Green v. Wilson

GREEN v WILSON 104028, 104034, Argued (Calendar Docket Nos. March 104039. No. 9). July 22, Decided 1997. Martin, Michigan, brought Diane B. Green and Leslie L. residents of negligence Wayne against action in the Circuit Court Fraser R. Wil- son, Ontario, alleging speeding of resident that the was defendant when his car crossed the line in the center Detroit-Windsor tunnel plaintiffs brought and collided head-on with their vehicle. The also dramshop against Inc., Enterprises, alleg- actions Vivio’s and Jason ing that both establishments served alcohol to the defendant when visibly intoxicated, he was and that accident occurred when he returning Phillip court, Jourdan, was home from bars. these J., granted summary disposition, holding Wilson’s motion for that Michigan’s statute, long-arm he within was not the reach of 27A.705, dramshop MSA and dismissed the actions allegedly person because the intoxicated retained as not Appeals, P.J., defendant. The Court of and Bandstra and White, JJ., opinion per curiam, holding W. Cynar, P. reversed in an that Wilson, compliance courts have over and that dramshop with the name and retain of the clause act would be allegedly person excused when the is dismissed for (Docket 156889). lack of No. The defendants appeal. by joined Cavanagh opinion In an Justice Kelly, Justices and opinion by joined an Justice Justices Brickley Boyle, Weaver, opinion by Supreme and and an Chief Justice Riley, Mallett, Court held/. preceded acts in Wilson’s his tortious subject 600.705(2); acts in Canada were insufficient to him to MCL 27A.705(2). jurisdic- The failure to retain Wilson was due to a plaintiffs avoid, any tional defect fear could of col- significantly lusion between the Wilson reduced. compliance provisions Strict with the name-and-retain would frus- purpose trate the act. Long-arm nature, types character, 1. statutes establish purposes exercising personal juris- must contacts that exist for process, hand, permissible long- diction. Due on the other restricts Green v Wilson necessary jurisdiction by defining quality contacts arm personal jurisdiction

justify If a defendant’s under constitution. statute, juris- of a or fit within a actions status process long- permits. The extended as far as due diction be process insofar as the statute arm is coextensive with due statute pro- therefore, by process, and, and due due statute is limited boundary. The nature of same outer coextensive cess share the par- pertinent only Michigan’s long-arm if the becomes fit a stat- of a defendant first within ticular acts or status provision. ute personal 2. over a defendant be exer- Limited provision Michi- if falls within of cised the defendant’s conduct pro- comports gan’s long-arm with due statutes and the exercise consequences 705(2), or its must § cess. the defendant’s act Under consequences Michigan. of the defend- have occurred in While the act, Canada, purposes in where ant’s of subsection occurred injuries, Wil- so too did the act. At the time sustained Michigan Michigan, had tort. in son left he committed no The acts preceded allegedly in were insuffi- that his tortious acts Canada subject 2. cient to him to subsection dramshop action, plaintiff maintaining As 3. a condition of alleged person liti- must retain the intoxicated until the name and Generally, gation settlement. failure is concluded trial or will in termination of retain the named intoxicated defendant result However, exceptions plain- recognized. The the action. have been brought dramshop tiffs in into the action as this case Wilson required, jurisdictional failure to him was to a but their retain due they possibility The collusion defect that could not avoid. of remote, plaintiffs and is the indemnifica- between the Wilson and 436.22(7); 18.993(7) reduces it. tion of further compliance provision would Strict with the name-and-retain be would the essential unfair under the circumstances and frustrate purpose of the act. joined concurring Brickley Justice Justices and Weaver, Riley, justifia- part dissenting part, in is no in and further stated that there plain language exception an to the of the ble reason to create provision Michigan’s dramshop act where the “name and retain” of allegedly driver been dismissed for lack of intoxicated has jurisdiction. Departure a statute from a literal construction of produce unjust justified result and when it would an absurd and purposes policies clearly of the inconsistent with the and be identity allegedly act, individ- where the intoxicated such as Clearly, reasoning apply in does not this ual unknown. this 455 Mich 342 case; known, danger intoxicated defendant is and the against of collusion and fraud the retail exists. licensee concurring dissenting part, Marlett, Chief Justice and in in prongs further because all stated that three the minimum con- personal jurisdiction met, tacts test were over the defendant is con- stitutionally permissible. personal juris- Clause Due Process allows a state exercise diction over a nonresident the nonresident has minimum con- by conducting state, tacts with the state within the activities thus invoking protections and benefits of its laws. The cause of state, action must from the arise defendant’s activities substantially these activities must be with connected the state to make the exercise over the defendant reasonable. In case, Michigan random, the defendant’s contacts with were not fortuitous, By using Michigan’s patronizing or attenuated. roads and Michigan’s establishments, purposefully the defendant availed him- protections Michigan self of the benefits laws. The accident Michigan, arose from the defendant’s activities and he cannot why jurisdiction compelling show reasons would be Further, Michigan strong ensuring unreasonable. has interests people do not drive when injured by compensated; residents who are drunk drivers are plaintiffs’ obtaining interest in and convenient effective relief is Wayne litigating County; best served in the most efficient resolu- Wayne County, tion would be in of where most the witnesses are likely be; jurisdiction Michigan Michigan’s to in would advance furthering and Ontario’s interest in shared fundamental substantive policies. social Michigan’s long-arm statute, 600.705; 27A.705, MCL MSA allows personal jurisdiction this state’s to courts exercise over nonresi- situations, juris- dents in certain and has been construed to confer permissible diction to the broadest extent the under federal consti- case, scope tution. In this the defendant’s actions are within the plain language the of subsection 2 of the statute. The began duty defendant this tort when he his breached of care choosing consequences neg- to drive while intoxicated. The of this ligent conduct occurred Canada the when suffered damages. their Because subsection 2 will reach a defendant consequences Michigan, either the act or the of the act occur in scope defendant is within the of subsection 2. part part.

Affirmed in and reversed in App (1995) affirmed in part. reversed in v Wilson Green Opinion by Kelly, L. Imbru- Imbrunone, P.C. Thomas Addis & (by none), plaintiffs-appellees. for the Bazzaná), Ernest R. Cooney, & P.C.

