13 Mass. App. Ct. 486 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1982
The plaintiff’s testator was, at the time of his death in 1973, the owner of a substantial block of the common stock of a publicly held corporation. On April 5, 1977, the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, acting under the provisions of G. L. c. 65, § 25 (as amended through St. 1971, c. 555, § 58), valued the stock at $3,507,823 for purposes of the inheritance tax.
The plaintiff did not appeal to the Appellate Tax Board, as permitted by § 26. Instead, on August 3, 1979, he filed in the Probate Court in which the estate was being settled a complaint against the Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner)
A judge bucked the jurisdictional question as well as the merits to a master, who persuaded himself that the court had jurisdiction to make an independent determination of value which would bind the Commissioner for inheritance tax purposes and suggested, not too subtly, that the case be settled. The Commissioner stuck to her guns, and the case was tried to the master, who valued the stock at $2,430,645.90. A second judge overruled the Commissioner on the jurisdictional point, adopted the master’s report and valuation, and entered judgment accordingly. The Commissioner appealed.
That remedy was not pursued in the present case. As even the master ultimately concluded, the question of the value of the stock was one of fact to be determined on all
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and a new judgment is to be entered dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction over its subject matter.
So ordered.
We are not concerned with the estate tax now found in G. L. c. 65C, inserted by St. 1975, c. 684, § 74, which applies only with respect to the estates of decedents dying on or after January 1, 1976. See St. 1975, c. 684, § 97.
She entered the picture on August 1, 1978, via St. 1978, c. 514, §§ 5 and 287.
See St. 1891, c. 425, §§ 13 and 14; R.L. c. 15, §§ 16 and 17 (1902); St. 1905, c. 367; St. 1907, c. 563, §§ 19-21; St. 1909, c. 490, Part IV, §§ 19-21; G. L. c. 65, §§ 25-27 and 30 (1921); St. 1922, c. 520, §§ 18 and 19; St. 1924, c. 300, § 3; St. 1930, c. 416, §§ 30 and 3-1; G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 65, §§ 25-27 and 30; St. 1939, c. 451, §§ 34 and 35; St. 1939, c. 494, §§ 1 and 2; St. 1953, c. 654, §§ 89 and 90; St. 1954, c. 572, §§ 1 and 2; St. 1961, c. 469, §§ 2 and 3; St. 1967, c. 550, § 1; St. 1971, c. 555, §§ 58 and 59. None of the further changes in G. L. c. 65, §§ 25-27, which were effected by St. 1978, c. 106, or by St. 1978, c. 514, §§ 176-177B, is of any present materiality.
See, e.g., Howe v. Howe, 179 Mass. 546, 547 (1901); Bradford v. Storey, 189 Mass. 104, 106-107 (1905); Dow v. Abbott, 197 Mass. 283, 288 (1908); Peabody v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 215 Mass. 129, 130 (1913); Attorney Gen. v. Skehill, 217 Mass. 364, 365-367 (1914); Attorney Gen. v. Roche, 219 Mass. 601, 602 (1914); Attorney Gen. v. Laycock, 221 Mass. 146, 147-149 (1915); Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201, 202 (1915); Walker v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 221 Mass. 600, n. at 600 (1915); Mitton v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 229 Mass. 140, 141, 143 (1918); Hill v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 229 Mass. 474, 475 (1918); Priestley v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 230 Mass. 452, 453 (1918); Whitney v. Tax Commr., 234 Mass. 188, 190, 191-192 (1919); Marble v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen., 245 Mass. 504, 506 (1923); Pratt v. Dean, 246 Mass. 300, 301, 307 (1923); Baker v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 253 Mass. 130, 131 (1925); Magee v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 256 Mass. 512, 513 (1926); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 267 Mass. 240, 241 (1929); Cabot v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 267 Mass. 338, 339-340, 342 (1929); Coolidge v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 268 Mass. 443, 445 (1929); Ames v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 269 Mass. 352, 358-359 (1929); Worcester County Natl. Bank v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 275 Mass. 216, 217-218 (1931); Watson
That case was not the first occasion on which distinctions were drawn between the respective functions of §§ 25 and 26 and §§27 and 30. In 1921 the Legislature assigned §§25 and 26 to a part of G. L. c. 65 which was entitled, “VALUATION AND APPRAISAL,” assigned § 27 to a part entitled, “ASSESSMENT OF TAX,” and assigned § 30 to a part entitled, “PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE AND COLLECT TAXES.”
See in particular Attorney Gen. v. Skehill, 217 Mass. 364, 365, 366 (1914); Attorney Gen. v. Roche, 219 Mass. 601, 602 (1914); Attorney Gen. v. Laycock, 221 Mass. 146, 148, 149 (1915); Whitney v. Tax Commr., 234 Mass. 188, 189-190, 191-192 (1919); Cabot v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 267 Mass. 338, 339-340, 342-343 (1929).
See St. 1930, c. 416, §§ 1, 30 and 31; St. 1937, c. 400, §§ 1, 4; St. 1939, c. 451, §§ 34 and 35; St. 1939, c. 494, §§ 1 and 2; St. 1953, c. 654, §§ 89 and 90; St. 1954, c. 572, §§ 1 and 2; St. 1961, c. 469, §§ 2 and 3; St. 1971, c. 555, § 58; St. 1978, c. 514, §§ 5 and 176.
See St. 1930, c. 416, § 1; St. 1931, c. 218, § 1; St. 1933, c. 321, § 7; St. 1937, c. 400, §§ 1 and 4; St. 1954, c. 681, §§ 5 and 22; St. 1968, c. 120, §§ 2 and 5; St. 1973, c. 1114, § 5; St. 1978, c. 514, § 72.
This case will not settle any great principle for the future so far as concerns the inheritance tax, which will steadily decrease in importance. It is clear under the present estate tax that all “appeals from the decision of the commissioner as to the value of an asset of the estate for purposes of chapter sixty-five C shall be made by filing a petition with the clerk of the appellate tax board” (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 62C, § 39(c), inserted by St. 1976, c. 415, § 22, and amended by St. 1978, c. 514, § 129. Subsection (b) of § 39 perpetuates the dichotomy between questions of valuation and other types of questions by providing that “appeals from the decision of the commissioner as to all other matters arising under chapter sixty-five C shall be made by filing a petition with either the clerk of the appellate tax board or the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate of the decedent . . . .”