72 Miss. 46 | Miss. | 1894
delivered the opinion of the court.
On the testimony in this record, carefully considered as a whole, the jury, if the case had been submitted to them, could not possibly have reached any reasonable conclusion other than that Drennan was a .stockholder in the Greenwood Ice & Coal Company, and a director and the vice president thereof, at the
The action of Kimball in investigating the loss, and submitting the matter to appraisement, was no waiver' of the right of the appellee to deny liability. The policy provides that " no appraisal shall be construed, under any circumstances, as evidence of the validity.of said policy, or of the company’s liability thereon. ’ ’ And the agreement for appraisal in this case stipulates that " it is for the purpose bf ascertaining and fixing the amount of said loss and damage only . . . and shall not determine, waive or invalidate any other right of either party to said agreement; ” and Kimball expressly refers to this' reservation in his testimony. The case of Insurance Co. v. Matthews, 65 Miss., 301, is decisive of this point.
Nor can it be justly claimed that Kimball, for the company, waived the right of the company to deny liability on the ground that he was interested in the Greenwood Ice & Coal Company, as stockholder, director and vice president. The agreement, at page twenty-five of the record, is that " Kimball, on ascertaining certain facts, of which he was ignorant, wrote the Greenwood Ice & Coal Company the letter of March 6,” withdrawing from the agreement to appraise the property. Kimball states that Keesler gave him the list of stockholders and officers of the company the day after he signed the appraisement agreement. Keesler says he did not recollect whether it was ¡that day or not. Kimball testifies that the information on which he acted in writing the letter of March 6 was the knowledge obtained in Greenwood, but after he signed the agreement fbr appraisal, as to
We forbear a minute analysis of, or further comment on, the remarkable testimony in this record. It is enough to say that no verdict for plaintiff could have been allowed to stand, and the action of the court in granting the peremptory charge was eminently proper, and the judgment is
Affirmed.