Plunkett (by Wilson. Robert defendant-appellant for M. Henk, Kozerski), P.C. Ted for Kallas & (by Enterprises, Inc., doing Jason defendant-appellant Booby Trap Lounge. business as & W.Fin- Finley (by Gregory Morrison, Morrison Inc., doing business as ley) Vivio’s, for defendant Spirits. Vivio’s Food and Kelly, presents 1) case two issues: whether J. This personal juris- may limited Michigan courts exercise who diction over a nonresident becomes Michigan, intoxicated in Michigan, chooses drive jurisdiction, and and causes an accident in another pro- compliance whether with the name-and-retain 2) vision of act will be excused when person litiga- is dismissed from allegedly intoxicated jurisdiction. 436.22(6); tion lack of MCL We conclude that defendant Fraser 18.993(6). preceded Wilson’s his acts subject in Canada insufficient tortious acts were him to MSA 27A.705. (2) subsection Appeals Therefore, we reverse lim- courts exercise determination that personal jurisdiction him. ited over it is neces- suit, As cannot be retained Wilson dramshop action sary whether determine Enterprises Vivio’s was Jason against defendants We that the failure properly dismissed. conclude that jurisdictional was due to a defect retain Wilson fear not avoid. We also conclude that plaintiffs could 455 Mich 342 Opinion by Kelly, J.

of collusion between and defendant Wilson significantly reduced in this case. Under the cir- compliance cumstances, strict with the name-and- purpose retain dramshop would frustrate the of the Consequently,

act. we would affirm Appeals Court of decision that allows a continuation dramshop against action defendants Jason Enterprises and Vivio’s.

i Lynn Plaintiffs Diane Green and Leslie Martin, both Michigan, residents of and defendant Wilson, a resi- dent of Ontario, were involved in an automobile acci- dent in the Detroit-Windsor tunnel. The accident approximately occurred in Canada, one thousand yards Michigan-Ontaiio south of the border. Plaintiffs allege exceeding speed that Wilson was limit when his car crossed the center line and collided head-on with allege their car. Plaintiffs further Wilson was intoxicated. negligence Wayne

Plaintiffs sued Wilson for Cir- cuit against and instituted actions defendants Enterprises, Vivio’s,Inc., and Jason Inc. Enterprises operate Both Vivio’sand Jason bars in the City complaint, plaintiffs of Detroit. In allege their that both establishments served alcohol to Wilson visibly while he was intoxicated. Plaintiffs also assert the accident occurred when Wilson returning home from the defendant bars. summary disposition

Wilson moved for under MCR 2.116(C)(1), arguing that the court lacked granted over him. The trial court holding motion, that Wilson was not within the reach Michigan’s long-arm statute, MCL 600.705; MSA 347 Green v Wilson Opinion by Kelly, J. 27A.705. The trial court also dismissed the against Enterprises actions Jason Vivio’s, because failed to retain the allegedly intoxicated person as a defendant.1 The Court of Appeals held that Michigan courts do have over Wilson purposes for the of litigation. The Court further compliance held that with the name-and-retain clause of the dramshop act would be excused when the person intoxicated is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 211 App 140; 535 NW2d We (1995). granted appeal. leave to 453 Mich 901

n A personal analysis is a two-fold inquiry: (1) do the defendant’s acts fall within the applicable long-arm statute, and (2) does the exercise of over the comport defendant with due process? Starbrite Distributing, Inc v Excelda Mfg Co, 454 Mich 302; 562 NW2d 640 (1997). It is useful history to review the and interplay between state long-arm statutes and the Due Process Clause2 before applying them in this case.

The United Supreme States expanded scope personal constitutional of jurisdiction with its International Shoe Co v Washington, decision 154; US 66 S Ct 90 L Ed 95 (1945). Post at 368- 1 Michigan’s dramshop states, part: act against An action under this section a retail licensee shall not be alleged person commenced unless the minor or the is a named defendant the action and is retained the action until litigation 436.22(6); is concluded trial or settlement. [MCL 18.993(6).] Const, US Am XIV. Mich 342

Opinion by Kelly, Shoe, the Court inteipreted 369. In International jurisdiction. conferring as not Clause Due Process establishing as the clause Rather, it construed jurisdictional power. permissible outer limits legis- comes from personal jurisdiction actual grant with the invest courts statutes that lative jurisdiction.3 exercise power to character, nature, establish the statutes Long-arm purposes that must exist types of contacts process, Due on the jurisdiction. exercising personal jurisdiction hand, permissible long-arm restricts other justify necessary to quality of contacts defining See jurisdiction under the constitution. personal Mich, Hadad v Lewis, Supp 1365, (ED 382 F may long-arm arise where Thus, situations 1974). the con- jurisdiction than does permits greater statute See Starbrite at 315 J., concurring stitution.4 (Weaver, Likewise, may there be part). dissenting power court will lack the instances where state defendant, even personal jurisdiction over exercise constitutionally permis- jurisdiction be though Warehouses, Inc, Mallory v Conida sible. See App 280, 286-288; (1982). primarily types long-arm two statutes: There are as the California “self-adjusting,” such “laundry-list,” such as statute, Michigan’s and the has The Cahfomia statute 600.705; MSA 27A.705. 3 See, jurisdiction States Juenger, Judicial in the United generally, comparison, European A in the communities: 82 Mich L R 1195 terms, jurisdiction may, give [Although to the statute its par applied court, pass muster as to the it must also constitutional Ivey, (ED Supp v States 747 F [United ticular case. Mich, 1990).] Green Wilson Opinion by Kelly, self-adjusting been called because it stretches auto- matically to extend wherever the Due permits. complete Process Clause Like a solar eclipse, process statutory analyses the due overlap entirely. only a Therefore, one-step analysis is neces- sary. Glannon, Civil Procedure, Examples and Expla- nations (2d ed), pp 24-27.

Laundry-list specific statutes enumerate acts that give jurisdiction. rise to They permit do not a one-step analysis, even in they circumstances where thought are to be process. “coextensive” with due analysis partial Their is akin to a eclipse, solar with part of the statute granting per- within the missible scope constitutional and part of the statute possibly outside it. Id. Court is the first in Michigan that was Sifers’

credited with stating concept per limited sonal is coextensive with due process. Since Sifers, many Michigan state and federal courts interpreted have Michigan long-arm statutes as coex tensive Sifers, process.5 with due the Court stated: 5 See, e.g., Arcilio, App 54, 73; Ins Comm’r v 221 Mich 561 NW2d 412 (1997) (“[0]ur long-arm interpreted grant statute has been to the broadest jurisdiction process”); Rainsberger basis for consistent with due v McFad den, App 660, 662-663; (1989) (“This 174 Mich 436 NW2d 412 statute has giving grant jurisdiction been construed as the courts the broadest of con process”); Canada, sistent with due Kriko v Allstate Ins Co 137 Mich of App 528, 531; (1984) (“[The long-arm 357 NW2d 882 was intended statute] give Michigan power possible to gain personal courts the full extent of jurisdiction princi over nonresident defendants as is consistent with the ples process”); Michigan of due Coalition Radioactive Material Users of Griepentrog, 1174, (CA 6, 1992); v Barclays 954 F2d 1176 Chandler v Bank PLC, 1148, (CA 6, 1990); AG, 898 F2d 1150 FFOC Co v Invent 882 F Supp 642, (ED Mich, 1994); Chrysler Corp Corp, 651 v Fedders 643 F2d 1229, (CA 6, 1981); Widger Corp 1236 Corp, Chemical v 601 Chemfil Supp 845, (ED Mich, 1985); F Corp, 847 Subacz v Town Tower Motel 567 Supp (ND Ind, 1983). F 1311 Mich by

