GREENE v. McELROY ET AL.
No. 180
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 1, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959.
360 U.S. 474
Assistant Attorney General Doub argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Samuel D. Slade and Bernard Cedarbaum.
David I. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case involves the validity of the Government‘s revocation of security clearance granted to petitioner, an aeronautical engineer employed by a private manufacturer which produced goods for the armed services. Petitioner was discharged from his employment solely as a consequence of the revocation because his access to classified information was required by the nature of his job. After his discharge, petitioner was unable to secure
Petitioner was vice president and general manager of Engineering and Research Corporation (ERCO), a business devoted primarily to developing and manufacturing various mechanical and electronic products. He began this employment in 1937 soon after his graduation from the Guggenheim School of Aeronautics and, except for a brief leave of absence, he stayed with the firm until his discharge in 1953. He was first employed as a junior engineer and draftsman. Because of the excellence of his work he eventually became a chief executive officer of the firm. During his career with ERCO, he was credited with the expedited development of a complicated electronic flight simulator and with the design of a rocket launcher, both of which were produced by ERCO and long used by the Navy.
During the post-World War II period, petitioner was given security clearances on three occasions.1 These were required by the nature of the projects undertaken by ERCO for the various armed services.2 On November 21,
the best interests of the United States.”
On January 23, 1952, petitioner, with counsel, appeared before the IERB. He was questioned in detail concerning his background and the information disclosed in the IERB letter. In response to numerous, and searching questions he explained in substance that specific “suspect” persons with whom he was said to have associated were actually friends of his ex-wife. He explained in some detail that during his first marriage, which lasted from
The Government presented no witnesses. It was obvious, however, from the questions posed to petitioner and to his witnesses, that the Board relied on confidential reports which were never made available to petitioner. These reports apparently were compilations of statements taken from various persons contacted by an investigatory agency. Petitioner had no opportunity to confront and question persons whose statements reflected adversely on him or to confront the government investigators who took their statements. Moreover, it seemed evident that the Board itself had never questioned the investigators and
On January 29, 1952, the IERB, on the basis of the testimony given at the hearing and the confidential reports, reversed the action of the PSB and informed petitioner and ERCO that petitioner was authorized to work on Secret contract work.
On March 27, 1953, the Secretary of Defense abolished the PSB and IERB and directed the Secretaries of the three armed services to establish regional Industrial Personnel Security Boards to coordinate the industrial security program.6 The Secretaries were also instructed to establish uniform standards, criteria, and procedures.7
On April 17, 1953, respondent Anderson, the Secretary of the Navy, wrote ERCO that he had reviewed petitioner‘s case and had concluded that petitioner‘s “continued access to Navy classified security information [was] inconsistent with the best interests of National Security.” No hearing preceded this notification. He requested ERCO to exclude petitioner “from any part of your plants, factories or sites at which classified Navy projects are being carried out and to bar him access to all Navy classified information.” He also advised the corporation that petitioner‘s case was being referred to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the IERB‘s decision of January 29, 1952, be overruled. ERCO had no choice but to comply with the request.10
This led to petitioner‘s discharge.11
Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the decision. On October 13, 1953, the Navy wrote to him stating that it had requested the Eastern Industrial Personnel Security Board (EIPSB) to accept jurisdiction and to arrive at a final determination concerning petitioner‘s status.13 Var-
“The transcript to be made of this hearing will not include all material in the file of the case, in that, it will not include reports of investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other investigative agencies which are confidential. Neither will it contain information concerning the identity of confidential informants or information which will reveal the source of confidential evidence. The transcript will contain only the Statement of Reasons, your answer thereto and the testimony actually taken at this hearing.”
Petitioner was again advised that the revocation of his security clearance was based on incidents occurring between 1942 and 1947, including his associations with alleged Communists, his visits with officials of the Russian Embassy, and the presence in his house of Communist literature.
