of this case. In Toliver, the plaintiff failed to provide any notice whatsoever before filing a medical-malpractice and negligence claim against the defendants. Id. at 69. Then, on interlocutory appeal following the trial judge‘s denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, this Court reversed and ordered Tolliver‘s complaint dismissed without prejudice for failure to provide presuit notice. Id. at 69-70. Tolliver subsequently sent the defendants a presuit-notice letter that did not meet the requirements of
Nor is there any language in the statute which arguably could be construed to say that notice is not required when filing a second suit after dismissal of a first on the same cause of action. The statute‘s notice requirement is not limited to the first filed action, but applies to all.
¶9. The Court was, however, addressing Tolliver‘s argument that her first lawsuit had satisfied the notice requirement. This Court preceded these statements by saying:
[T]he statutory requirement of sixty days’ written notice before filing a medical negligence suit is mandatory. Quoting Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927 (Miss. 2006), we stated that the Mississippi Legislature did not include any exceptions to the rule which would pretermit the written-notice prerequisite. [Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691, 695 (Miss. 2006)] (quoting Pitalo, 933 So. 2d at 928-29). In the absence of any exceptions to the mandatory requirement, Tolliver‘s argument that circumstances dictate when or if written notice is required is without merit.
Tolliver, 19 So. 3d at 71. When read in context, it is apparent that this Court‘s actual holding was that written notice under
¶10. In today‘s case, Watson provided valid presuit notice under both
¶11. GLH does point to two decisions that follow its interpretation of Tolliver. The first is an unpublished memorandum opinion and order from a United States District Court. See Anderson v. S. Sunflower Co. Hosp., Civ. No. 3:18CV254TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss July 3, 2018). The district court in that case, admittedly, does seem to have been persuaded by the surface-level reading of the sentence in Tolliver that GLH advances today, but that decision is not binding on this Court. See id. *2. GLH also cites the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mosely v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc., 232 So. 3d 162 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). But the question of whether the plaintiff should have filed a second notice was not a contested issue in that case. “At the hearing on the motions to dismiss, Mosely conceded that the second action should be dismissed under Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691, 697-98 (¶16) (Miss. 2006), due to lack of presuit notice, but argued that the dismissal should be without prejudice.” Id. at 165.
¶12. We take this opportunity to correct a misapprehension of law. Here, Watson delivered a proper notice of claim more than ninety days before filing the second suit. Nowhere does the MTCA (strictly construed or not) require Watson to send a second notice of claim; the statute requires a notice of a claim, not a notice of a complaint. Whether an intervening first complaint was filed is of no consequence. The trial court was correct in finding that GLH‘s motion to dismiss should be denied on this point.
2. Whether the ninety-five day tolling period under Section 11-46-11(3) is itself tolled when a complaint is filed before the ninety-five day period.
¶13. Finally, GLH contends that Watson‘s second complaint was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations under
shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after, except that filing a notice of claim within the required one-year period will toll the statute of limitations for ninety-five (95) days from the date the [chief executive officer] receives notice of claim.
No action whatsoever may be maintained by the claimant until the claimant receives a notice of denial of claim or the tolling period expires, whichever comes first, after which the claimant has an additional ninety (90) days to file suit; failure to file within the time allowed is an absolute bar to any further proceedings under this chapter.
¶14. GLH concedes that Watson‘s initial complaint operated to toll the one-year statute of limitations. However, it contends that Watson failed to follow the procedures contained in
¶15. The trial court stated in its order denying GLH‘s motion to dismiss:
[W]hen [Watson‘s] lawsuit was dismissed on January 5, 2019, [she] was placed in the same position she was in, on June 5, 2018, prior to filing the first
lawsuit. The general principal in Mississippi is when a complaint is filed and properly served, that complaint tolls the running of the statute of limitations. Price v. Clark, 21 So. 3d 509, 521 (Miss. 2009).
We agree with the trial court‘s analysis: despite Watson‘s early filing of the initial lawsuit, she remained entitled to benefit from the tolling provisions. Importantly, the second lawsuit was identical to the first in all respects. Watson filed her second complaint within the additional time allotted to her by
¶16. We affirm the trial court‘s denial of GLH‘s motion to dismiss, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶17. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRIFFIS, J.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶18. Regardless of the outcome of the first issue, i.e., whether the plaintiff, Roxanne Watson, had to serve notice again following the dismissal of her first complaint, the statute of limitations had run against her claims. Accordingly, and with respect, I dissent.
¶19. Watson‘s claim accrued on May 22, 2017, the date of the alleged negligent treatment.
¶20. The majority reaches a different result by holding not only that filing the initial complaint tolled the running of the one-year statute of limitations but also that the filing of the initial compliant tolled the ninety-five day tolling period applicable to the running of the one-year period established in ¶21. The purpose of requiring notice of a claim and a ninety-day waiting period before filing suit is to allow the governmental entity to take prompt corrective action and settle claims when appropriate. Lane v. Miss. Dep‘t of Transp., 220 So. 3d 254, 259 (¶19) (Miss. 2017). The ninety-five day tolling of the statute of limitations then ensures that, in the event that the prospective defendant does not reply to the notice within ninety days, the plaintiff will have at least five days left to file suit before the statute of limitations expires. ¶22. While, as set forth above, I would reverse the judgment on grounds that the one-year limitations period ran before Watson filed her second complaint, I also agree with the majority‘s refusal to apply Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So. 3d 67 (Miss. 2009), to hold that Watson was required to re-serve presuit notice. However, I agree for a different reason. ¶23. Regarding the question of whether a dismissed complaint may satisfy the statutory ¶24. The majority does not follow Arceo based on the factual distinction that, in Arceo, the plaintiff was arguing that the complaint and other filings from the first, fatally flawed attempt at litigation provided sufficient notice, but that, here, Watson provided sufficient written notice prior to filing her first complaint. Some holdings are, by their plain reading, of broader application than the facts of the specific case that give rise to them. Here is one such holding. The Arceo Court‘s conclusion, that each complaint requires presuit notice, was based on the language of the applicable statute—not the form of the notice the Arceo plaintiff argued was sufficient. The majority‘s holding today, that the statute did not require Watson to serve presuit notice before filing her second complaint contradicts the Arceo holding. ¶25. Arceo, however, addressed the presuit notice requirement found in After all procedures within a governmental entity have been exhausted, any person having a claim under this chapter shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity, except that at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity. GRIFFIS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.