Opinion Kelly, upon in this case to construe We are called attempt the of represents an on statute which potential expand limited to its full Michigan legislature to jurisdiction Michigan courts over nonresidents. personal of say prepared is forbidden Unless we are jurisdiction to the to exercise Federal Constitution we should not construe in the statute indicated

extent Horen, restrictively. so statute [Sifers added).] (emphasis (1971) interpret that, if a defendant’s to mean We Sifers long-arm fit within actions or status as far as due be extended statute, process permits.6 statute is coextensive The process limited as the statute is with due insofar pro- process, therefore, the statute and due and, due boundary. reasoning outer cess share the same interpretation. supports implicit Mallory Mal- lory, supra at 286-288. Appeals Mallory, determined the Court of jurisdic- statutory personal grounds for

none permitted exercise of tion that the at 286-287.It reasoned over a sister state. Id. permit Legislature a suit in such did not intend process Michigan, regardless what due Consequently, conduct a there was no need to allow. analysis. process Id. at 288. due Michigan’s long-arm nature of The coextensive particular pertinent only if the becomes as coextensive with due notes that reference to statutes One author phraseology misleading. process would be He believes that such is often specific categories jurisdic- to mean that interpreted

better interpreted, be as lib- statute are to conveyed by long-aim tion erally process (empha- allow. as the due clause will at [Glannon added).] sis v Wilson Green J. Opinion Kelly, long-arm acts or of a defendant first fit a status within implicitly provision. Mallory statute As the con- equal cluded, this does not mean that the two are require single inquiry solely upon process a based due restrictions. provisions §

The enumerated 705 would be superfluous any Legislature intended activ- ity satisfy long-arm that is constitutional also stat- Michigan Legislature Furthermore, ute. could language have written into the statutes that confers jurisdiction process, to the broadest limits of due as other have states done. It chose not do so.7 per-

The State limited exercise jurisdiction sonal over Wilson if two conditions are provi- met: Wilson’s First, conduct must fall within a Michigan’s long-arm sion of Second, statutes. jurisdiction comport pro- exercise of must with due supra. Starbrite, cess. long-arm pertaining acquiring

The state’s statute personal limited over individuals on the specific basis of acts is codified at MCL 27A.705. It states: any following relationships

The existence of agent between an individual or his and the shall state con- stitute a sufficient basis of enable court of record of this state to exercise limited arising over individual . . . out of an act which creates any following relationships:

[*] ^{[*] [*]} Legislature The Illinois added catch-all to its enumerated Anderson, long See statute 1989. reach Illinois’ stat provision, ute: The B J 504 catch-all 84 Ill 455 Mich 342

Opinion Kelly, done, causing (2) doing an act to be or conse- The or resulting quences occur, state in an action for tort. in the allege in activities Plaintiffs that Wilson’s § 2 of fall within subsection 705. specific types of not

Section 705 does delineate purposes of subsection 2. The acts that suffice for only provides guidance is “act” it that the or “conse- quences must in an action for tort.” of the act” “result plain reading language words reveals that A these injury must occur either the tortious conduct or the Michigan. in purposes of subsection the act is case, allegedly negligent careening of defendant’s plaintiffs’

speeding vehicle into vehicle while defend- alleged ant drove Plaintiffs that Wilson intoxicated. speed throughout “travel[ed] at an excessive rate of the center line in [Windsor] tunnel did cross attempt pass striking [an] vehicle, a motor head-on operated being in the lane a northbound vehicle plaintiff . .” That act in . . occurred Canada. consequences Canada, of the act also occurred in Any liability injuries. where the sustained liquor under the dram- the defendant establishments shop triggered by act to be the accident had Canada. unpersuaded

We are the dissent’s contention drinking driving the “act” while in that is Wilson’s Michigan. at 374-375. At the time Wilson left Post Michigan, tort. he had committed no The acts preceded Wilson’s tortious subject him to acts Canada were insufficient MSA27A.705. subsection of MCL Green v Wilson

Opinion by Kelly, can While the Court envision where situation an act in in a Michigan results tort this case elsewhere, does not involve one. Most find states the exercise of over nonresidents for out-of- state driving accidents under circum- analogous impermissible. stances Casad, Jurisdiction Civil Actions, 7.02[2][e][i], p Consequently, 7-34. ¶ we do not believe subsection 2 appropri- ate in this case. Since Wilson’s acts do fit under statute, do pro- § we not reach due opinion. cess for the reasons noted in n of this rv analyze We next the dramshop whether action against defendants Jason Enterprises and Vivio’s continue without Wilson. dramshop provides act statutory an exclusive

remedy against liquor licensees for selling alcohol to or visibly minors intoxicated persons.

MSA 18.993. As a condition a of dram- maintaining shop action, plaintiff a must “name-and-retain” the person alleged intoxicated until the litigation con- by trial cluded or settlement. MCL 436.22(6); 18.993(6). recognized One purpose of the name-and- provision preclude retain tois collusion between the plaintiff and Putney person. the intoxicated Haskins, v 414 Mich 324 NW2d (1982). 729 accomplished This is ensuring that the intoxicated person has a financial stake in the of outcome case. Id.

Generally, the a Court has determined that failure required to retain the named intoxicated defendant as by subsection 6 in a results termination of the dram- Putney v A & G Enter- Spalo shop 188; action. at Mich 342 455 354 Opinion by Kelly, (After Remand), prises 406, 409-411; Mich (1991). However, of the Court members NW2d 546 man- also that certain circumstances have reasoned pro- application the name-and-retain a date looser NW2d Clements, v vision. See Salas Shay (1976); Inc, 401- JohnKal, 402; 471 NW2d 551 departure that a from

The Court in Salas reasoned justified was statute the literal construction unknown. Id. at because the named defendant was requiring plain- reasoned that 109-110.The Court may actually tiff to retain an unknown defendant encourage defend- collusion between dramshop. at 110. dismissal due to ant and the Id. A pro- plaintiffs’ an unknown defendant failure retain unjust an result and was inconsis- duced absurd policies dramshop purposes with tent act. Id. plurality Shay, reasoned that to the name-and-retain

strict adherence unjustified. Justice and Justice Levin Chief Cavanagh so concluded that the risk of fraud and collusion was pro- the name-and-retain attenuated that violation of at 402. vision did not occur. Id. Justices Brickley that there was no conflict between concluded Boyle However, rules and the act. the mediation they plaintiff rejected that, if a mediation concluded comply provi- in order to with name-and-retain justices four sion, Thus, no sanctions should follow. suit to without the named allowed the continue Id. at 405. defendant. plaintiffs brought Wilson the case,

In this into by dramshop required 22(6). action as subsection As opinion, n of their failure to discussed in this v Wilson Green Opinion by Kelly, J. to a jurisdictional retain him was due defect plaintiffs could not avoid. identity known, complete

