On February 23,1988, appellant was indicted on 19 counts of violations of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, as amended. Appellant represented himself at trial and the jury convicted him on 13 counts of the indictment for selling securities while neither appellant nor the security was rеgistered, and for employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the sale of securities in violation of OCGA §§ 10-5-3; 10-5-5; 10-5-12 (thereby including violations of 10-5-12 (a) (1)) and 10-5-12 (d) (1) as these statutes existed prior to the July 1, 1986 amendments.
The indictment was based upon appellant’s plan of obtaining investment money from Harvey Starr (“Starr”). Beginning in October 1983, Starr loaned appellant money for appellant’s plans to publish a Born-Again Study Bible. Appellant represented himself as the president of Paul Benjamin Publishers, the publisher of the bible. Starr continued to mаke loans to appellant through September 1984, re ceiving promissory notes for the loans, which totaled between $58,000 and $65,000. Two repayment checks from appellant bounced, and one repayment of $500 was made; the rest of the money was not repaid to| Starr. Starr was unaware that appellant had obtained large sums o: money from many other investors to complete these bibles; that man; of these investors had pursued legal action against appellant for th recovery of their money; that appellant’s оriginal supply of bibles hai been seized in satisfaction of a judgment against him; and that appel-j lant had filed for bankruptcy during the time he was obtaining mone; from Starr. A securities investigator for the Secretary of State testi fied at trial that in an interview with appellant, appеllant stated b him that Paul Benjamin Publishers was not an active business, tha although he had “test marketed” some sample bibles, he had not for mally published any bibles and that he understood the loans he wai obtaining to be personal loans to him so that he could “decide to g< to the moon or the Bahamas or whatever with personal loans.” Star: testified at trial that he had no understanding that the money he wa¡ lending appellant was to be used by him for personal purposes.
Appellant appeals the jury verdict, the sentence and the denial his motiоn for a new trial. Appellant raises 22 enumerations of erro: however appellant’s arguments and citations of authority in his bri relate to only 13 of those enumerations. Thus, the other enumerd *219 tions, which are not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument shall be dеemed to have been abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2). In his pro se brief, appellant presents six substantive arguments which encompass the remaining 13 enumerations. Herein, we will address the six substantive legal arguments raised by appellant in his brief.
1. Appellant first argues that the prosecution against him should have abated due to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of OCGA § 10-5-12. On July 1, 1986, Section 12 was repealed in its entirety and replaced with a new Section 12, without the inclusion of a saving clause. Section 12 (a) (1), which made it “unlawful for any person ... to offer to sell or to sell any security in violation of Code Section 10-5-3, 10-5-5, or 10-5-19 or any rule, regulation, or order promulgated or issued by the commissioner under this chapter” was continued verbatim into the new Section 12. Section 12 (d) (1), which made it “unlawful for any person in conneсtion with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly ... to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” was included in the new Section 12 practically verbatim at Section 12 (a) (2) (A), which states “it shall be unlawful for any person ... in connectiоn with an offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly ... to employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” Sections 3 and 5 of the Securities Act of 1973, also charged in the indictment, were not repealed in thе 1986 amendments.
Appellant cites
Robinson v. State,
I 2. Appellant next argues that the indictment charging violations if OCGA §§ 10-5-3 and 10-5-5 failed because it did not state that the
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activities charged were not exempt transactions. Since the statutes at issue describe offenses generally applicable to all persons or to all persons in certain categories and the exemptions provided limits tо the operation of the statutes, the issue of exemptions is “merely [a] matter of defense, and it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that he falls into such exception, rather than upon the State to prove that he does not.”
Flynn v. State,
3. Appellant next contends that neither the indictment, the proof at trial, nor the jury instruсtions were sufficient on the issue of theB wilfulness or the intent of appellant’s actions. OCGA § 10-5-24 re-B quires the State to prove that appellant wilfully violated the statutes.™ The indictment so charged. The trial court’s instruction that wilfulB means knowingly and intentionally committing the acts that consti-B tuted the violation was not in error. Further, the evidence at trial waaB sufficient to support the verdict that appellant was guilty of wilfully® i.e., knowingly and intentionally, selling unregistered securities wherM he was also unregistered and of employing a device to defraud. Evi-M dence at trial of previous investment plans attempted by appellan® showed his awareness of registration requirements, and testimony afl trial indicated that appellant treated his deals as personal loans alH though his investors were never so informed. This argument of appelH lаnt has no merit. H
4. Appellant also argues that he was denied his right to .effectivM assistance of counsel. The record shows that appellant rejected thH first attorney that was appointed to represent him, and when appelH lant moved for the appointment of another attorney, a hearing waH held, after which the trial court issued an order that appellant did noH *221 meet the income standards of indigence and denied appellant appointed counsel. Appellant contends that despite his non-indigent status, the сourt erred in not appointing an attorney since he in reality could not afford the large fees demanded by lawyers for a complicated securities case. Appellant cites no authority supporting this relative standard for a right to counsel which is based upon the type and complexity of the case involved. Appellant had a right to appointed counsel only if he were determined to be indigent. See OCGA § 17-12-4 et seq. We find no merit in appellant’s contention.
5. Appellant’s argument that the State failed to prove venue in Gwinnett County also fails. “OCGA § 10-5-15 specifies venue for violations of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 . . .: ‘For the purposes of venue for any . . . criminal action under this chapter, any violation of this chapter . . . shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which аny act was performed in furtherance of the transaction which violated the chapter.’ ”
Thayer v. State,
6. Contrary to appellant’s contentions, the prosecution was not arred by the statute of limitation. The four-year limitation period pplicable to appellant’s case does not include any period in which he perpetrator of the crime or the crime is unknown. OCGA § 17-3-2 2). “The knowledge placed at issue by OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) is the nowledge of the State, which knowledge includes that imputed to he State through the knowledge not only of the prosecution, but also ncludes the knowledge of someone interested in the prosecution, or njured by the offеnse. [Cit.]”
Duncan v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
On Motion for Rehearing.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant, who has now retained mnsel, first argues that the trial court erred in determining that ap-lellant was not indigent and in failing to appoint counsеl for him. |fter a review of the hearing on appellant’s indigence, it is clear to us jiat appellant did not meet the standards of indigence. Appellant and is wife reported a sizable income on their tax return, and appellant,
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who is college educated, had been free on bond since the indictment was returned, thus able to secure extra income for his defense. See
Boles v. State,
Appellant also asks the court to consider an enumeration of error that was not raised at trial or enumerated in the initial appeal. In light of appellant’s pro se status at trial and on aрpeal, we will con sider the contention of error on this motion for rehearing. Appellant asserts that the court’s charge to the jury was fatally flawed because the court did not charge the jury on OCGA § 10-5-12 (a) (2) (A) which makes it unlawful for any person “[i]n connection with an offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . [to] employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.5 Appellant was indicted on the predecessor to this statute and wa¡ convicted of violating it on several сounts. Appellant contends that pursuant to OCGA § 5-5-24 (c), there was “a substantial error in th charge which was harmful as a matter of law, regardless of whethei objection was made” thereto. In fact, no objection on this basis wa¡ made to the court’s charge. “To constitute harmful еrror within thi meaning of [OCGA § 5-5-24 (c)], an erroneous charge or failure t( charge must result in a gross injustice, such as to raise a question a¡ to whether the appellant has been deprived of a fair trial.”
Hamrick v. Wood,