Greenhill v. StateGreenhill v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Cooper
On February 23,1988, appellant was indicted on 19 counts of violations of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, as amended. Appellant represented himself at trial and the jury convicted him on 13 counts of the indictment for selling securities while neither appellant nor the security was registered, and for employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the sale of securities in violation of
The indictment was based upon appellant’s plan of obtaining investment money from Harvey Starr (“Starr”). Beginning in October 1983, Starr loaned appellant money for appellant’s plans to publish a Born-Again Study Bible. Appellant represented himself as the president of Paul Benjamin Publishers, the publisher of the bible. Starr continued to make loans to appellant through September 1984, re ceiving promissory notes for the loans, which totaled between $58,000 and $65,000. Two repayment checks from appellant bounced, and one repayment of $500 was made; the rest of the money was not repaid to| Starr. Starr was unaware that appellant had obtained large sums o: money from many other investors to complete these bibles; that man; of these investors had pursued legal action against appellant for th recovery of their money; that appellant’s original supply of bibles hai been seized in satisfaction of a judgment against him; and that appel-j lant had filed for bankruptcy during the time he was obtaining mone; from Starr. A securities investigator for the Secretary of State testi fied at trial that in an interview with appellant, appellant stated b him that Paul Benjamin Publishers was not an active business, tha although he had “test marketed” some sample bibles, he had not for mally published any bibles and that he understood the loans he wai obtaining to be personal loans to him so that he could “decide to g< to the moon or the Bahamas or whatever with personal loans.” Star: testified at trial that he had no understanding that the money he wa¡ lending appellant was to be used by him for personal purposes.
Appellant appeals the jury verdict, the sentence and the denial his motion for a new trial. Appellant raises 22 enumerations of erro: however appellant’s arguments and citations of authority in his bri relate to only 13 of those enumerations. Thus, the other enumerd *219 tions, which are not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument shall be deemed to have been abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2). In his pro se brief, appellant presents six substantive arguments which encompass the remaining 13 enumerations. Herein, we will address the six substantive legal arguments raised by appellant in his brief.
1. Appellant first argues that the prosecution against him should have abated due to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of
Appellant cites Robinson v. State, 256 Ga. 564 (350 SE2d 464 (1986), for the proposition that “[w]hen a statute making described [conduct a crime is repealed prior to final judgment on a conviction, [the repeal ends the prosecution if the legislature has not provided [otherwise in a saving clause.” Robinson, supra at 565. However, this [court, in Barrett v. State, 183 Ga. App. 729 (360 SE2d 400) (1987), [acknowledged that “a saving clause is not the only mechanism by [which a prosecution might be validated” after the law which was in effect when the conduct was committed has been repealed. Barrett, supra at Division 1 (a). If there is a “clear ‘demonstration of (legislative) intent’ [cit.] that prosecution of the conduct. . . under the for-Jner law should not abate with the re-defining of the crime,” Barrett, supra, then abatement will not be upheld. In Barrett, such legislative Intent was demonstrated because the conduct at issue had not ceased |o be a crime despite the redefinition in the statute. The same is true In this case. The conduct with which appellant was charged and con-licted was not decriminalized at any time during the various redefinitions of the statute. Therefore, the prosecution did not abate. See State v. Benzaquen, 184 Ga. App. 392 (361 SE2d 503) (1987).
I 2. Appellant next argues that the indictment charging violations if
3. Appellant next contends that neither the indictment, the proof at trial, nor the jury instructions were sufficient on the issue of theB wilfulness or the intent of appellant’s actions.
4. Appellant also argues that he was denied his right to .effectivM assistance of counsel. The record shows that appellant rejected thH first attorney that was appointed to represent him, and when appelH lant moved for the appointment of another attorney, a hearing waH held, after which the trial court issued an order that appellant did noH
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meet the income standards of indigence and denied appellant appointed counsel. Appellant contends that despite his non-indigent status, the court erred in not appointing an attorney since he in reality could not afford the large fees demanded by lawyers for a complicated securities case. Appellant cites no authority supporting this relative standard for a right to counsel which is based upon the type and complexity of the case involved. Appellant had a right to appointed counsel only if he were determined to be indigent. See
5. Appellant’s argument that the State failed to prove venue in Gwinnett County also fails. “
6. Contrary to appellant’s contentions, the prosecution was not arred by the statute of limitation. The four-year limitation period pplicable to appellant’s case does not include any period in which he perpetrator of the crime or the crime is unknown.
Judgment affirmed.
Banke, P. J., and Birdsong, P. J., concur.On Motion for Rehearing.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant, who has now retained mnsel, first argues that the trial court erred in determining that ap-lellant was not indigent and in failing to appoint counsel for him. |fter a review of the hearing on appellant’s indigence, it is clear to us jiat appellant did not meet the standards of indigence. Appellant and is wife reported a sizable income on their tax return, and appellant, *222 who is college educated, had been free on bond since the indictment was returned, thus able to secure extra income for his defense. See Boles v. State, 178 Ga. App. 508 (3) (343 SE2d 729) (1986). “[I]t is only indigent defendants for whom the trial court must appoint counsel.” Burnett v. State, 182 Ga. App. 539, 540 (356 SE2d 231) (1987). The court did not err in failing to appoint counsel. Appellant next asserts that the court erred in failing to warn appellant of the dangers of proceeding to trial pro se. After a review of the transcripts of all the pre-trial hearings, it is again clear to us that appellant was in fact warned by the court of the dangers of proceeding pro se, and consequently this argument of appellant has no merit.
Appellant also asks the court to consider an enumeration of error that was not raised at trial or enumerated in the initial appeal. In light of appellant’s pro se status at trial and on appeal, we will con sider the contention of error on this motion for rehearing. Appellant asserts that the court’s charge to the jury was fatally flawed because the court did not charge the jury on