Since the of Wilson is Salas pres- absence of collusion that existed in is not unlikely However, ent here. it highly there the collusion between and Wilson envi- Putney sioned given the Court the reasons for plaintiffs’ to fact, failure retain Wilson. In strict com- pliance could lead dramshops intoxi- encourage cated nonresident defendants contest to avoid a dramshop action. See Salas at 110. There- fore, under the circumstances of this case, we con- possibility clude that the of collusion is remote and that subsection 7 of dramshop act further reduces it. 436.22(7); 18.993(7). MSA dramshop

Under subsection has “right to full the allegedly visibly indemnification from person for all damages against awarded the licensee.” MCL 436.22(7); 18.993(7).8 Consequently, one expect Wilson not to engage energetic assis- tance of plaintiffs’ case as was discussed in Salas at 110. Subsection 7 seems to allow the dramshops to enforce the indemnification provision separate in a cause action against Wilson if necessary. Presum- ably, dramshops could enforce a provision such Canada. even Thus, though Wilson party is not a his lawsuit, financial stake in it will remain strong. agree

We with Appeals the Court of reasoning that strict enforcement of the name-and-retain provision would be unfair in this case. 211 App 141. The Subsection 7 was added 1986 amendments of the act. 342 455 Mich 356 Opinion Kelly, J. negligence their able to exercise be against Wilson, but are in Canada of action

cause dramshops against apparently the cause without dramshop action the Furthermore, since there.9 remedy against a visi- a licensee who serves exclusive dramshops bly person Michigan, the subject penalty. 436.22; MSA no MCL will be bring deny plaintiffs opportunity to To the 18.993. dramshops against frus- the would action cause of purpose dramshop act. See of the trate the essential 109-110. Salas at

Lastly, unpersuaded defendants’ fear we are defending respect dram- with of shop burden undue of the indemnification action. With existence provision, little dif- will have it seems defendants necessary, parties ficulty deposing Also, Wilson. rogatory in order to to obtain letters should be able depose system. legal See, Wilson under the Canadian e.g., 28 Touche, & OR3d 188 re Fecht v Deloitte (1996). jurisdic- of a

As cannot be retained because Wilson beyond plaintiffs’ control, find that we tional defect compliance with name-and-retain strict dramshop purpose act. frustrate the would 18.993(6). 436.22(6); a result, As we Appeals decision affirm the Court against action a continuation of the allows Enterprises and Vivio’s. defendants Jason J. JJ., Cavanagh Kelly, with Boyle, concurred possible against express opinion are as to what causes do not an We situation, analogous particular In an reverse defendants Canada. these Appeals however, courts were unable to found that Lopez, dramshops. Mozdy See over Canadian exercise App NW2d Green v Wilson

Opinion by J. Weaver, (concurring and dissenting in Weaver, I concur with the parí). reasoning and result of the opinion’s lead conclusion that does not over However, exist defendant Wilson. I dis- opinion’s sent from the lead exception creation an to the “name and retain” provision of Michigan’s is justifiable act. There no reason exception Court to create an plain language of provision “name and retain” allegedly where the intoxicated driver has been per- dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. sonal

i provision The “name and retain” the dramshop pertinent part: act states in against An action under this section a retail shall licensee alleged per- . be commenced unless the . . intoxicated son is a named defendant action and is retained in litigation the action until the is concluded trial or settle- 436.22(6); 18.993(6).] ment. [MCL language provision of this is clear and unambigu- Spalo v A & G Enterprises (After Remand), ous. 409-411; J., 471 NW2d 546 (1991) (Griffin, “ plurality opinion). being means a real ‘[R]etained’ party in interest in the full sense of those words.” Riley Richards, 428 Mich Putney v In Haskins, 181, 187; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), acknowledged this Court provision “name and per retain” amounted to a rule se requiring the retention of the allegedly intoxicated defendant the litigation until is concluded trial or settlement. Mich 342 Opinion by Weaver, J. provision purpose is and retain” of the “name

One allegedly preclude intoxicated collusion between disadvantage injured plaintiffs to the defendants has defendant.1 This licensee of the retail emphasized that prevents ways retain” the “name and [o]ne by ensuring will the defendant fraud collusion testifying, personally exam- a financial stake

have direct negli- in a witnesses, arguing did not act ining that he supra [Putney, at gent manner. 188.] allegedly stake, financial to have direct order must more than nominal defendant be actually litigation. party, but be retained in must Id. for lack intoxicated defendant excused

An stake has no direct financial litigation. Therefore, remote, there however in the Putney, supra. As or of collusion fraud. exists risk Riley, supra, no can be “[t]here Court stated in this pro- compliance degrees with the ‘name and retain’ supra Riley, I Thus, at 211. would hold vision.” exception provi- creating the “name and retain” an to provision’s contrary case is the sion this purpose.

n Putney, Legisla- the 1986, after decision in In the 18.993(7) 436.22(7); the ture added MCL Legislature provision, have adopting “name retain” the the difficulty determining recognized whether inherent for the court the judicial resulting a of fraud and the drain on serious likelihood there Putney, supra per resources, at rule se. and instead decided to create a 187. Green Wilson Opinion by Weaver, dramshop the act. This subsection affords “right alleged to full indemnification from the visi-

bly person damages intoxicated for all awarded yet against This the licensee.” Court has to be presented scope interpreting with a case the the provision. opinion However, indemnification the lead provision reasons that the indemnification insures against allegedly collusion because the intoxicated litigation driver retains a financial stake in the even if allegedly intoxicated defendant cannot be opinion Therefore, retained.2 the lead concludes that exception provision an to the “name and retain” is appropriate in case. reasoning

The effect of this tois render the “name provision meaningless and retain” whenever there is possibility dramshop might some that the be able to pursue person for indemnifi- pursuit litigation cation, even that involves in a for- eign as in the instant case. The conclu- opinion pur- sion of lead is with inconsistent poses provision. of the “name and retain” Further, the Legislature repeal did not or amend the clear and unambiguous language pro- of the “name and retain” provision. it vision when added the indemnification plain language Therefore, the should opinion full effect, be afforded and because the lead reasoning unpersuasive. this, I fails do find its separate expressly permitted While a for suit indemnification for all July 1986, only possible cases filed after indemnification remains ave Riley, supra, dramshop. nue of recourse As this Court noted evidently provi case filed before the effective date the indemnification sion, separate alleged suit for contribution ... case “[a] of an person something deep pocket, with less than an even [is] Riley, supra possibility.” 212, more remote n 4. at 360 Mich 342 455 Opinion Weaver, J. Appeals holding that I Court of

Further, find the provision and retain the name of “strict enforcement similarly unpersua- produce an absurd result” (1995). App NW2d 233 140, 145; 535 211 Mich sive. Relying 103, 109; Clements, v on Salas (1976), that because reasoned the Court NW2d 889 responsible plaintiffs Wil- defendant for were not the personal jurisdiction, there for lack of dismissal son’s danger the was of collusion between no Wilson. defendant “departure Court noted that Salas at this

In justified is a statute construction of from the literal produce an absurd such construction would when clearly unjust inconsistent result and would be question.” purposes policies the act with the exception to the name this created an Thus, Court identity alleg- provision and edly where the retain because, unknown intoxicated individual was no situation, there could be collusion between such a alleged plaintiff and the intoxicated individual.3 apply pres- Clearly, reasoning Id. does identity intoxi- ent case where plaintiff’s lack is known. Nor is the cated defendant personal juris- lack over a dismissal for of control Legislature’s grounds ignoring clear diction only exception to the where this created an The other instance JohnKal, Inc, provision Shay retain” was in “name and Shay, held the name and retain this Court NW2d alleg where the bar of a action does not maintenance edly after a mediation intoxicated defendant was dismissed court-ordered present Shay distinguishable the dis from the case because settlement. discovery, allowing Shay occurred after thus missal of the defendant remaining its in the a testimonial record for the retail licensee action danger have been diminished of collusion also defense. Further, process. Shay plurality opinion, and the reason mediation majority ing opinions comprising the does not control. of the two v Green Wilson Opinion by C.J. Mallett, allegedly mandate the intoxicated defendant must be named and retained until the conclusion of the litigation. case, this defendant is Therefore,

known. the danger of collusion and fraud against the retail licensee exists. While the of danger collusion well might remote, entirely be it is inappro- priate for this speculate Court to regarding likeli- hood such of collusion or fraud in light of the clear unambiguous of language the “name and retain” provision.

For the reasons above, stated I would an not create exception to the “name and retain” in this case.

Brickley and Riley, JJ., concurred with Weaver, C.J. (concurring in part dissenting Mallett, For part). following reasons, I dissent.

i LIMITED

As opinion the lead notes, in determining whether the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over the is proper defendant case, two-step analysis this must First, be undertaken. it must be determined of personal jurisdiction exercise limited over Wil- son would be requirements consistent with the Due Process Clause, US Const, Am XIV. it Second, must be determined if Wilson is within the reach of Michigan’s long-arm statute, 27A.705. v Jeffrey Rapid Corp, American 178, Also, NW2d 644 (1995). because the trial court granted summary disposition in case, this it assumed that all factual allegations in complaint Mich 342

Opinion C.J. Mallett, appeal. purposes this Simko are true for (1995). 654; 532 NW2d 842 Blake, Mich A DUE PROCESS jurisdic- the exercise court found that The trial Due Process not violate the tion over Wilson would appeal ruling. 211 did not and defendants Clause, App Even Appeals presented, though the Court it was potentially disposi- because it is this issue addressed general will review rule, this Court not tive. As presented not in the lower courts. that are issues Bldg Elliott, 596, Co v Gordon Grossman granting (1969). to leave Thus, NW2d441 602; 171 regarding appeal, grant leave this Court did appeal process with Rather, issue. leave to due respect jurisdictional question was limited to to the had under “whether the circuit court [Michigan’s statute] 600.705; MSA 27A.705 (1996). . . . .” 453 Mich 901 over defendant Wilson process Although waived, I issue has been the due analysis prong sake of will discuss this completeness. Washington, 326 US Shoe Co v International (1945), L United 316; 154; 66 Ct 90 Ed 95

310, S Supreme Due held that the Process States jurisdic- personal a state to exercise Clause allowed if has “mini- over a nonresident the nonresident tion with the state so that “traditional mum contacts” justice” play are not of fair and substantial notions principle of Under the “minimum contacts” offended. not ever be Shoe, a defendant need International subject physically present be in a state in order to Green v Wilson Opinion Mallett, C.J. personal in that state. See McGee v Int’l Ins, 220; 199; 355 US 78 S 2 L 2d Ct Ed Life (1957). Rather, requirement the “minimum contacts” be if satisfied “purposely defendant avails privilege of conducting activities [himself] State, within forum thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v Denckla, US 253; 78 1228; S Ct L Ed 2d 1283 If a (1957). purposefully defendant avails himself of a state’s laws, reasonably he can anticipate being haled into that state’s courts. World-Wide Volkswagen Wood son, 444 US 100 S Ct 62 L Ed 2d 490 developed courts have a three-part test to determine a defendant has the minimum contacts necessary jurisdic- for a court exercise incorporates tion. This test the United States Supreme jurisprudence Court’s on this issue.

First, purposefully the defendant must have availed him- privilege conducting Michigan, self activities in invoking protections thus the benefits and of this state’s Second, laws. the cause of action must arise from the Third, defendant’s activities in the state. the defendant’s substantially activities must be connected with make exercise of over the rea- defendant supra [Jeffrey, 186; Distributing, sonable. at Starbrite Inc Mfg Co, 302, 309; (1997).] v Excelda 454 Mich 562 NW2d 640 Thus, in order to determine if Wilson has minimum Michigan, contacts with we pur- must first ask if he posefully availed himself of protec- the benefits and tions of Michigan law. As this Court noted in Witbeck v Cody’s Inn, 667; Bill Ranch 659, “ ‘purposeful NW2d 439 (1987), availment’ requirement insures that a defendant will not be Mich

Opinion by Mallett, C.J. solely ‘random,’ as a result of haled into quoting Burger contacts,” or ‘attenuated’ ‘fortuitous,’ King Ct 2174; 105 S Rudzewicz, 471 US Burger King, the United Ed L 2d 528 Supreme explained: States “deliberately” engaged sig- has the defendant [W]here manifestly ... has within a State he nificant activities conducting privilege of business availed himself there, his are the “bene- and because activities shielded presumptively protections” of it is fits the forum’s laws and require him to submit to the burdens of not unreasonable litigation at in that forum as well. [Id. 475-476.] Michigan are case, In this Wilson’s contacts with deliberately or attenuated. He random, fortuitous, patronized state, entered establishments that are regulated by Michigan and law, licensed and drove on governed by are this roads that maintained state. By Michigan’s patronizing using Michigan’s roads and purposefully establishments, Wilson availed himself of protections law. the benefits Second, it must be determined the cause of action arose from the defendant’s activities in the allegedly patronized case, state. In bars in this Wilson Michigan, Michigan, intoxicated in and chose became Michigan. urges Wilson to drive while intoxicated find that the accident is unrelated to his Court to Michigan, i.e., that the accident did not activities alleged becoming arise from his acts choosing I while drive intoxicated. finding. decline make such a Whether Wilson’s are the cause of the accident is activities question jury. of fact that must be resolved Corp, 440 Riddle Products v McLouth Steel (5th ed), (1992); Prosser, Torts Green Wilson Opinion by Mallett, C.J. Certainly, the 41, pp alleged 264-265. causal nexus § by is I the not so attenuated that would hold precluded is finding that a causation as matter of person law. intoxicated, When drives while it is might Thus, that an accident foreseeable occur.1 tak- ing plaintiff’s allegations true, the factual as the acci- dent arose from Wilson’s activities in Michigan. must

Third, it be determined if defendant’s activi- ties substantially were so connected with Michigan that the exercise of is I reasonable. note easy this of the is generally test to meet. is, That defendant purposefully has availed him- “ self to state’s law, present this he ‘must a compelling presence case that the some other considerations ” would render Starbrite, unreasonable.’ supra 313, quoting Burger supra King, at at 477. Although primary a court’s concern in assessing the reasonableness of exercising over a defendant is the on the defendant, burden the court will factors, also consider other including

the adjudicating dispute, forum State’s interest in plaintiff’s obtaining interest convenient and effective relief, adequately pro- at least when that interest is not plaintiff’s power forum, tected to choose the judicial system’s obtaining interstate interest the most controversies, efficient resolution of and the shared interest furthering poli- several States social fundamental Volkswagen, supra cies . . . .” at see [World-Wide supra Starbrite, at 313.]

