Greene v. Trelleborg Sealing Solutions US, Inc.Greene v. Trelleborg Sealing Solutions US, Inc.
Before the Court is Defendant Trelleborg Sealing Solutions US, Inc.‘s (“Trelleborg“) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 50). Plaintiff Ashley Greene opposes this motion. (ECF 67). The Court grants Trelleborg‘s motion for the following reasons.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination and sexual harassment case. Ms. Greene alleges that she was discriminated against, sexually harassed, and retaliated against for complaining of discrimination on the basis of her sex and for reporting sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Several issues arise in the parties’ statements of material facts that must be resolved before the Court may proceed. First, Trelleborg notes that Exhibit A to Ms. Greene‘s statement of material facts, (ECF 69-1), was never produced to Trelleborg despite Trelleborg‘s repeated requests calling for its production.1 As Trelleborg correctly notes, it was Ms. Greene‘s responsibility under
Even if the Court were to consider this exhibit, it does not appear to be material to any part of this dispute. Ms. Greene only relies upon Exhibit A at three points: her partial admission of Trelleborg‘s Material Fact 9, (ECF 68 at 3), her full admission of Trelleborg‘s Material Fact 10, (id.), and her Additional Material Fact 70, which Trelleborg denies, (ECF 72 at 36). Trelleborg‘s Material Fact 9 reads as follows: “The Equal Employment Opportunity and Anti-Harassment Policy explains that Trelleborg does not tolerate discrimination, including sexual harassment, and it explains the
Exhibit A, which appears to be a collection of Trelleborg orientation documents, does not contradict Trelleborg‘s Material Fact 9 nor support the additional context Ms. Greene attempts to add in her response. As Ms. Greene admits Material Fact 10, there is no dispute of material fact for Exhibit A to support. And Exhibit A does not properly support Ms. Greene‘s Additional Material Fact 70. This proposed material fact reads:
The Employee Handbook provided by Trelleborg to Plaintiff was in a form of a binder entitled “Orientation” (Ex. A). This “Orientation” Handbook was primarily for union employees and included the agreement between Trelleborg Sealing Solutions—Fort Wayne GOEP, Division and The United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy Allied Industrial and Service Workers Union AFL-CIO-CLC (Local 7-0304). The orientation handbook also included “Plant Rules” (which included a Discipline Schedule) (Ex. A).
(ECF 72 at 36). Very little of Ms. Greene‘s proposed fact is substantiated by Exhibit A. There is no indication in Exhibit A that it was primarily for union employees, nor that the agreement contained within was made between Trelleborg and the unions Ms. Greene lists. Nor is there any indication in the exhibit (or cited elsewhere in the proposed fact) that this was the handbook given to Ms. Greene. It is accurate that Exhibit A contains a “Plant Rules” section that includes a discipline schedule. But without citation to evidence that this exhibit was the “handbook” given to Ms. Greene, Exhibit A does not properly support even this portion of Ms. Greene‘s proposed
Next, Trelleborg points out a pattern of issues in Ms. Greene‘s response to Trelleborg‘s statement of material facts. Many of Ms. Greene‘s responses purport to “partially admit” a fact, then go on to offer additional details that do not contradict any element of that fact. For example, Trelleborg‘s Material Fact 48 asserts that “Ms. Greene admits it is possible that Mr. Degitz simply did not like her.” (ECF 68 ¶ 48). Ms. Greene‘s response: “Partially admit. Perhaps Degitz did not like Plaintiff, but he nevertheless sexually harassed her and treated her differently.” (Id.) This is not a denial. Nor is it a partial admission. It is a full admission followed by an attempt to contextualize, and the Court will treat it as such.