Petitioner, in response to a question, stated at the outset of the hearing that he was then employed at a salary of $4,700 per year as an architectural draftsman and that he had been receiving $18,000 per year as Vice President and General Manager of ERCO. He later explained that
Petitioner was subjected to an intense examination similar to that which he experienced before the IERB in 1952. During the course of the examination, the Board injected new subjects of inquiry and made it evident that it was relying on various investigatory reports and statements of confidential informants which were not made available to petitioner.16 Petitioner reiterated in great detail the
Soon after the conclusion of the hearing, the EIPSB notified petitioner that it had affirmed the Secretary‘s action and that it had decided that the granting of clearance to petitioner for access to classified information was “not clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” Petitioner requested that he be furnished with a detailed statement of findings supporting the Board‘s decision. He was informed, however, that security con-
After the EIPSB decision in 1954, petitioner filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Dis-
The Court of Appeals recognized that petitioner had suffered substantial harm from the clearance revocation.21 But in that court‘s view, petitioner‘s suit presented no “justiciable controversy” - no controversy which the courts could finally and effectively decide. This conclusion followed from the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the Executive Department alone is competent to evaluate the competing considerations which exist in determining the persons who are to be afforded security clearances.
Petitioner contends that the action of the Department of Defense in barring him from access to classified information on the basis of statements of confidential informants made to investigators was not authorized by either Congress or the President and has denied him “liberty” and “property” without “due process of law” in contravention of the
The issue, as we see it, is whether the Department of Defense has been authorized to create an industrial security clearance program under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be restrained in following their chosen professions on the basis of fact determinations concerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings in which they are denied the traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.
Prior to World War II, only sporadic efforts were made to control the clearance of persons who worked in private establishments which manufactured materials for national defense. Report of the Commission on Government Security, 1957, S. Doc. No. 64, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 236. During World War II the War Department instituted a
Respondents maintain that congressional authorization to the President to fashion a program which denies security clearance to persons on the basis of confidential information which the individuals have no opportunity to confront and test is unnecessary because the President has inherent authority to maintain military secrets inviolate. And respondents argue that if a statutory grant of power is necessary, such a grant can readily be inferred “as a necessarily implicit authority from the generalized provisions” of legislation dealing with the armed services.
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government‘s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots.25 They find expression in the
Professor Wigmore, commenting on the importance of cross-examination, states in his treatise, 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1367:
“For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience.”
Little need be added to this incisive summary statement except to point out that under the present clearance procedures not only is the testimony of absent witnesses allowed to stand without the probing questions of the person under attack which often uncover inconsistencies,
We must determine against this background, whether the President or Congress has delegated to the Depart
“PART V—DISSEMINATION OF CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION
“29. General. a. No person shall be entitled to knowledge or possession of, or access to, classified security information solely by virtue of his office or position.
“b. Classified security information shall not be discussed with or in the presence of unauthorized persons, and the latter shall not be permitted to inspect or have access to such information.
“c. The head of each agency shall establish a system for controlling the dissemination of classified security information adequate to the needs of his agency.
“30. Limitations on dissemination—a. Within the Executive Branch. The dissemination of classified security information shall be limited to persons whose official duties require knowledge of such information. Special measures shall be employed to limit the dissemination of ‘Top Secret’ security information to the absolute minimum. Only that portion of ‘Top Secret’ security information necessary to the proper planning and appropriate action of any organizational unit or individual shall be released to such unit or individual.
“b. Outside the Executive Branch. Classified security information shall not be disseminated out-side the Executive Branch by any person or agency having access thereto or knowledge thereof except under conditions and through channels authorized by
the head of the disseminating agency, even though such person or agency may have been solely or partly responsible for its production.”
The second, Exec. Order No. 10501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049, which revoked Exec. Order No. 10290, is entitled “Safeguarding Official Information In The Interests Of The Defense Of The United States” and provides in relevant part:
“Sec. 7. Accountability and Dissemination. . . .
“(b) Dissemination Outside the Executive Branch. Classified defense information shall not be disseminated outside the executive branch except under conditions and through channels authorized by the head of the disseminating department or agency, even though the person or agency to which dissemination of such information is proposed to be made may have been solely or partly responsible for its production.”
Clearly, neither of these orders empowers any executive agency to fashion security programs whereby persons are deprived of their present civilian employment and of the opportunity of continued activity in their chosen professions without being accorded the chance to challenge effectively the evidence and testimony upon which an adverse security determination might rest.28
Turning to the legislative enactments which might be deemed as delegating authority to the Department of Defense to fashion programs under which persons may be
The first proffered statute is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
Another Act cited by respondents is the Armed Service Procurement Act of 1947, as amended. It provides in
“(a) Purchases of and contracts for property or services covered by this chapter shall be made by formal advertising. However, the head of an agency may negotiate such a purchase or contract, if— . . .
“(12) the purchase or contract is for property or services whose procurement he determines should not be publicly disclosed because of their character, ingredients, or components.”
It further provides in
“(a) The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting may not be used. Subject to this limitation and subject to subsections (b)-(e), the head of an agency may, in negotiating contracts under section 2304 of this title, make any kind of contract that he considers will promote the best interests of the United States.”
Although these statutes make it apparent that Congress recognizes the existence of military secrets, they hardly constitute an authorization to create an elaborate clearance program which embodies procedures traditionally believed to be inadequate to protect affected persons.29
Lastly, the Government urges that if we refuse to adopt its “inferred” authorization reasoning, nevertheless, congressional ratification is apparent by the continued appropriation of funds to finance aspects of the program fashioned by the Department of Defense. Respondents refer us to Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 774-781. At those hearings, the Committee was asked to approve the appropriation of funds to finance a program under which reimbursement for lost wages would be made to employees of government contractors who were temporarily denied, but later granted, security clearance. Apparently, such reim
If acquiescence or implied ratification were enough to show delegation of authority to take actions within the area of questionable constitutionality, we might agree with respondents that delegation has been shown here. In many circumstances, where the Government‘s freedom to act is clear, and the Congress or the President has provided general standards of action and has acquiesced in administrative interpretation, delegation may be inferred. Thus, even in the absence of specific delegation, we have no difficulty in finding, as we do, that the Department of Defense has been authorized to fashion and apply an industrial clearance program which affords affected persons the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. But this case does not present that situation. We deal here with substantial restraints on employment opportunities of numerous persons imposed in a manner which is in conflict with our long-accepted
Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process. See, e. g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101; Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 172; Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 299-300; American Power Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm‘n, 329 U. S. 90, 107108; Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146, 156; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49. Cf. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. These cases reflect the Court‘s concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation‘s lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition.
In the instant case, petitioner‘s work opportunities have been severely limited on the basis of a fact determination rendered after a hearing which failed to comport with our traditional ideas of fair procedure. The type of hearing was the product of administrative decision not explicitly authorized by either Congress or the President. Whether those procedures under the circumstances comport with the Constitution we do not decide. Nor do we decide whether the President has inherent authority to create such a program, whether congressional action is necessary, or what the limits on executive or legislative authority may be. We decide only that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER concur in the judgment on the ground that it has not been shown that either Congress or the President authorized the procedures whereby petitioner‘s security clearance was revoked, intimating no views as to the validity of those procedures.
What has been written on both sides of this case makes appropriate a further word from one who concurs in the judgment of the Court; but cannot join its opinion.
Unlike my brother CLARK who finds this case “both clear and simple,” I consider the constitutional issue it presents most difficult and far-reaching. In my view the Court quite properly declines to decide it in the present posture of the case. My unwillingness to subscribe to the Court‘s opinion is due to the fact that it unnecessarily deals with the very issue it disclaims deciding. For present purposes no more need be said than that we should not be drawn into deciding the constitutionality of the security-clearance revocation procedures employed in this case until the use of such procedures in matters of this kind has been deliberately considered and expressly authorized by the Congress or the President who alone are in a position to evaluate in the first instance the totality of factors bearing upon the necessity for their use. That much the courts are entitled to before they are asked to express a constitutional judgment upon an issue fraught with such important consequences both to the Government and the citizen.
Ample justification for abstaining from a constitutional decision at this stage of the case is afforded by the Court‘s traditional and wise rule of not reaching constitutional issues unnecessarily or prematurely. That rule indeed has been consistently followed by this Court when faced with “confrontation” issues in other security or loyalty cases. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535; cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116. Adherence to that rule is, as I understand it, the underlying basis of today‘s decision, and it is on that basis that I join the judgment of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.
To me this case is both clear and simple. The respondents, all members of the President‘s Cabinet, have, after a series of hearings, refused to give Greene further access to certain government military information which has been classified “secret.” The pertinent Executive Order defines “secret” information as
“defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation, such as by jeopardizing the international relations of the United States, endangering the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or compromising important military or defense plans, scientific or technological developments important to national defense, or information revealing important intelli
gence operations.” Exec. Order No. 10501, Nov. 5, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049, 3 CFR (1949–1953 Comp.), p. 979, § 1 (b).
Surely one does not have a constitutional right to have access to the Government‘s military secrets.1 But the Court says that because of the refusal to grant Greene further access, he has lost his position as vice president and general manager, a chief executive officer, of ERCO, whose business was devoted wholly to defense contracts with the United States,2 and that his training in aeronautical engineering, together with the facts that ERCO engages solely in government work and that the Government is the country‘s largest airplane customer, has in some unaccountable fashion parlayed his employment with ERCO into “a constitutional right.” What for anyone else would be considered a privilege at best has for Greene been enshrouded in constitutional protection. This sleight of hand is too much for me.
But this is not all. After holding that Greene has constitutional protection for his private job, the Court has ordered the President‘s Cabinet members to revoke their refusal to give Greene access to military secrets.3 It
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.
After full consideration the Court concludes “that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.” In so doing, as I shall point out, it holds for naught the Executive Orders of both President Roosevelt and President Truman and the directives pursuant thereto of every Cabinet officer connected with our defense since 1942 plus the explicit order of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Chief of Staff in 1946. In addition, contrary to the Court‘s conclusion, the Congress was not only fully informed but had itself published the very procedures used in Greene‘s case.
I believe that the Court is in error in holding, as it must, in order to reach this “authorization” issue, that Greene‘s “right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference” is protected by the
In holding that the
“Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases. . . . Judicial restraint of those who administer the Government‘s purchasing would constitute a break with settled judicial practice and a departure into fields hitherto wisely and happily apportioned by the genius of our polity to the administration of another branch of Government.”
The Court refuses to pass on the constitutionality of the procedures used in the hearings. It does say that the hearings provided for in the program permit the restraint of “employment opportunities through a denial of clearance without the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.” I think the Court confuses admin
At no time since the programs now in vogue were established in 1942 have the rights of cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses been required. In fact the present regulations were patterned after the Employee Loyalty Program, first inaugurated upon the passage of the
I shall not labor the point further than to say that in my opinion the procedures here do comport with that fairness required of administrative action in the security field. A score of our cases, as I have cited, support me in this position. Not one is to the contrary. And the action of the Court in striking down the program for lack of specific authorization is indeed strange, and hard for me to understand at this critical time of national emergency. The defense establishment should know—and now—whether its program is constitutional and, if not, wherein
II. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS HAVE GRANTED SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO THE CABINET OFFICERS.
Since 1941 the industrial security program has been in operation under express directives from the President. Within a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued
In 1947, the
“(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including procurement plans . . . ; (2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization; . . . and (10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.”8
In his first report to the President in 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal reported that:
“. . . the Munitions Board is responsible for necessary action to coordinate internal security within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters. This work is being planned and in some phases carried forward by the following programs:
“c. Development of plans and directives to protect classified armed forces information in the hands of industry from potential enemies;
“d. Establishment of uniform methods of handling of personnel clearances and secrecy agreements. . . .” First Report of the Secretary of Defense (1948) 102-103.
The forerunner of the exact program now in effect was put in operation in 1948 under the supervision of that Board. And, in the Annual Report to the President, in 1949, the Secretary, then Louis Johnson, reported that
“Industrial Security.—A program to coordinate and develop uniform practices to protect classified mili-
tary information placed in the hands of industry under procurement and research contracts was continued by the Munitions Board. Criteria were developed for the granting or denial of personnel and facility clearances in the performance of classified contracts. Work was started to establish a central security clearance register to centralize clearance data for ready reference by all departments and to prevent duplication in making clearance investigations. A joint Personnel Security Board administers this program, and the Industrial Employment Review Board hears appeals from security clearance denials.” Second Report of the Secretary of Defense, for the Fiscal Year 1949 (1950), 85.
