GREEN v. UNITED STATES
No. 80-6039
C. A. 4th Cir.
450 U.S. 929
Because it cannot be said with assurancе that an improper finding of a § (b) (7) circumstance played no part in the jury‘s decision to impose the death penalty in this case, I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence on this additional ground.
JUSTICE STEWART joins all but the first and last рaragraphs of this dissenting opinion. He would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment imposing the death penalty, so that a properly instructed jury may consider what sentence to impose. See Westbrook v. Balkcom, 449 U. S. 999, 1001 (1980) (dissent from denial of certiorari).
Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
In United States v. Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600 (1976), this Court held that when a criminal defendant‘s sucсessful request for a mistrial is precipitated by “‘prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,‘” a subsequent trial on the same charges is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Petitioner was tried for conspiracy to distribute heroin.
The court‘s reasоning is questionable on both grounds. The central issue presented by this case—whether prosecutorial misconduct must have the speсific purpose of provoking a defendant‘s request for a mistrial in order to raise double jeopardy concerns—has divided thе Courts of Appeals. The majority in the court below, as well as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Nelson, 582 F. 2d 1246 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1079 (1979), have limited Dinitz to situations in which the prosecution
In my view, this latter interpretation of Dinitz is the correct one.2 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant‘s interest in a single, fair adjudication of his guilt or innocence. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358, 370 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 343 (1975); Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734, 736 (1963). This constitutional interest is implicatеd whenever intentional governmental misconduct results in a mistrial. Regardless of whether the Government‘s misbehavior was designed specifically to provoke a mistrial or was simply intended to reduce the chances of an acquittal, the net effect on the defendant is the same: he is faced with the burdens and risks of a second trial solely because the Government has deliberately undermined the intеgrity of the first proceeding. Indeed, in United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470 (1971), the central decision relied on in Dinitz, this Court concluded that
The second ground for the decision of the court below—that Dinitz does not apply to Government witnesses—is equally suspect. Dinitz referred to “‘prosecutorial . . . overreaching,‘” 424 U. S., at 607, but nothing in that decision suggests that its holding was limited solely to misconduct by the prosecutor. To be surе, the prosecutor cannot be held responsible for the misconduct of every Government witness. However, in this case, Agent Dixon‘s rоle in the prosecution of petitioner was far more extensive than that of an ordinary Government witness. As Judge Winter observed in dissent:
“Agent Dixon was a four-year veteran of the Drug Enforcement Administration. . . . Since joining DEA he had made over 150 arrests and participated in аpproximately 35 cases. Manifestly he was the agent in charge of the instant case; he sat at counsel table throughout the еntire trial. Significantly, the government had been advised that defendant would not testify because of his record. Undoubtedly, as the agent in chаrge, Dixon had that knowledge.” 636 F. 2d, at 930.
Given Dixon‘s extensive involvement in the prosecution of the Government‘s case against petitioner, I quеstion whether the court below correctly found Dinitz to be inapplicable. In any event, the question is sufficiently important to warrant this Cоurt‘s review.