In case, Wilson cannot show compelling rea- why jurisdiction sons be Michigan would unreason- fact, great Legislature risk of accident is so has driving criminalized while intoxicated. MCL MSA 9.2325. 455 Mich 342 Opinion Mailett, C.J. accident, Wilson At the time of the able. Detroit close Windsor.2 Because

a resident of enough here, I not to socialize could for defendant litigate say him to that it would be unreasonable likely be would here. the alternative forum Also, litigating in Windsor, burden Detroit and the litigating in burden of Windsor. be similar to the jurisdiction support in fact, other factors strong Michigan Michigan. in interest First, has dispute. adjudicating seeks ensure This state people drive while and to do not injured who are ensure that residents compensated. Second, are because the drunk drivers plaintiffs’ Detroit, inter- are residents obtaining in convenient and effective relief is best est Wayne County. litigating Third, in most served controversy of the would occur efficient resolution Wayne County, Wil- where the witnesses of most of likely Finally, alleged son’s intoxication are be. jurisdiction Michigan would advance the shared furthering Michigan funda- interest of Ontario policies. juris- social As do other mental substantive holding dictions, has an interest in those injure through driving responsible who others drunk for their actions. prongs all three of the “minimrim con-

Therefore, jurisdiction test over is met, tacts” are Wilson constitutionally permissible.3 alleged at the Plaintiffs that Wilson resided in Windsor time of deny accident, apparently presently Wilson is Wilson does this. ninety Ontario, living London, approximately from which miles Windsor. majority of in which motor acci We note that in the cases vehicle involving dents defendants have occurred outside a forum nonresident personal jurisdic- state, not have courts have found that forum does Green v Wilson

Opinion by Mallett, C.J. B MICHIGAN’SLONG-ARMSTATUTE Michigan’s long-arm statute, 27A.705, allows this state’s per- courts to exercise sonal over nonresidents in certain situations. any following relationships existence agent

between an individual or his and the state shall con- stitute a sufficient basis of to enable a court of record of this state to exercise limited over the per- individual and to enable the court to render Casad, tion over Actions, the nonresident. Jurisdiction in Civil 7.02[2][e][i],pp usually ¶ 7-34 to 7-36. This is either because the nonresi- nothing purposefully dent has done avail himself of the forum’s laws or because the accident did not arise from the nonresident defendant’s con- tacts with the forum. example, Holsey, App 472; For in Clavenna v 81 Mich (1978), Michigan a resident and a Canadian resident were involved in a boating Although accident on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. Appeals carefully separate Court of in that case did not the constitutional question statutory question, from the did it indicate that the Canadian any Michigan. defendant lacked contacts with Id. at 476-477.The Court of Appeals correctly injured Michigan also noted that the fact that the resi- hospitals provide dent was treated Detroit would not minimum con- jurisdiction. all, tacts sufficient for After the defendant’s contacts with the Shoe, forum plaintiff’s state matter under International not the contacts. Colisto, Supp (WD See Mich, 1981) (a also Zandee v F Michigan resident and a resident of British Columbia were in an involved accident Dakota). in North Likewise, Joseph Co, App 6; in Helzer v F Lamb 429 NW2d (1988), Michigan by a crossing resident was struck a van while street in Michigan, Windsor. The nonresident defendant had contacts with litigation. but these contacts were unrelated to the The driver of the van daily was a Michigan job. Canadian resident who drove into as of his Although Michigan, the defendant had conducted activities in the Court of Appeals noted that no evidence established a causal nexus between the defendant’s Therefore, activities in and the accident. the acci dent did not Michigan. “arise from” the defendant’s contacts with present presents unique The case situation. In contrast to Clavenna Zandee, unequivocally the defendant has availed himself of the bene protections Michigan Helzer, fits and of law. In contrast to his activities in causally resulting are linked to the accident. 455 Opinion Mallett, C.J. representative or his judgments against the individual sonal any following creates arising act which out of an relationships: any the state. business within

(1) transaction of The done, causing to be or conse- (2) doing an act or resulting for tort. occur, in an action quences in the state tangible use, possession real or ownership, or (3) The state. personal property within the situated person, property, risk or (4) Contracting to insure a contracting. at the time of within this state located to be rendered Entering for services (5) into a contract in the state to be furnished or for materials defendant. trustee, director, manager, or other Acting (6) as a of, incorporated or corporation under the laws

officer of a place state. having principal of business within this its subject Maintaining state while (7) a domicile this relationship family the basis of the which is marital or maintenance, property alimony, separate divorce, claim for custody.[4] settlement, support or child child scope Wilson falls within Plaintiffs contend that to be causing or an act doing 2: “The of subsection resulting in the state consequences occur, done, or provision, it interpreting for tort.” In in an action history of statutes helpful to consider in the United States. Supreme expanded

After the United States jurisdiction over nonresi- the exercise 5 6virtually every state in International Shoe4 dents 4 individuals, only personal jurisdiction applies over to § While 705 provisions corporations, comparable long-arm MCL has statute 27A.725, 600.725; 27A.715, partnerships, MSA and MCL voluntary associations, unincorporated partnership associations or 600.735; MSA27A.735. 5 Shoe, only International could exercise state courts Before to if the nonresident consented over nonresidents 369 Green v Wilson Opinion by Mallett, C.J. enacted statutes to the use of “long-arm” facilitate. jurisdiction. Illinois was the first pass long- state arm and this statute, attempted identify statute every appropriately situation which state could jurisdiction.6 exercise Soon after the Illinois statute passed, Supreme the Illinois Court held that the permitted statute state to exercise permitted by the full extent the Due Process Clause.7 Several other states followed Illinois’ lead passed and “laundry-list” style long-arm statutes,8 many courts of with states these statutes held that scope of the statute was coextensive with the Due Process Thus, Clause.9 in these states, the courts have essentially merged the constitutional statutory questions. In 1970, explicitly California merged the two-steps jurisdictional analysis by passing stat- ute that simply says that the may jurisdic- state assert in any tion situation allowed the Due Process Clause.10 process physically or was served Pennoyer with while within the state. (5 Otto) 714, 720; (1871). 95 US 24 L Ed 565