At other points, Ms. Greene purports to partially admit a fact advanced by Trelleborg, but provides no explanation qualifying her admission, (id. ¶ 62 (“[p]artially admit[ing]” a fact with no additional explanation)), leaves a blank space where a pin citation to supporting evidence should go, (id. ¶ 67 (“(Pl. Aff. ¶___).“)), or provides an explanation wholly unrelated to the substance of the material fact she purports to dispute, (id. ¶ 65 (responding to the statement that “Ms. Greene understood she could report complaints to HR” by stating that Mr. Degitz would “kick the trash at Plaintiff ‘daily‘“)). In these instances, and all others where Ms. Greene fails to legitimately dispute Trelleborg‘s material facts, the Court will treat Trelleborg‘s facts as admitted. See Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When a responding party‘s statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party‘s statement in
Ms. Greene started working for Trelleborg on October 21, 2019. (ECF 51-1 at 72:17–23). At the time Trelleborg hired Ms. Greene, she signed an offer letter. (Id. at 164:13–165:7). She was hired as a Maintenance, Repair, and Operation (“MRO“) Buyer in the Purchasing department. (Id. at 72:24–73:06). She remained in this position throughout her time at Trelleborg. (Id.)
Trelleborg maintains an Equal Opportunity and Anti-Harassment Policy that covered Ms. Greene during her employment. (Id. at 82:10–87:11). That policy explains that Trelleborg does not tolerate discrimination, including sexual harassment, and it explains the procedure for employees to lodge complaints of harassment or discrimination. (Id.) The parties dispute which precise version of the policy Ms. Greene received from Trelleborg, but they agree that she was aware of the policy and its complaint procedure. (ECF 68 ¶ 10). Ms. Greene was also aware she could go to the human resource department or her manager to report complaints of discrimination or harassment. (ECF 51-1 at 86:3–87:11).
The parties also agree that Ms. Greene successfully availed herself of this complaint process on at least one occasion. Ms. Greene‘s initial supervisor was Controller Michelle Esterline. (Id. at 79:24, 80:11–13). On or around August 4, 2022, Ms. Greene complained to Ms. Esterline that a coworker‘s behavior toward Ms. Greene, including touching her hand, made her uncomfortable. (Id. at 217:23–220:13). Ms. Esterline addressed this complaint right away. (Id.)
Around October 2022, Trelleborg directed employees in the Purchasing Department to begin returning to in-person work part-time, as opposed to working a primarily remote schedule. (Id. at 161:13–163:12; ECF 51-2 ¶ 14). Ms. Greene was permitted the flexibility to arrive late and leave early on in-office days to address her childcare needs. (ECF 51-1 at 161:13–163:12). Around May 2023, Mr. Degitz informed Ms. Greene that Trelleborg was requiring all manufacturing and manufacturing support employees, including Ms. Greene, to return to full-time in-person work. (Id. at 190:18–191:23). Human Resources Generalist Stacy Standish, Ms. Brenneke, Mr. Degitz, and Ms. Esterline met with Ms. Greene on May 24, 2023, to discuss concerns related to her schedule, her reporting structure, her performance review and compensation, and the manner of her communications. (ECF 51-2 ¶¶ 15–17, Exhibit 2). Ms. Greene made a recording of the meeting. (ECF 133:17–134:16, 272:14–273:08).
Ms. Greene understood that the decision to require her to return to work was not made by Mr. Degitz. (ECF 51-3 at 15:55–16:15). During the meeting, Ms. Greene
Ms. Greene also discussed her compensation at the meeting. During her last year of employment, she received a raise. (ECF 51-1 at 160:8–11). She understood, though, that allotment for salary increases had decreased across the board for all employees at Trelleborg that year. (ECF 51-3 at 12:35–13:05). During the meeting, Ms. Esterline informed Ms. Greene that her performance had been “up and down” and “rocky” during the last year. (Id. at 6:50–10:23). Ms. Esterline explained that she had received complaints from other employees about Ms. Greene‘s communication style over Teams, in person, and on the phone. (Id.) Ms. Greene admitted that her performance had been rocky or uneven. (Id. at 7:43–8:03). Ms. Greene also admitted that Trelleborg had directed her to speak more politely to a fellow employee. (ECF 51-1 at 235:3–239:2).
Outside the specific context of this meeting, Ms. Greene admits that she would commonly use terms like “BS” and “WTF” to Ms. Esterline. (Id. at 206:3–24). She also
Ms. Greene testifies in her deposition that Mr. Degitz constantly told her she was ugly. (Id. at 103:2–11). She reports that Mr. Degitz told her that she should be in the kitchen and not in a purchasing role. (Id. at 136:4–7). According to Ms. Greene, Mr. Degitz would kick trash and recycle bins at Ms. Greene or throw things at her daily when she worked in-person. (Id. at 114:14–121:18). Ms. Greene admits that she struggles to recall the details and frequency of these comments and behaviors, (id. at 136:4–23), but she recalls reporting Mr. Degitz multiple times to HR and Ms. Esterline via email, in-person conversations, or Teams messages. (Id. at 126:20–131:23).
