Wе must decide whether, under the facts of this case, reporting deadlines imposed by the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association are preempted by federal law. They are not.
The Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Assоciation (“MWUA”) was created by Mississippi’s state legislature “to provide an adequate market for windstorm and hail insurance in Mississippi’s six coastal counties: George, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, and Stone.” Miss. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n v. Union Nat. Fire Ins. Co.,
Plaintiff Greenwich Insurance Company (“Greenwich”) is a MWUA member and also sells Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (“MPCI”). Insuring crops comes with risks of its own. Indeed, once upon a time, “[p]rivate insurance companies apparently deemed all-risk crop insurance too great a commercial hazard,” and so refused to provide such .coverage. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
Thus, Greenwich is required to participate in two somewhat similar programs— one a state program, the other a federal program. In the ordinary course, dual participation presents no problems. Indeed, the parties agree that MWUA was not permitted to base the post-Katrina assessments on MPCI premiums collected by Greenwich.
MWUA’s assessment efforts were hampered by complaints of several insurance companies that they had incorrectly reported information regarding premiums collected. In an effort to provide its members an opportunity to ensure accurate reporting, MWUA conducted a “true-up” — i.e., an opportunity to submit corrected 2003 premium data. The true-uр procedure was challenged in state court and ultimately approved of by the Mississippi Supreme Court. As that Court saw it, “[t]he true-up was not an effort on behalf of MWUA to make a new rule; it wаs simply a remedy to the property-insurance chaos caused by Hurricane Katrina.” Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n,
Greenwich was apparently among those insurers for which MWUA had faulty data. Nonetheless, for whatever reason, it did not take advantage of the true-up process. Instead, it repeatedly represented to MWUA that all figures were accurate. Specifically, Greenwich confirmed the contents of an annual statement showing it had collected no MPCI premiums in 2003. Based on those representations, MWUA assessed Greenwich $4.1 million.
That assessment finally prompted Greenwich to take a closer look at the reported figures. Accоrding to its brief, Greenwich “immediately began an investigation into the now decade-old data and discovered that MPCI premiums had been misclassified as assessable premiums.”
Both parties moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment, but after additional briefing, the district court certified the question of preemption for interlocutory apрeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). We granted permission to appeal the interlocutory order. We review de novo certified orders denying summary judgment. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC,
While the parties agree that this case presents one • discrete legal issue, they frame that issue in vastly different ways. According to Greenwich, MWUA based its assessment in part on MPCI premiums and therefore plainly violаted controlling federal law. According to MWUA, there is no conflict in the law, and Greenwich is simply using preemption arguments in an attempt to escape the consequences of its own inсompetence.
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress has authority to preempt state law. See U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. “When a federal law contains an express preemption clause, we ‘fоcus, on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.’ ” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting,
“Federal regulations can have a preemptive effect equal to that of federal laws.” O’Hara v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No State or local governmental body or non-governmental body shall have the authority to promulgate rules or regulations, pass laws, or issue policies or decisions that directly or indirectly affect or govern agreements, contracts, or actions authorized by this part unless such authority is specifically authorized by this part or by the Corporation.
7 C.F.R. § 400.352(a).
According to Greenwich, because enforcement of the true-up deadline means it must pay an assessment based on otherwise non-assessable MPCI premiums, the true-up deadline “direсtly or indirectly affect[s] MPCI” and is therefore preempted.
“[W]hen the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emptiоn.’ ” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good,
We hold that the FCIC did not intend to preclude MWUA from imposing and enforсing its true-up deadline. Written to prevent state interference with MPCI, 7 C.F.R. § 400.352(a) is undoubtedly a broad preemption clause., But the interpretation urged upon us by Greenwich exceeds these textual bоunds.
The challenged deadline did not directly or indirectly affect MPCI because the deadline did not trigger an assessment improperly based on MPCI premiums. Indeed, strictly speaking, even Greenwich’s fаilure to abide by the deadline did not trigger the improper assessment. Rather, Greenwich’s independent actions-specifically, its repeated affirmative statements that the 2003 premium data was correct-triggered the assessment. Greenwich reported $0 in “Multiple peril crop” premiums on its annual statement. (ROA. 717.) It alleges it should have reported $4,756,021 in MPCI premiums. (ROA. 675.)
Thus, “in reality,” Greenwich’s complaint “is directed at the actions of private parties, not the operation of’ MWUA deadlines. See New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. "Insurance companies are no longer called members,” Miss. Windstonn Underwriting Assn,
. Greenwich also cites 7 U.S.C. § 1511(2012) for the proposition that MPCI is exempt from state and local taxes and 7 C.F.R. § 400.351(b)(2) and (5) for the proposition that MWUA’s post-Katrina assessments could not be based on MPCI premiums. Neither of