Neff 6 Hay, (2d 8.33, ed), pp 316-320; Casad, See Scoles & Conflict of Laws § supra, 4.01, pp n 3 ¶ 4-3 to 4-4. 7 Miller, 378, 389; Nelson v 11 Ill 2d 143 NE2d 673 Hay, supra; Casad, supra. Scoles & n 6 n 3 9 See, e.g., Outfitters, Superior Court, 456, Inc v 167 Colo 458- Safari (1969); Scholl, 785, (Iowa, 1980); 448 P2d 783 Larsen v 296 NW2d Bank, 77, 96; (1969); Hunt v Nevada State Fox, 285 Minn Fox v (Tex App, 1977); Longines- 559 SW2d Civ but see also Reinecke, Inc, Wittnauer Watch Co v & Barnes 15 NY2d (1965) (holding long-arm NE2d 68 that the New York statute is not coex Clause). tensive with the Due Process Island, Jersey, Wyoming Cal Code P Civ 410.10. Rhode New have one-step long-arm followed California’s lead and enacted statutes. RI Gen 9-5-33; 4:4-4(b); Also, Illinois, Laws NJ Court Rule WYStat Ann 5-1-107. passed laundry-list-style long-arm statute, which the first added a catch-all provision to its statute 1989. The catch-all states that the long-arm jurisdiction any court exercise situation that does not process. Anderson, long offend due See reach Elinois’ Mich 342 455 370 C.J. by Opinion Mallett, long-arm statute passed Michigan’s Legislature laundry-list- Illinois’ resembles in 1961. This statute long- after long Michigan’s Not style long-arm statute. it this Court indicated passed, statute was arm states and construe the lead of other would follow confer to the statute to long-arm constitutionally permissible. In broadest extent Sifers 623 195, 198; (1971), NW2d Horen, majority of this Court stated: upon Michigan in this case to construe a

We are called represents attempt on the statute which an expand potential Michigan legislature limited to its full jurisdiction Michigan courts over nonresidents. say prepared is forbidden Unless we are by the to exercise to the Federal Constitution in the statute we should not construe the extent indicated restrictively. statute so opinion Linkfield, the lead in Schneider v

Likewise, (1973), repeated from proposition Sifers: having ‘long-arm’statutes sim “The courts of those states confer, specifically, which limited ilar to that of personal jurisdiction over defendants based on ‘the transac any state,’ generally within the have con tion of business extending the state’s strued their statutes as by process.”[11] permitted the farthest limits due provision, 111B J 504 Other states that statute: The catch-all laundry-list-style originally long-arm statutes have also added enacted provisions 4.2(a); R to their statutes. Ala Civ P La Rev Stat catch-all 13.3201; Neb Rev Stat 25-536. opinion Justice Swainson and The lead in Schneider was written Kavanagh. opinion joined by An Justice Justice Thomas Giles written joined by Kavanagh, Justice Coleman and Chief Justice T. M. Williams explicitly proposition that the statute is coex does not state the Clause, disagreement with with the Due Process but does limit its tensive Green v Wilson Opinion by Mallett, C.J. Since this pronouncements Court’s Sifers Schneider, proposition that Michigan’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause continually has been repeated by the Michigan Court Appeals12 federal courts sitting jurisdiction Brauchli, Inc, the lead App 528, 531; ples The practice. Wilson mischaracterizes the tion”); The Court Michigan show if the defendants had conducted business in but remanded the case to the trial Mich to basis for long-arm statute stretches to the limits of the Due Process Clause. NW2d 539 sistent with due broad But see case returned to the Court of clime’s contacts with gan Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu- been construed as ing expand 769; assume ally permissible, [Michigan’s long-arm den, clude that five courts have shortened the reach of the Clause to warrant the exercise of limited (1997) (“[0]ur long-arm (1977) (panel containing Wilson cites Woodward v 12See, e.g., give Michigan Justice resident was referred Michigan of due 243 NW2d 724 174 Mich App 308, 316; Schneider v language limited Mallory jurisdiction jurisdiction opinion The trial court courts lacked concurred (1973) (“The only Riley); process”); over nonresident defendants as is consistent with the 357 NW2d 882 Ins Comm’r v resident later sued App 660, 662-663; justices personal jurisdiction 71 Mich v Conida of the statute . . . indicates the process”); courts to an unrelated issue. Stan Sax giving Linkfield, 323 NW2d 683 consistent with due as the forum (1976); with Michigan Northern Ins Co New York v B in Schneider jurisdiction statute has been App 263, 265-266; the courts the broadest Justice granted summary disposition, holding the trial court’s due Warehouses, Inc, Kriko v Allstate Ins Co full holding Corp (1984) (“[The long-arm her doctor to a clinic in South Arcilio, 40 Mich Appeals, Keenan, Kiefer real limitation extent of the Due Process were insufficient under 436 NW2d 412 Riley) v the clinic (1982) (“all agree that, court Siefen state on constitutional in to its full agreed v 221 Mich App 131, 135; the court Woodward. statute] 79 Mich May, for the long-arm of Thus, process”); Rainsberger interpreted power possible personal jurisdiction. in Compounds, order to allow the with the 113 Mich 247 NW2d 375 placed 46 Mich process analysis, one could Michigan’s potential”) (panel App proposition would allow unequivocally (1989) (“This App 543; grant statute. We believe that case”); Hapner Michigan. In Legislature’s 54, 198 NW2d 834 statute] of on this statute to proposition Woodward, App 280; grounds. of App 566, 571; Canada, grant 73; ^[68] jurisdiction to Elliott, Ltd, reasonably courts for mal- if constitution- 561 NW2d 412 Bend, 261 NW2d 80 that gain personal was intended Id. When the (1976) (“The the broadest Michigan statute has plaintiff stated that Id. 317 NW2d id. at The court v McFad desire to Michigan 137 Mich App 768, that the a Michi- Indiana. that the contain- (1972). at v Rolf princi- con- con- 546. 455 Mich 342 C.J. Opinion Mallett, diversity.13 that Michi- assumption almost-universal