As a general matter, Ms. Greene largely avoided Mr. Degitz, including on Teams messaging. (Id. at 105:21–23).2 When she did correspond with him via Teams, the messages he sent were not sexually harassing. (Id. at 103:2–11, 105:2–6). But Ms. Greene
On August 9, 2023, Mr. Degitz notified Ms. Greene that, due to a company-wide policy, her job title was changing from MRO Buyer to Purchaser. (Id. at 239:11–240:11). This was part of Trelleborg‘s effort to ensure uniform titles across the company. (Id.) Ms. Greene was unaware of who made the decision to change her title, and she was frustrated by the change. (Id. at 152:6–153:16, 158:23–159:1 239:11–245:15). But she admits that Trelleborg could not have retaliated against her by changing her job title if all the employees in her position across the country had their job titles changed from MRO Buyer to Purchaser. (Id. at 159:16–19). On August 11, 2023, she resigned from Trelleborg. (Id. at 76:4–8, 95:15–17, 160:24–161:4, 246:15–247:8).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must review the record, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party‘s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). But the Court will not “sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor will the Court conduct research or develop arguments for the parties. Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.“).
To survive summary judgment, the nonmovant “cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in his pleadings, but must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial.” Robin v. Espo Eng‘g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted); see also Goodman v. Nat‘l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
III. ANALYSIS
Ms. Greene alleges that while working at Trelleborg, she was discriminated against, sexually harassed, and retaliated against for complaining of discrimination on the basis of her sex and for reporting sexual harassment. (ECF 6). She further alleges that she was constructively discharged as a result of the discrimination and retaliation. (Id.) Trelleborg moves for summary judgment on all aspects of Ms. Greene‘s complaint.
a. Contractual Limitation
Because the potential contractual limitation of Ms. Greene‘s claims could dispose of this matter without requiring a merits analysis, the Court begins there. Ms. Greene‘s offer letter from Trelleborg, which Ms. Greene signed, provides as follows:
As a condition of employment or continued employment and to the extent permitted by law, I agree not to file any action or suit relating to or arising out of my application for employment or employment with the Company more than 180 calendar days (or in less time if any applicable law so requires) after the event and/or employment practice or action complained of including but not limited to, failure to hire, employment termination and discrimination claims against the Employer or its agents, claims for wages, salary, commissions or expenses, and I agree to waive any statutes of limitation to the contrary (except those requiring a shorter period). I understand and agree that any action or lawsuit filed outside this 1853 day period will be barred forever. I understand and agree that the 180 day period (or applicable shorter period) will not be extended for any reason, including continuing violations. I further understand that the filing of complaint internally with the employer does not toll or extend the 180 day period for filing a civil lawsuit, claim, or charge.
It is undisputed that Ms. Greene resigned from Trelleborg on August 11, 2023. It is also undisputed that she filed this action on October 7, 2024, more than a year later. Thus, Trelleborg contends that Ms. Greene is precluded from bringing this action. But, as Ms. Greene points out, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“) on November 20, 2023, (ECF 6 at 1; ECF 6-1 at 1), and the EEOC issued her a right-to-sue letter on July 11, 2024, (ECF 6-1 at 3). Trelleborg dismisses this EEOC proceeding as “not relevant,” maintaining that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff filed an administrative charge does not negate, nor toll, her independent contractual obligation to file suit within the agreed upon period.” (ECF 73 at 4).
