29 Del. Ch. 297 | New York Court of Chancery | 1946
The complainant, Margaret M. Greenly, wife of the defendant, Harry B. Greenly, seeks a decree that she is the real equitable owner of her husband’s legal interest in certain real property near Delmar, in Sussex County, standing in their names as husband and wife, and, therefore, as tenants by the entirety; and for a conveyance to her of her husband’s legal interest.
The complainant has an aged father, Arthur W. Phippin, and considers it her moral and legal duty to provide for his maintenance and support; she is not financially able to do this except at her own home. Harry B. Greenly knew of the complainant’s responsibilities in this respect and of her purpose to fulfill her obligations, and their marriage took place June 24, 1944, with that understanding. In the latter part of the year 1944, Harry B. Greenly was anxious to engage in the business of raising chickens; he had no experience whatever in that line, but the complainant, and especially her father, had. Moreover, they were acquainted with the Tull Brothers of Seaford, Delaware, who were willing to finance the undertaking. The Tulls knew nothing about the defendant, and relied, entirely on the complainant and her father. The latter were of material assistance in growing the first flock of chickens, and the defendant promised the complainant one-half of the profits, if any, and arranged accordingly with Tull Brothers to pay her. In the spring of 1945 the Tulls paid the complainant by check about $1,800 which represented her share of the profits. The evidence justifies the conclusion that this money was paid to, and accepted by, Margaret M. Greenly, as her own property, without condition or reservation as to its use. Harry B. Greenly testified that it was given to her for the purpose of buying a home, but his assertion in this respect is flatly denied by both the complainant and her father, and by the circumstances. He also testified that he told the complainant that he would not have divided the profits with her had he known that she was not going to put the money back into the business; but he made no such
At the time of their marriage, Margaret M. Greenly had about $1,200 which represented her savings. The house provided by the defendant on the chicken farm was a small dwelling, in poor condition, and was wholly unfit for a place of residence. The complainant was anxious to have a proper home, and frequently urged the defendant to provide one, but was always met with his statement that the house was good enough for him and if she did not like it she could leave. All through the year 1945 the complainant expressed her dissatisfaction with their home; the defendant did nothing about it, and at the end of the year was not in a position to acquire a better home as he had lost heavily in his subsequent chicken operations. At any rate, it is clear that he displayed no interest in acquiring a home until the end of 1945, at which time the complainant learned that the Delmar property was for sale. Margaret M. Greenly and her father went to look at the property and concluded to buy it; her husband also saw the place. The owner of the property lived in Norfolk, and the complainant went there to see him; she entered into an agreement to purchase the place, and paid the first installment of $100 on the purchase price.
On her return home, the complainant told the defendant what she had done and he requested that the conveyance be made to them jointly, saying that it was the fair thing to do. At the same time he expressly promised that the complainant’s father could make his home with them and if any
A resulting trust is one implied by law from the supposed intention of the parties and the nature of the particular transaction. Carkonen v. Alberts, 196 Wash. 575, 83 P.2d 899, 135 A.L.R. 209; 1 Pomeroy Eq.Jur., (5th Ed.,) § 155; 4 Pomeroy Eq.Jur., (5th Ed.) § 1031. It rests upon the natural presumption that, in the absence of evidence to
Where a deed is made to the wife, but the consideration is paid by the husband, there is rebuttable presumption that a gift to the wife is intended. Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N.C. 282, 70 S.E. 476; 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 459, p. 1391; 54 Amer.Jur. 160.
Where the wife pays the consideration and the deed is made to the husband with her consent, under the majority rule it seems that in the absence of other controlling circumstances, it is ordinarily presumed to be for her benefit, and that no gift was intended. Keaton v. Pipkins, (10 Cir.) 43 F.2d 497; Havens v. Bliss, 26 N.J.Eq. 363; 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 460, p. 1397; 1 Tiff. Real Property, 649. Whatever reason there may be to criticize this rule under modern conditions, it seems to be firmly established by the decided weight of authority. See 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 460, p. 1399.
In law, a conveyance of land to a husband and wife
Constructive trusts do not arise from the intent of the parties, “but depend for' their existence on the wrongful conduct of the defendant, which induces a court to adjudge him a trustee”; they are remedial in character (Restat. Law of Trusts, 1249), and ordinarily bear little, or no, relationship to resulting trusts. 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 454, p. 1359; 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 451; Carkonen v. Alberts, 196 Wash. 575, 83 P.2d 899, 135 A.L.R. 209; 1 Pom.Eq.Jur., (5th Ed.) 210. Some fraudulent or unfair and unconscionable conduct is essential. Roy v. Enot, 120 N.J.Eq. 67,183 A. 906; Levine v. Schofer, 184 Md. 205, 40 A.2d 324; 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 451; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 471, p. 8. But whether a resulting trust, or a constructive trust, be relied on, a complainant must prove her case by clear and satisfactory evidence. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 472, p. 13. Conceding that the mere fact that Margaret M. Greenly consented to her husband being made a grantee in the deed does not, necessarily, show that she intended him to be the real beneficial owner of that interest, a resulting trust can hardly be relied on. Margaret M. Greenly paid the entire purchase price, but at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed she said that it would be better to have it made that way—to the two of them, as husband and wife. That statement would seem to rebut any possible inference that the deed was intended to be entirely for her benefit.
But was Greenly guilty of such improper and fraudulent conduct that a constructive trust should be decreed?
The rights of the parties must be determined as of the time of the execution and delivery of the deed, and subsequent acts, unless so closely connected therewith as to throw some light on that transaction, are ordinarily of little im
The defendant concedes that when the deed was made, Margaret M. Greenly intended that her father should make his home with them. She seems to have sought to impose that obligation on her husband since the very beginning of their married life in 1944; indeed the marriage took place on that condition. Margaret M. Greenly was not in a normal state of health when the deed was made, and was worried about her father’s future. She paid the . entire purchase price for the property, and before she would comply with her husband’s request—that the deed be made to them as husband and wife—she required him to reiterate, and even amplify, his prior promises with respect to her father. Greenly had then lost heavily in his chicken operations. Apparently, he and his father-in-law had never gotten along any too well, and almost immediately after the deed had
A constructive trust of his legal interest in the property will, therefore, be decreed, and he will be directed to convey that interest to the complainant.