Despite the intended to grant statute was gan’s long-arm constitutionally pos- jurisdictional powers broadest Court have that sible, suggested some members of the widely may not be as broad as long-arm statute Brauchli, Inc, 404 Mich Hapner believed. Rolf Justice 160, 168, (1978), n 273 NW2d Levin, stated in a footnote: joined by Justice Fitzgerald, my disagreement with the statement I also note “[i]n previous decisions, has viewed the statute as an this Court attempt by expand potential Legislature to its full non- limited courts over statutes, with . . . The contrast stat- residents.” (Cal rules of other states Code Civ Proc NJ utes or due-process stated, this state “As defendants lacked sufficient ties with courts, making to the of our we therefore them amenable personam grant judgment want affirm the court’s of accelerated (After Remand), App . . . .” Woodward v Keenan (panel containing Wood- (1979) Justice Riley). ward, therefore, constitutional, statutory grounds. It was decided on does not hold that the reach of the statute is shorter than the Due Process Clause. 13See, e.g., Michigan Coalition Radioactive Material Users v Barclays Griepentrog, 1174, 6, v Bank (CA 1992); Chandler 954 F2d 1176 PLC, AG, 1148, 6, Supp (CA 1990); FFOC Co v Invent 882 F 898 F2d 1150 (ED Mich, 1994); Chrysler Corp Corp, 1229, 642, v Fedders 651 643 F2d Corp Corp, (CA 1981); Widger 6, Supp v Chemical 601 F 1236 Chemfil Corp, Mich, Supp 845, (ED 1985); Subacz v Town Tower Motel F 847 567 Inc, (ND Ind, 1983); Speckine Supp 1308, v Stanwick Int’l F 1311 503 Corp, 1055, (WD Mich, 1980); Gavelek v Coscol Petroleum 491 F 1057 Systems Bamgerger’s, 188, Mich, v Supp (ED 1979); Microelectronic 193 Theurer, Transport, 168, Supp (ED Mich, 1977); Central Inc v 434 F 171 Inc, Hatter, Supp 1076, (ED Mich, 1977); Mad Inc v Mad Hat 430 F 1078 Smith, Night Club, Supp 889, (ED Mich, 1975); Hill v ters 399 F 890 337 F Lewis, Supp 981, Mich, 1972); Supp 1365, Hadad v (WD F 982-984 382 Niles, Mich, Supp 146, (WD (ED 1974). But see Horvath v F 148 Mich, 1992) (suggesting long-arm statute has been shortened Lak, applied providers), Inc v Deer medical when out-of-state Enterprises, 1293, 6, 1989) (suggesting (CA Creek F2d that the process long-arm cases). statute not be coextensive with due in tort Green v Wilson Opinion by Mallett, C.J. Rules, provision subject- 4:4-4[d]), does not contain jurisdiction permis- ing non-residents to to the fullest extent sible under the Federal Constitution.

Likewise, Witbeck, supra 666, 3, at 428 Mich n equivocated scope this Court in dicta on the of the long-arm statute. construing Michigan’s statute, some courts have con process

cluded that its reach is coextensive with due tests Supreme laid down the United States Court. . . . This upon conclusion is based a statement made in Sifers Horen, (1971), that the long-arm “represents attempt statute an on the of the expand Michigan legislature potential to its full limited jurisdiction courts over nonresi However, . . . dents.” Court also declared that Sifers holding upon its rested the “exercise to the [of] statute.”[14] extent indicated in the In order to present case, precise resolve the contours of the long-arm statute need not be deter- I note, mined. do however, that statutes that extend jurisdiction of are generally broadly. courts construed 3A Singer, Statutory Sutherland Construction (5th ed), 67.03, pp 67-69. § Instead of determining long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process I Clause, would hold that Wilson’s actions are within scope plain of the language of subsection 2 of the

long-arm statute. This subsection allows this state’s courts to exercise long-arm for “[t]he 14Presently, agree that, all members of the Court in at least some situa tions, scope long-arm of the statute exceeds the boundaries of the Starbrite, supra Due Process Clause. In at all members of the Court agreed requirements that the statute were met. Two mem bers, however, argued constitutionally impermissible. Mich 342 455 374 Opinion Mallett, C.J. by consequences

doing causing done, to be or an act or resulting action for tort.” in an occur, in the state Michigan, became intoxi- came to Wilson Michigan, intoxi- to drive while in and chose cated argues Michigan. these acts did not He that cated in only tort, and that the in current action for result act of in an action for tort was the act that resulted crossing tunnel Detroit-Windsor the center line plaintiff’s striking above, however, I car. As noted alleged activi- link Wilson’s whether a causal between question is a and the accident exists ties in summary granted dis- Because the trial court of fact. accept plaintiffs’ position I must case, in this by caused Wilson’s that the accident was claim alleged above, the causal intoxication. As also noted by plaintiffs alleged attenuated that link is not so as a matter of law. I find a lack of causation fact the accident occurred Moreover, the Wilson does not remove defendant outside scope 2 2. Subsection does from the of subsection require Michigan. Rather, that the entire tort occur consequences provides either the act or it Michigan. Wilson case, In this the act must occur began duty of care when he breached his this tort choosing conse- while intoxicated.15 The to drive quences negligent conduct occurred Canada of this damages.16 Because suffered their when the the act 2 will reach a defendant either subsection Michigan’s alleged drunk is a violation of Because Wilson’s conduct pre 9.2325, driving laws, it would create a rebuttable Inc, Service, & sumption negligence. Klanseck v Anderson Sales NW2d 356 plain light Again, favorable to the the facts in the most we must take alleged was caused Wilson’s tiff and assume that the accident intoxication. Green v Wilson Opinion by C.J. Mallett,

or the consequences of the act occur in Michigan, Wilson is scope within the of subsection 2.17

Therefore, because Wilson allegedly became intoxi- cated in Michigan and chose to drive while intoxi- cated he Michigan, committed acts in this state in an action for tort.” Jurisdiction is “resulted] proper thus under the long-arm statute. Because both statutory the constitutional requirements have met, been this state exercise personal limited jurisdiction over Wilson.

n NAMEAND RETAINCLAUSE Because I would hold that Michigan courts have limited Wilson, over complied have with the name and retain clause of the dramshop act. I concur with opinion Kelly’s Justice insofar as it discusses the act. Gurwin, 59; Wilson relies on Coleman v 443 Mich 503 NW2d 435 (1993), Corp, and Gross v General Motors 448 Mich 528 NW2d 707 (1995), support argument scope of his that he is not within the of sub Gross, however, interpret Michigan’s section 2. Both Coleman and venue statute, 27A.1629, not the statute. Even if analogize case, they support we were to our venue cases to this plaintiffs’ position, Gross, Wilson’s. we noted that venue does not solely injury occurred, lie where the but also where or all of the Likewise, Coleman, cause of action arose. Id. at 154. we stated that we determining would examine the elements of the cause of action in where proper. Thus, cases, duty venue is Id. at 63. in tort we examine where the arose, duty breached, relationship where the the causal between the damages, plaintiff damages. breach and and where the suffered Lorencz v Co,

Ford Motor will Venue be proper duty, damages where the defendant breached his even were suffered elsewhere. present case, In the elements of the cause of action occurred in Michi- gan, namely, duty Wilson breached his of care when he chose to drive while intoxicated. 455 Mich 342

Opinion by C.J. Mallett, judgment affirm reasons, For these I would Appeals the Court and remand the case to the trial proceedings. court for further

Case Details

Case Name: Green v. Wilson

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 22, 1997

Citation: 565 N.W.2d 813

Docket Number: Docket Nos. 104028, 104034 and 104039, Calendar No. 9

Court Abbreviation: Mich.