This is wrong. Until she exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC and receiving a right-to-sue letter, Ms. Greene was unable to bring a Title VII action in this Court. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, a contractual provision that required her to sue in federal court without regard to the exhaustion of her administrative remedy “would be contrary to public policy” because administrative review of the filed charge can, and here did, extend beyond the contractual limitations period. Lugihibl v. Fifth Third Bank, 13-cv-7193, 2015 WL 1235221, at *2 (N.D. Ill. March 16, 2015); see also Sanford v. Quicken Loans, No. 13–11929, 2014 WL 266410 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2014); Mazurkiewicz v. Clayton Homes, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 682 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Friedmann v. Raymour Furniture Co., Inc., No. CV 12–1307(LDW)(AKT), 2012 WL 4976124 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012); O‘Phelan v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 03 C 00014, 2005 WL 2387647 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005); Mabry v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:03 CV 848, 2005 WL 1167002 (M.D. N.C. Apr. 19, 2005); Lewis v. Harper Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 769 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Salisbury v. Art Van Furniture, 938 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Mich. 1996). The Court declines to dismiss Ms. Greene‘s claims on this basis, as there is a genuine issue over whether this contractual provision is enforceable.
b. Gender/Sex Discrimination
Trelleborg next contends that Ms. Greene‘s discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment because, as a matter of law, she did not suffer an adverse employment action.
To prevail on her Title VII discrimination claim, Ms. Greene must show that she suffered an adverse employment action. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep‘t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has explained that an adverse employment action means “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335, 1336 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Muldrow v. St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024)). Some examples of adverse employment action include “delaying training, denying vacation times, transferring shifts, and considering family circumstances in a biased way.” Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460, 470–71 (7th Cir. 2025). In contrast, “a swapped role . . . in the same building . . . [that does] not affect
In her complaint, Ms. Greene alleges that she suffered adverse employment actions when she was deprived of the hybrid work schedule other employees enjoyed, denied her annual raise despite meeting all performance requirements, and had her job title changed without explanation of her new responsibilities or benefits.4 (ECF 6 ¶ 8). She also alleges that she was constructively discharged. (Id. ¶ 10). Both parties now agree that Ms. Greene did in fact receive her annual raise, so the Court need not address this issue. Trelleborg argues that the remaining three actions Ms. Greene puts forward are not adverse employment actions as a matter of law.
Trelleborg first contends that the change to Ms. Greene‘s schedule was not an adverse employment action. By Ms. Greene‘s own account, when she started at Trelleborg, she had to be in the office five days a week. (ECF 51-1 at 74:6–8). Then, during the COVID-19 pandemic, she went fully remote. (Id. at 74:9–19). Both parties agree that Mr. Degitz informed Ms. Greene around May 2023 that Trelleborg was implementing a company-wide directive for all manufacturing and manufacturing support employees, including Ms. Greene, to return to full-time in-person work. (ECF
Ms. Greene offers no persuasive argument that Trelleborg‘s return-to-work policy constituted an adverse employment action. In fact, she only offers two sentences in response to Trelleborg‘s argument, first contending it was “not true” that “all workers were required to return to in-office work,” and then stating that her circumstances only changed after experiencing sexual harassment from Mr. Degitz and complaining. She cites no record evidence for either point.
First, Trelleborg does not assert that all workers were required to return to in-office work. It asserts, and Ms. Greene does not dispute, that the policy required all manufacturing and manufacturing support employees to return to the office. Second, Trelleborg asserts, and Ms. Greene does not dispute, that this decision to return some employees to full-time in-office work was company-wide, and not a decision made by Mr. Degitz. Third, even if Ms. Greene‘s arguments were not undeveloped and
Next, Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene‘s title change from MRO Buyer to Purchaser was not an adverse employment action. In support, it contends that the change of title was a matter of wording only, with no change in Ms. Greene‘s pay, role, or responsibilities. This is supported by Trelleborg‘s email correspondence with Ms. Greene. On August 7, 2023, Mr. Degitz forwarded Ms. Greene an email notifying her that Trelleborg was conducting a clean-up and standardization of the many different job titles that existed across the company. (ECF 51-1 at 202). The forwarded email explained that this would not be “a contractual Job Title change but is a change in the wording of your job title.” (Id.) Ms. Greene responded to this email with a question: “So I am no longer the MRO buyer?” (Id.) Mr. Degitz clarified that she was still the MRO buyer, which prompted Ms. Greene to send several emails expressing frustration over the title change. (Id. at 198–201).
