Greenberg v. PeopleGreenberg v. People
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Hand
delivered the opinion of the court:
This was an action of debt, commenced in the name of the People, for the use of Augusta Balaban, against Louis Greenberg as principal ánd M. Bromberg and James Foster as sureties, in the circuit court of Cook county, upon the official bond, as constable, of Louis Greenberg.
The declaration was in the .usual form in debt upon an official bond, and assigned, as a breach of said bond, that while said Greenberg, as constable, was engaged in levying an execution upon a stock of merchandise belonging to the
The defendants introduced no evidence, and the evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff fairly tended to show that Israel A. Balaban had a small retail grocery store in the city of Chicago, which was carried on by him with the assistance of his wife, Augusta Balaban.; that one Cohen recovered a judgment against Balaban for $3.90 and costs, and an execution issued thereon, which was placed in the hands of Greenberg, as a constable, to serve; that Greenberg went to the store of Balaban, in company with three assistants, to make a levy under said execution; that the amount claimed by Greenberg of Balaban was $10.^0; that Balaban could not pay the same and asked time to make a schedule of his personal property, and stated to Greenberg that he did not have to exceed in value $400 worth of personal property, all of which he claimed as exempt from execution under the exemption laws of this State; that Greenberg refused to recognize the right of Israel A. Balaban to an exemption or to allow him time to make a schedule, but he and his assistants immediately proceeded to
It is apparent from the foregoing statement that the-conduct of Greenberg on the occasion of the making of said levy
In Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass. 191, which was a suit upon a constable’s bond for seizing the property of one person upon an execution against another, the court held the object of the bond was to make the sureties responsible for the due performance of the constable’s official’ acts, and it was said: “By an official act is not meant a lawful act of the officer in the service of process; if so, the sureties would never be responsible. It means any act done by the officer in his official capacity, under color and by virtue of his office.” The foregoing language of the Massachusetts court was cited with approval by this court in Campbell v. People, 154 Ill. 595, which was a suit upon a county clerk’s bond.
In Clancy v. Kenworthy, 74 Iowa, 740, which was an action upon a constable’s bond for making a false arrest, it was contended, as it appeared the constable had no lawful authority to make the arrest, the act was not done in the line of his official duty, and his bondsmen could not, by reason of that fact, be held liable. The court, on page 743,
In State v. Beckner, 132 Ind. 371, (31 N. E. Rep. 950,) a constable who had a writ of replevin to execute, forced an entrance into a dwelling house where a sewing machine described in the writ was kept by an inmate and assaulted the owner of the dwelling. While resisting the entry of the officer into the house the householder was injured by the officer, and it was held the constable’s bondsmen were liable for the misconduct of the constable in unlawfully entering the dwelling house and assaulting the owner thereof.
In the case at bar Greenberg’ had gone to the store of Israel A. Balaban to levy the execution, and while he was proceeding to execute the writ by making a levy the execution debtor sought to schedule his personal property for the purpose of claiming his exemption as the head of a family. This he had a right to do, and it was unlawful for the officer to prevent him from so doing, and he might lawfully call to his aid his wife and brother-in-law to assist him in making such schedule. While his wife was attempting to examine the goods which Greenberg had taken from the shelves in the store and placed in a box, for the purpose of calling off their number and amount that the same might be written into the schedule, Greenberg assaulted her, as the evidence fairly tends to show, with a view to prevent a schedule from being made and thereby to deprive the execution debtor of his exemption.
The authorities upon the question of the liability of bondsmen for the official misconduct of public officers are not in entire harmony. The appellants largely rely, to show want of liability on the part of the bondsmen, upon State v. Dayton, 61 Atl. Rep. 624, where the Supreme Court of Maryland held, in a case somewhat similar to the case at bar, that the bondsmen of a constable were not liable for an assault made upon a person who was present while the constable was making a levy upon merchandise in the store where the person assaulted was employed. (Also Jewell v. Mills, 3 Bush. 62, and South v. State, 18 How. 396.) The statute in this State provides (Hurd’s Stat. 1905, chap. 79, sec. 9, p. 1272,) that the bonds of justices of the peace and constables in this State shall be made payable to the
The appellants have raised a number of questions on this record in addition to the one already disposed of, among which is that of a claimed variance between the proofs and the declaration, and the want of proper proof to. establish the genuineness of certain’ documentary evidence admitted in evidence upon the trial. The questions thus raised are extremely technical and we think without merit, and while the questions discussed in the briefs have all been considered by the court, we do not deem it necessary to take them up severally in this opinion.
Finding no reversible error in this record the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Carter took no part in the decision of this case.