Appellant, administratrix of the estate of a decedent who was hit by a truck while crossing a street on foot, appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee and the denial of her motion for partial summary judgment. There are no facts in dispute, and the pivotal legal issue is whether OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (2), 1 which requires that no-fault benefits be provided to non-resident motorists involved in motor vehicle accidents in Georgia and insured by insurers doing business in Georgia, covers “motorists” who are on foot rather than in their cars at the time of the accident.
The decedent, a resident of Alabama, was insured by appellee. While driving along Peachtree Industrial Boulevard, the decedent stopped to make a phone call, and as she recrossed the street on foot after making her call she was hit by a truck and killed. Appellant sought statutory minimum no-fault benefits from appellee pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq., the Georgia No-Fault Act. Appellee denied appellant’s claim on the grounds that appellant’s decedent was a pedestrian rather than a “motorist” at the moment she was struck. Appellant filed suit seeking no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) benefits as well as statutory penalties, attorney fees and punitive damages for appellee’s bad faith refusal to pay. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment and appellant filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the coverage issue only. This appeal follows the grant of appellee’s motion and the denial of appellant’s motion.
1. OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (2) mandates that insurers doing business in Georgia but issuing policies or contracts to insureds outside Georgia provide at least the statutory minimum no-fault PIP coverage established by § 33-34-4 “with respect to motorists insured under the policies or contracts who are involved in motor vehicle accidents in this state and, notwithstanding any provisions of the policies or con *479 tracts to the contrary, all such policies or contracts of insurance shall be deemed to satisfy the minimum requirements of this chapter if a motorist insured under the policies or contracts of insurance is involved in a motor vehicle accident in this state.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant contends that “motorist” as used in OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (2) does not mean only those individuals actually riding in motor vehicles at the time an accident involving a motor vehicle occurs. We agree. This court has often used the word “motorist” to describe individuals not at that moment in their vehicles. See, e.g.,
Bosworth v. State,
Nor can “motorist” be construed to include only those actually in their cars at the relevant time in light of the purpose of the No-Fault Act. The disputed language in OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (2) must be viewed against the general framework of protection provided by the interplay of §§ 33-34-3; 33-34-4; and 33-34-7. OCGA § 33-34-4 establishes the statutory minimum amount of no-fault benefits that must be provided for a motor vehicle registered in Georgia. OCGA § 33-34-7 lists specified insured events,
including an insured being struck by a motor vehicle while a pedestrian,
whose occurrence triggers payment of no-fault benefits. OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (1) mandates that all insurance policies issued in Georgia “be in accordance with the requirements of this chapter,” and OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (2) provides that even if policies are not issued in Georgia, insurers doing business in Georgia must provide at least the statutory minimum coverage established in § 33-34-4. One of the purposes of the No-Fault Act is to
*480
ensure, to the extent possible, that all victims of automobile accidents in the state are provided with certain minimal insurance coverage.
Cannon v. Ga. Farm
&c.
Ins. Co.,
Appellee’s argument that our interpretation renders the legislature’s use of “motorist” in the disputed clause synonymous with “insured” when the legislature could have simply used the word “insured” instead does not convince us otherwise. A look at the disputed language shows, that “motorist” is twice used as a noun immediately followed by the descriptive clause “insured under the policies or contracts.” Thus, if the legislature had used “insured” rather than “motorist” as its synonym, the resulting phrase would have been “an insured under the policies or contracts” — a phrase that is awkward at best. See
Doran v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
“The amendment [adding § 33-34-3 (a) (2)] was aimed at insurers authorized to transact or transacting insurance in Georgia. As to this category of insurers, it directed that they should include in policies issued in other states or Canadian provinces a provision ‘which provides at least the minimum coverage required under Section 3 (b) of this Act (OCGA § 33-34-4 (a) (2)) . . .’ if the insured is involved in a motor vehicle accident in Georgia. [Cit.] Section 3 (b) is the basic PIP of $5,000. . . . [0]ut-of-state policies issued to insureds later involved in auto accidents in Georgia by companies transacting or authorized to transact insurance here were affected. The requirement was that such policies provide minimum PIP coverage of $5,000. . . .” (Emphasis supplied and footnote omitted.) Id. at 68. Here, appellant’s decedent was issued a policy in another state and *481 was then involved in a motor vehicle accident in Georgia. Thus, coverage should be provided.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage and in denying appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the same issue.
2. Appellant also sought statutory penalties, attorney fees and punitive damages based on appellee’s bad faith. However, this court has recently held that, in the absence of a contractual term in the policy providing for bad faith damages, there can be no post-repeal recovery of penalties, attorney fees or punitive damages for an insurers’ bad faith failure to pay under the repealed No-Fault Act. See
Terry v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co.,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
The Georgia Legislature repealed OCGA § 33-34-3, effective October 1, 1991. Because decedent’s policy was issued prior to October 1, 1991, we apply the repealed version of the statute. See Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 3.1.