Ms. Greene‘s response to this argument is limited to one sentence: “Plaintiff‘s job title changed ‘MRO Buyer’ to ‘Purchaser‘, which was made complicated by the refusal of Tom Degitz to provide any feedback to her regarding the change in her position.” (ECF 67 at 5). In support, she cites paragraph three of her EEOC filing, which essentially restates this sentence. (ECF 6-1 at 2).
Again, this is not enough. Ms. Greene does not meaningfully engage with Trelleborg‘s argument, and the evidence she cites does nothing to create a genuine issue
Third, Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene‘s resignation from Trelleborg was not a constructive discharge and thus was not an adverse employment action. Voluntary resignation only constitutes an adverse employment action when it falls into the category of constructive discharge. Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 843 F.3d 760. Constructive discharge occurs “when, from the standpoint of a reasonable employee, the working conditions become unbearable.” Wright v. Illinois Dep‘t of Children and Family Svcs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). There are generally two forms of constructive discharge. The first occurs when an employee resigns due to alleged discriminatory harassment. To show that this form of constructive discharge occurred, a plaintiff must “show working conditions even more egregious than that required for a hostile work environment claim.” Id. The second occurs ”when the employer‘s actions communicate to the employee that she immediately and unavoidably will be terminated.” Ziccarelli v. Dart, 35 F.4th 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original).
Trelleborg contends that Ms. Greene‘s recording of the meeting with Trelleborg undercuts any claim that her termination was imminent or her work environment egregiously discriminatory beyond the standard for a hostile work environment. As
It seems clear that the second form of constructive discharge did not occur here. To show this form of constructive discharge, a plaintiff must offer evidence that “the handwriting [was] on the wall and the axe was about to fall.” Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 409 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original). At no point does Ms. Greene point to evidence indicating that her termination was imminent. Instead, she argues that because she was required to return to in-office work, “her ability to be a foster parent and to transport her own children around was now compromised—the handwriting was on the wall and the axe was about to fall.” (ECF 67 at 5). This argument does not hold water. The fact that Trelleborg required Ms. Greene, along with all other manufacturing and manufacturing-support employees, to return to in-office work cannot support the contention that Ms. Greene‘s termination was imminent, even if this requirement interfered with Ms. Greene‘s out-of-office activities.
The first form of constructive harassment is a better fit for these facts, but ultimately it also fails. In her deposition, Ms. Greene alleges that Mr. Degitz engaged in
As Ms. Greene has failed to put forward evidence that she was constructively discharged, the Court finds as a matter of law that no constructive discharge occurred. Without a viable claim of adverse employment action, Ms. Greene‘s discrimination claim may not proceed. Thus, this claim fails as a matter of law.
c. Retaliation
Next, Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene‘s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because she cannot show retaliation under either the burden-shifting or the holistic method of proof. A Title VII retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) [s]he
To prevail under the burden-shifting approach, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by putting forward evidence to show that “(1) [s]he engaged in a protected activity, (2) [s]he performed [her] job duties according to [her] employer‘s legitimate expectations, (3) [s]he suffered an adverse action, and (4) [s]he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in protected activity.” Id. To prevail under the holistic method, the plaintiff must put forward evidence which, when considered as a whole, “would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff‘s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Id.
Under the burden-shifting approach, Ms. Greene‘s claim fails at the threshold because she puts forward no evidence of a similarly situated comparator. In her brief, she argues that Tom Degitz was treated more favorably, and though he was her supervisor at the time she resigned, “there was a time when he was not a supervisor (even though he was always her superior).” (ECF 67 at 6). The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that a superior cannot ordinarily serve as a similarly situated comparator for a subordinate. Burks v. Wisconsin Dep‘t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[O]rdinarily, it will not be the case that a plaintiff is similarly situated to
Her claim fares no better under the holistic approach. Though Ms. Greene has identified her deposition testimony as evidence of Mr. Degitz‘s bad behavior, she does not point to any evidence suggesting that Trelleborg retaliated against her as a result of her complaints about this behavior. The Court has determined that Ms. Greene was not constructively discharged, and both parties agree that Trelleborg implemented a company-wide return-to-office policy that affected all employees in manufacturing and manufacturing support, not just Ms. Greene. Similarly, the change to Ms. Greene‘s job title was part of a company-wide initiative. There is no evidence that any of these events stemmed from Ms. Greene‘s complaints about Mr. Degitz‘s behavior, and Ms. Greene does not identify any other allegedly adverse action that resulted from her complaints about Mr. Degitz. In fact, it does not appear that the record contains any evidence that these complaints occurred beyond nonspecific reference to HR complaints in a Teams chat and Ms. Greene‘s self-serving allegations in her pleadings, discovery response, and deposition testimony. Even if there were a genuine issue of material fact over whether the changes to Ms. Greene‘s title and work schedule were adverse actions, as seems unlikely, there is no “causal link” between any protected activity Ms. Greene undertook and those actions. Lewis, 909 F.3d at 866. Thus, this claim fails as a matter of law.