Transmitted with that report to the President was the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, where the number of security cases processed by the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Board, and the number of appeals handled by the Industrial Employment Review Board were detailed.9
Again in 1950 the Secretary of Defense informed the President, in a report required by law, of the status of the industrial security program.
“In the past 6 months, the Munitions Board activated the Industrial Employment Review Board, established procedures under which the latter will operate, and developed a set of uniform criteria stipulating the circumstances under which security clearances will be denied. The Munitions Board also established a Central Index Security Clearance File to serve as a clearing house for all individual and facility clearances and denials, [and] developed a standard security requirements check list . . .
Uniform standards for security investigations of facility and contractors’ personnel are being developed . . . . A standard military security agreement is being coordinated to bind potential suppliers to security regulations before a classified contract is awarded, and a manual to give security guidance to industry is being prepared.” Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to Dec. 31, 1949 (1950), 97.
The President, in 1953, in Reorganization Plan No. 6,
Thus we see that the program has for 18 years been carried on under the express authority of the President, and has been regularly reported to him by his highest Cabinet officers. How the Court can say, despite these facts, that the President has not sufficiently authorized the program is beyond me, unless the Court means that it is necessary for the President to write out the Industrial Security Manual in his own hand.
Furthermore, I think Congress has sufficiently authorized the program, as it has been kept fully aware of its development and has appropriated money to support it. During the formative period of the program, 1949-1951, the Congress, through appropriation hearings, was kept fully informed as to the activity. In 1949 D. F. Carpenter, Chairman of the Munitions Board, appeared before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations to testify concerning the requested appropriation for the Board. While the report indicates much of the testimony was “off the record,” it does contain specific references to the program here under attack.11 Significantly the appropriation bill for 1950 included an item
Again, in 1950 General Timberlake, a member of the Board, testified:
“Then we are going to intensify the industrial mobilization planning within the Department of Defense, with particular emphasis on industrial security . . . .” House of Representatives, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on the Supplemental Appropriation for 1951, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 264.
While, again, some of the testimony was “off the record” it was sufficiently urgent and detailed for the Congress to appropriate additional funds for the Board for 1951.12
By the 1953 Reorganization Plan, the functions of the Munitions Board were transferred to various Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The industrial security program was put under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces. Of course, this office received an appropriation each year. These hearings, to cite but two, certainly indicate an awareness
While it certainly is not clear to me, I suppose that the present fastidiousness of the Court can be satisfied by the President‘s incorporating the present industrial security program into a specific Executive Order or the Congress’ placing it on the statute books. To me this seems entirely superfluous in light of the clear authorization presently existing in the Cabinet officers. It also subjects the Government to multitudinous actions—and perhaps large
And I might add a nota bene. Even if the Cabinet officers are given this specific direction, the opinion today, by dealing so copiously with the constitutional issues, puts a cloud over both the Employee Loyalty Program and the one here under attack. Neither requires that hearings afford confrontation or cross-examination. While the Court disclaims deciding this constitutional question, no one reading the opinion will doubt that the explicit language of its broad sweep speaks in prophecy. Let us hope that the winds may change. If they do not the present temporary debacle will turn into a rout of our internal security.
Notes
“10. When adequate investigation has revealed that there is good cause to suspect an employee of subversive activity on a national defense project of importance to Army or Navy procurement, the vital success of the project, as well as the security of the loyal employees, may require that the Army or Navy, without revealing the nature or source of its evidence, request the immediate removal of such individual from the project. To this end the cooperation of the organizations representative of organized labor is solicited for the following program: . . .”
Clearly this procedure did not anticipate confrontation or cross-examination.
“Mr. Mahon. Under that [the contingency fund] you can buy a boy a top, or a toy, provided the Secretary of Defense thinks it is proper?
“Gen. Moore. That is right, and we come down here and explain to this committee with respect to this in a very secret session how much we have spent and precisely what we have spent it for.” House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 780.
