279 Mass. 339 | Mass. | 1932
This is an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through being struck by a motor vehicle owned by the defendant, registered in her name and operated by her
Although the cause of action in the case at bar arose before, the trial occurred after, the enactment of St. 1928, c. 317. Since that statute relates only to evidence and not to substantive rights, it was applicable at the trial. Thomes v. Meyer Store Inc. 268 Mass. 587. Under the terms of that statute in an action like the present, evidence that the motor vehicle was registered in the name of the defendant as owner is “prima facie evidence that it was then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible.” Upon the testimony that statute was applicable to the case at bar. There was testimony tending to support the affirmative defence, permissible under the statute, that the defendant as owner of the motor vehicle was not responsible for the conduct of the operator. None of that testimony bound the plaintiff. Whether it was to be believed and accepted by the jury presented purely a question of fact. They were at liberty to discredit it and to rely upon the prima facie responsibility established by the statute. Wilson v. Grace, 273 Mass. 146. Ferreira v. Franco, 273 Mass. 272.
Even if it be assumed without so deciding that the question of variance between the declaration, wherein it was alleged that the defendant was driving the motor vehicle at the time of the collision, and the proof, which tended to show that her brother-in-law was driving it, is open to the
Exceptions overruled.