Last, Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene‘s sexual harassment claim fails as a matter of law because she cannot meet its legal elements.
Ms. Greene argues that Mr. Degitz‘s sexual harassment is actionable because it created a hostile work environment for her. To succeed on a hostile work environment theory, Ms. Greene must show that “(1) the work environment was objectively and subjectively offensive, (2) the harassment complained of was based on gender, (3) the conduct was either severe or pervasive, and (4) a basis for employer liability exists.” Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2019). Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene cannot succeed on any of these elements. At summary judgment, Ms. Greene was required to put forward evidence and argument sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact over whether she could establish each of these elements at trial. She has failed to do so.
In her response to Trelleborg‘s argument that her sexual harassment claim fails as a matter of law, Ms. Greene mostly restates the allegations she made in her complaint and elsewhere in her brief. Remarkably, she does not cite to a single piece of record evidence throughout her entire response to Trelleborg‘s argument on sexual harassment. Nor does she seriously engage with any of Trelleborg‘s substantive arguments. Instead, her general approach is to flatly deny Trelleborg‘s argument without elaboration, then list off a series of allegations, some of which reflect those she made in her deposition and some which do not. (Again, it is difficult to discern with certainty which allegations track Ms. Greene‘s deposition because Ms. Greene fails to
Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene cannot establish a basis for employer liability because an employer can only be liable if it was “negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment.” Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997)).5 To establish negligence, a plaintiff generally must show a concerted effort to inform her employer the problem exists, including by taking actions such as lodging complaints or involving high level management. Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, both parties agree that Trelleborg maintained an Equal Opportunity and Anti-Harassment Policy that covered Ms. Greene during her employment and explained Ms. Greene‘s recourse in the event of sexual harassment. Trelleborg points out that when Ms. Greene availed herself of that process in the past, Trelleborg immediately responded. But when it comes to Mr. Degitz, Trelleborg argues that Ms. Greene‘s vague assertion in her deposition that she made “approximately 35” reports of sexual harassment about Mr. Degitz is not enough at summary judgment. (ECF 51-1 at 131:7–21). In Ms. Greene‘s deposition, she stated that she forwarded emails to her personal account for approximately eight months before resigning. (ECF 193:6–13). And
In essence, Trelleborg argues that no reasonable juror could find for Ms. Greene on this issue because (1) she states that she complained near-constantly about Mr. Degitz, including over email, (2) she forwarded all complaining emails she could access to her personal email account, and (3) she produced those emails as part of this litigation, but for some unexplained reason those emails do not appear in the record. Ms. Greene does not have a satisfactory response. Rather than addressing this remarkable gap in the evidence at summary judgment, she restates in conclusory fashion her allegations against Mr. Degitz and asserts without citing any record evidence that “[t]here is plenty of evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude” that Trelleborg is liable for Mr. Degitz‘s conduct. (ECF 67 at 12).
Vague reference to “plenty of evidence” will not suffice at this stage. Summary judgment is the “put up or shut up moment” in a lawsuit, and Ms. Greene has failed to put up. Hammel, 407 F.3d at 859. Ms. Greene has asserted that she complained almost every day to Trelleborg about Mr. Degitz‘s conduct, but she has failed to produce evidence supporting that. Without evidence of her complaints, there is no basis for Trelleborg to be held liable, and without a basis for employer liability, Ms. Greene‘s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim cannot survive summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Trelleborg‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 50). The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED on September 1, 2026.
/s/ Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT