Lead Opinion
Rizón Commercial Contracting, Inc. appeals the circuit court’s order vacating its mechanic’s liens and dismissing its counterclaim for foreclosure. We find the circuit court erred in determining as a matter of law that Rizón was not a “laborer” that performed work “for the improvement of real estate” under subsection 29-5-20(A) of the South Carolina Code (2007). We reverse and remand for foreclosure proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 2010, the Greens of Rock Hill, LLC and GRH 2011, LLC (collectively the “owners”) initiated the “Riverwalk development project,” which involved developing several pieces of property on the Catawba River in Rock Hill into a large, mixed-use community. The owners hired Celriver Services, LLC to serve as the general contractor for portions of the development project, which included demolishing an abandoned manufacturing facility on the property, grading the land, and installing roads andl infrastructure.
Following the demolition of the manufacturing facility, large pieces of “scrap concrete” remained on the property. Celriver
The Work to be performed by the Subcontractor [Rizón] includes mobilization of all labor, equipment, materials and other items required to crush and screen 30,000 tons of concrete stockpiled [on the property]. The concrete material is to be crushed and screened, as required, to meet the South Carolina Department of Transportation specifications for Graded Aggregate Base....
Rizón paid for the rental equipment used to crush the concrete and for all expenses incurred in completing the contract, including labor and operating costs. Upon completion of the work, Celriver moved the crushed concrete to “various sites” on the property, where it was used as a paving base for roads, sidewalks, and parking lots.
Rizón subsequently filed mechanic’s liens against the River-walk property pursuant to section 29-5-20, claiming it was owed $295,591 for the work it performed. The owners filed a petition to vacate the liens, claiming Rizón “did not provide labor, material, or supplies for the improvement of real property” and was thus “not entitled to a mechanic’s lien.” Rizón filed an answer and counterclaim seeking foreclosure.
The trial court issued an order vacating Rizon’s mechanic’s liens and dismissing its foreclosure claim. The court found Rizón was not a laborer because it “did not ... do anything to improve the real estate.” Although the court acknowledged that “crushing the concrete may have been a benefit to Celriver,” it determined this work, by itself, “did not improve
II. Rizon’s Entitlement to Mechanic’s Liens
Mechanic’s liens “are purely statutory and may be acquired and enforced only in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the statutes creating them.” Ferguson Fire & Fabrication, Inc. v. Preferred Fire Prot, L.L.C.,
The circuit court vacated Rizon’s mechanic’s liens based on the procedure approved by the supreme court in Sea Pines Co. v. Kiawah Island Co.,
The owners admit the concrete crushed by Rizón “was used to improve the property,” but contend the sole task for which Rizón contracted did not, by itself, improve the real estate. We disagree. Celriver hired Rizón to accomplish two tasks: (1)
We find further support for our holding in certain sections ot~ the mechanic's lien statute. As this court stated in A. V.A., "There has been over the years a tendency of the General Assembly to liberalize the mechanic's lien statute, making available each time a lien to additional providers of labor and materials."
III. Conclusion
We hold the circuit court erred in vacating Rizon’s mechanic’s liens and dismissing its foreclosure action as a matter of law. Therefore, the order of the circuit court is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for the court to hold foreclosure proceedings consistent with this decision.
Notes
. The owners included with their petition to vacate the mechanic’s liens a written contract between Celriver and Rizón dated 2010. Rizon’s owner claimed in an affidavit, however, that "the contract from 2010 was not the contract under which [Rizón was] working.” At oral argument, Rizón told the court Celriver initially hired Rizón in 2010 to crush the scrap concrete, and the 2010 contract covered the work performed by Rizón for that year. Rizón explained, however, that there was no written contract covering the work performed in 2011, which is the work relevant to this litigation. Notwithstanding this, Rizón admitted that the terms of the oral contract established in 2011 were "substantially the same” as those provided in the 2010 written contract. This is supported by the affidavit of Dave Williams, Vice President of Celriver, which used the same language contained in the 2010 contract to describe the work to be performed by Rizón under the 2011 contract.
. The circuit court also found (1) Rizón did not furnish the material that was used to improve the property because "Rizon's sole task was simply to change the form of the scrap concrete supplied by others into stone usable in the construction of roads”; and (2) "Rizón was not a subcontractor as it relates to the improvement of the subject real estate” because “there is no indication that Celriver’s contract with the Owners required crushing of the concrete in order that it could be used in building roads and sidewalks.” We decline to address these findings because our conclusion that Rizón is a laborer under subsection 29-5-20(A) is sufficient to support our holding. See § 29-5-20(A) (providing a mechanic’s lien to "[e]very laborer, mechanic, subcontractor, or person furnishing material” (emphasis added)). We also do not address Rizon’s argument that the circuit court erred in ruling on the owners’ petition without allowing discovery because our holding is dispositive of this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I would hold that the work performed by Rizón does not entitle it to mechanic’s liens under section 29-5-20 of the South Carolina Code (2007). See Clo-Car Trucking Co. v. Clifflure Estates of S.C., Inc.,
“[S]ection 29-5-20(A) ... provides in relevant part: ‘Every laborer, mechanic, subcontractor, or person furnishing material for the improvement of real estate when the improvement has been authorized by the owner has a lien thereon, subject to existing liens of which he has actual or constructive notice, to the value of the labor or material so furnished....”’ Ferguson Fire & Fabrication, Inc. v. Preferred Fire Prot., L.L.C.,
While Rizón did pay for the labor, services, and material used in crushing the stockpiled concrete, these activities do not amount to furnishing material for the improvement of real estate within the meaning of section 29-5-20, as these materi
Moreover, Rizón did not dispose of discarded solid wastes and therefore does not fall within the ambit of “construction and debris disposal services” under section 29-5-27. See S.C.Code Ann. § 29-5-27 (2007) (“Any person providing construction and demolition debris disposal services, as defined in Section 44-96-40(6), including, but not limited to, final disposal services provided by a construction and demolition landfill, is a laborer within the meaning of Sections 29-5-20....”); S.C.Code Ann. § 44-96-40(6) (2002) (“ ‘Construction and demolition debris’ means discarded solid wastes resulting from construction, remodeling, repair and demolition of structures, road building, and land clearing.”).
Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the order of the circuit court.
. I have found no evidence in the record to support the majority's statement that one reason Celriver hired Rizón was to rid the property of demolition debris so construction could continue. At oral argument, Rizón admitted that the terms of the oral contract in 2011 were "substantially the same” as the terms of the 2010 contract provided in the record, and that contract simply states that Rizón was hired for the purpose of crushing stockpiled concrete.