Lead Opinion
A jury found Daniel Greene guilty of murder, armed robbery and aggravated assault. The jury also found, as an aggravating circumstance, that Greene committed the murder during the course of an armed robbery and, based upon that finding, the jury imposed a death sentence for the murder. For the armed robbery, Greene received a life sentence and, for the aggravated assault, a 20-year sentence.
Greene appealed and, in one of his enumerations, he asserted that the trial court erred by excusing five prospectivе jurors for cause based upon their opposition to the death penalty. Greene v. State,
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Greene’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Greene v. Georgia, 519 U. S._(117 SC 578, 136 LE2d 507) (1996). The Supreme Court held that this Court “correctly recognized that [Wainwright u] Witt is, ‘the controlling authority as to the death[-penalty] qualification of prospective jurors. . . .’ [Cit.]” Greene v. Georgia, supra at 578-579. However, the Supreme Court also held that Wainwright v. “Witt is not ‘controlling authority5 as to the standard of review to be applied by state appellate courts reviewing trial courts’ rulings on jury selection.” Greene v. Georgia, supra at 579. “[T]he Suрreme Court of Georgia is free to adopt the rule laid down in [Wainwright v.] Witt for review of trial court findings injury-selection cases, but it need not do so.” Greene v.
The proper standard for determining the disqualification of a prospective juror based upon his views on capital punishmеnt “is whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright v. Witt, supra at 424 (II). This standard does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with “ ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ” Ledford v. State,
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Supreme Court also held that, under 28 USC § 2254 (d), a federal court must give deference to a state triаl court’s finding of prospective juror bias. As noted, we are not bound by that additional holding in Wainwright v. Witt, since this Court is not a federal court which conducts a habeas corpus review of a state trial court’s findings pursuant to 28 USC § 2254 (d). Nevertheless, we do apply the Wainwright v. Witt standard of review because this Court previously has adopted it as the controlling law of Georgia.
It is because veniremembers “may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings!,)” [cit.], that deference must be paid to the trial court’s determination of whether the views of a prospective juror will “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” [Cits.]
Ledford v. State, supra at 64 (6). See also Crowe v. State,
Under that controlling Georgia authority, our review of the trial court’s disqualifications of the prospective jurors must be based upon a consideration of the voir dire as a whole. Crowe v. State, supra at 588 (9) (a); Spivey v. State,
As has been pointed out, “ ‘determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.’ [Cit.] Often, the answers of a prospective juror will to some degree be contradictory. [Cit.]” [Cit.]
Jefferson v. State, supra at 823 (2). The relevant inquiry on appeal is whether the trial court’s finding that a prospective juror is disqualified is supported by the record as a whole. See Crowe v. State, supra at 588 (9) (a); Taylor v. State,
Prospective Juror Irma Miller
Ms. Miller initially stated that she was conscientiously opposed to the death penalty in “some cases.” She then said that she would not vote for that punishment in any case. However, she next appeared to equivocate, stating that she did not “really know” whether she would never vote for the death penalty. Nevertheless, she thereafter affirmed that, even if she believed the death penalty was the most appropriate sentence, she could not vote for that penalty “no matter, regardless of what the facts and circumstances showed in the case” and that she did not think she could ever vote for that sentence. Eventually, she appeared to equivocate yet again, conceding that “there are certain circumstances where it might be necessary that we vote for the death penalty” and that she “probably would vote for the death penalty.” However, she concluded her voir dire by admitting that she was “ninety percent” opposed to the death penalty and committed to the belief that only God should take a lifе.
At best, Ms. Miller gave conflicting and- equivocal answers regarding her views on the death penalty. Because Ms. Miller appears to have been unable to articulate her true feelings, deference must be paid to the trial court’s assessment of her qualification. This deference extends to the trial court’s resolution of the conflicts and equivocations in Ms. Miller’s voir dire. Considering Ms. Miller’s voir dire as a whole and giving the requisite deference to the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the trial court was authorized to find that the thоughts she expressed on the death penalty conveyed the impression that she would be unable to apply the law faithfully and impartially and that she was, therefore, subject to disqualification.
Prospective Juror Linda McDougal
Although Ms. McDougal began her voir dire by stating that she was not conscientiously opposed to the death penalty, she did admit, upon further examination, that she “truly” could not “say at this time” that she could vote for that penalty. Only when subsequently pressed did she state that she could vote for the death sentence. However, then she admitted that she leaned toward a life sentence and “truly” did not know whether that leaning would interfere with her decision to .vote for a death sentence. Thereafter, Ms. McDougal gave answers which seem to indicate that she was qualified, but she eventually began weeping and finally acknowledged that she was not
Ms. McDougal’s responses were conflicting and equivocal and she had some difficulty expressing her true feelings regarding the death sentence. Having seen Ms. McDougal and heard the entirety of her voir dire, however, the trial court was authorized to find that, if faced with imposing the death sentence, she would respond on the basis of her emotional aversion to that sentence, rather than in accordance with her instructions and oath.
Prospective Juror Alicia Oden
Ms. Oden began her voir dire by acknowledging that she was conscientiously opposed to capital punishment. Although she did state that she would vote for the death penalty in some circumstances, she nevertheless expressed some “serious concеrns” about that penalty. Those “concerns” took the form of the religious “price” she “would have to pay for partaking in something that resulted in someone else’s life being taken.” When asked whether she could set aside her religious beliefs, Ms. Oden did not respond. When pressed, however, she stated that she “would try to follow the orders of the court.” (Emphasis supplied.) A more definite response was requested and Ms. Oden admitted that she “would not be able to. I cannot say definitely that I would be able to.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thereafter, she appeared to equivocate and gave some responses which indicated that she was qualified. However, she then reiterated that she had a “feeling against the death penalty,” but would “try to be fair.” Finally, she acknowledged a “semi” strong leaning against the death penalty which was “going to come with” her into the jury room.
From the entirety of Ms. Oden’s voir dire, it is apparent that the trial court was authorized to find that she harbored a strongly held religious aversion to the death penalty. Indeed, she frankly questioned her own ability to adhere to the instructions of the court, rather than to her beliefs. She could state only that she would “try to be fair” and she further qualified that statement by acknowledging that her religious beliefs would still be with her in the jury room. Having seen and heard Ms. Oden, the trial court was authorized to form the impression that, based upon her religious views in opposition to the death penalty, she would be unable to apply the law.
Prospective Juror Bendolyndo Bady
When asked if she was conscientiously opposed to the death penalty, Ms. Bady replied that she never in her “heart felt like that you should take one life for another. So, you know, it’s kind of hard for me to answer.” However, she thereafter did state that she could vote for the death penalty in some circumstances. Nevertheless, when she
The trial court was authorized to find that Ms. Bady held a strong personal aversion to the death penalty and was uncertain as to whether she could actually vote to impose that sentence. In order for Ms. Bady to be qualified, she would have to be willing to set aside her own strong personal feelings and follow, instead, her instructions and oath. However, she acknowledged that her belief was strong and that she could not be talked out of it by the attorneys. If she could not be talked out of her strongly held belief by the attornеys, the trial court was not required to believe that she nevertheless could set aside her belief and follow her instructions and oath instead. To the contrary, the trial court was authorized to believe that portion of Ms. Bady’s voir dire wherein she acknowledged that she would not vote for the death penalty. Consequently, the trial court was authorized to determine from the content and tenor of Ms. Bady’s responses that she would be unable to apply the law, rather than follow her own personal belief.
Prospective Juror Betty Ann Sims
Ms. Sims began her voir dire by stating that she was not conscientiously opposed to the death penalty. However, when asked specifically whether she would vote for that penalty if authorized by the charge and the evidence, she stated that she did not think that she could. When asked about this conflict, she replied that she did not “really think [she] could put a person in the electric chair. . . . [She did not] think [she] could go along with that.... Maybe [she] didn’t understand [the] first question.” Upon further questioning, she then stated that she was so conscientiously opposed to the death рenalty that she did not think that she could vote for that penalty under any circumstances. However, she then stated that she “probably could” vote for the death penalty “under some circumstances.” Thereafter,
The transcript of Ms. Sims’ voir dire shows conflict with regard to her views on the death penalty. In resolving the conflicts and equivocations in Ms. Sims’ responses, the trial court was authorized to conclude that she was disqualified, since she could not affirm that she was unbiased against the death penalty and could, at best, state only that she “probably could” be fair and could only “guess” that she would vote for the death penalty even though convinced that it was the proper sentence.
As support for his contention that the trial court’s findings must be reversed, Greene cites Jarrell v. State,
[fjurther voir dire examination of this juror might have established a reluctance to impose a death sentence so strong it would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of her duties as a juror.
Jarrell v. State, supra at 881-882 (1). Here, entirely unlike Jarrell, however, the trial court did not base its disqualifications upon the prospective jurors’ mere expressions of “qualms”, and “leanings.” Instead, the trial court undertook an extensive and thorough voir dire to determine whether the prospective jurors’ views on capital
Greene also urges that Pope v. State,
Considering the entirety of the extensive and thorough voir dire and giving the requisite deference to the trial court’s findings, a revеrsal of the disqualifications of the prospective jurors in this case would be contrary to the controlling authority of Ledford, supra, and innumerable other cases previously decided by this Court. Accordingly, we adhere to our original judgment and affirm Greene’s convictions and sentences.
Judgments affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The U. S. Supreme Court remanded this case to this Court in order that we might articulate the standard of review we apply to a trial court’s findings when a venireperson is dismissed for cаuse due to juror bias. Greene v. Georgia, 519 U. S._(117 SC 578, 136 LE2d 507) (1996). In an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court man
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,
the most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimоny in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out. . . .”
Id.,
The majority opines that each of the prospective jurors at issue in this appeal “offered equivocal and contradictory testimony which authorized the trial court to find that [the juror’s] view on capital punishment was such as to prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties.” Majority opiniоn, p. 54. The fact that a juror expresses a variety of opinions regarding the death penalty is not an unusual situation. As former Chief Justice Weltner observed on behalf of the court in Spivey v. State,
[W]e offer this parenthetical comment upon the general problems involved in Witherspoon questions. First, it should be noted that prospective jurors rarely come into court with precisely defined opinions relative to the death penalty. Instead, most carry with them contradictions arising from a deep-seated human need to avengе outrageous cruelty, a quasi-religious tendency toward forgiveness, and a sense of the worth of every human life. Few have been called upon to formulate and express their thoughts with any degree of clarity or precision. In reality, then, voir dire becomes an exercise in the shaping of opinions, more so than their expression. Again and again, the record in death cases will contain answers which are ambiguous, equivocal, and contradictory. That is not because the juror is attempting to dissimulate, but because he never before has been required to formulate and express, with solemnity and finality, a viewpoint on one of the most controversial issues in modem American culture. The fact that a juror may arrive at a posture which varies from his initial expressions should be understood as exactly what it is — a final distillation, after substantial questioning by contending counsel and often by the judge, of theretofore unarticulated, amorphous, and casual thoughts upon capital punishment.
Excusal for cause is appropriate when a venireperson states “unambiguously and unequivocally that he or she would vote against the death penalty regardless of what evidence might be presented at trial.” Id. at 193. In the case at bar, in direct conflict with Spivey, the majority upholds the trial court’s excusáis for cause of jurors who were ambiguous and equivocal in their voir dire responses. In Witherspoon, supra,
Each of the venirewomen stated there were circumstances under which they could impose the death penalty. See Greene v. State,
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears join in this dissent.