Rоdrick Green appeals from his convictions of aggravated assault and criminal damage to property in the first degree, asserting the trial court erred by denying him a prе-trial hearing under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.6 and by erroneously charging the jury on prior difficulties between himself and the victim. He also *651 alleges he is entitled to a new trial becausе he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Green contends his convictions should be reversed because the trial court failed to rule on his motion to present evidence of specific acts of violence of the victim until after the State had presented its case. Even if wе were to agree that the trial court should have ruled on the motion before the trial started, we cannot reverse Green’s conviction “where as here, apрellant can show no prejudice suffered from the failure to have the hearing before trial.”
Thaxton v. State,
We find no merit in Green’s claim that his inability to cross-examine the victim about the viсtim’s prior acts of violence during the presentation of the State’s case prejudiced his defense. After the trial court ruled that Green could present evidencе of the victim’s prior acts of violence, Green could have recalled the victim for purposes of cross-examination. See
Yebra v. State,
2. In his second enumeration of error, Green alleges the trial court committed reversible error when it gave the following charge, of its own accord, to the jury:
Evidence of prior difficulties between the defеndant and the alleged victim has been admitted for the sole purpose of illustrating, if it does so illustrate, the stated feeling between the defendant and the alleged victim and thе bent of mind and course of conduct on the part of the defendant. Whether this evidence illustrates such is a matter solely for you, the jury, to determine, but you are not to cоnsider such evidence for any other purpose.
Green argues this charge improperly characterized the testimony at trial as showing that he had engaged in prior viоlent acts with the victim when the evidence showed only that the victim had engaged in prior violent acts with other people. Green also argues this charge impropеrly advised the jury that the evidence was to be used to determine defendant’s bent of mind and course of conduct, instead of the victim’s bent of mind and course of conduct.
Based on our review of the evidence submitted during Green’s trial, we agree that there was no evidence of prior difficulties between Green and the victim. Thus, the charge, while abstrаctly *652 correct, was not authorized by the evidence. We disagree, however, with Green’s contention that the jury should have been advised that the victim’s prior violent acts should be used to evaluate the victim’s bent of mind and course of conduct. The issue before the jury was Green’s state of mind at the time he fired his gun and whether he did so in self-defense based оn his knowledge of the victim’s previous behavior.
Although we agree the charge was not warranted, we will not reverse a criminal conviction simply because a trial cоurt gives an abstractly correct jury instruction that is not authorized by the evidence. Harm must also result, and we cannot reverse a conviction when it is highly probable that an erroneous jury instruction did not contribute to the verdict.
Francis v. State,
3. In his remaining enumeration of error, Green claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel (a) acquiesced in the trial court’s decision not to hold a pre-trial hearing on the admissibility оf the victim’s prior acts of violence and was unprepared to proceed with the hearing before trial; (b) failed to object to the erroneous charge discussed in Division 2 of this opinion; and (c) failed to object to the State’s comments on the exercise of Green’s right to remain silent during cross-examination of a police officer and closing argument.
“The Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.”
Ross v. Kemp,
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, [appellant] must show that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the alleged ineffeсtive act, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Jowers v. State,260 Ga. 459 (396 SE2d 891 ) (1990).
LaJara v. State,
A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is not required to address the performance portion of the inquiry before the
*653
prejudice component “or even to address both components if the dеfendant has made an insufficient showing on one.” Id. Finally, a trial court’s finding of effectiveness must be upheld unless clearly erroneous.
Cammon v. State,
We find no merit in any of Green’s ineffective assistаnce of counsel claims because he has failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different but for his counsel’s alleged inеffective acts. We have already concluded in Divisions 1 and 2 that no prejudice resulted to Green as a result of the trial court’s failure to hold a pre-trial hearing оr its jury charge on prior difficulties with the victim.
Green’s third allegation of ineffective assistance, that his counsel failed to object to the State’s comments on the exerсise of his right to remain silent, warrants further discussion. Green bases this allegation on the following testimony by the police officer who responded to a report of a dischаrged firearm at the victim’s apartment:
[THE STATE]: Now, in your ten years of experience in law enforcement, Officer Hickey, have you been involved in cases where someоne claimed self defense?
[WITNESS]: Yes, I have.
[THE STATE]: Approximately how many times?
[WITNESS]: I couldn’t count. It’s a large amount.
[THE STATE]: Okay. And typically in those situations when you respond to them —.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m just going to make an objection to this. I think it’s an ultimate issue question. We want to voir dire the witness outside the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: What’s the question?
[THE STATE]: The question, Your Honor, is I’d like him to explain what his experience has been when he has responded to scenes where there is a claim of self-defense.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s an ultimate issue question.
[THE STATE]: It’s not an ultimate issue as to whether or not it’s the issue in this case. He’s talking about the typical response.
THE COURT: I’ll overrule the objection.
[THE STATE]: Thank you, Your Honor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge.
[THE STATE]: Can you please explain tо the ladies and gentlemen what your experience has been in cases where someone is claiming self defense?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object on the terms *654 of vagueness. It calls for a narrative response.
[THE STATE]: I’m trying not to lead the witness, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[WITNESS]: In my course of experience, I have experienced when an individual is claiming self defense they normally are at thе scene of the crime when it occurred or they might call us at a different time.
[THE STATE]: When you say they’re at the scene of the crime, do you mean they wait for the policе?
[WITNESS]: Yes, they do. They’re at the scene. They’re waiting for us. And normally they’re the ones who call. In this particular incident, that did not occur.
[THE STATE]: I have nothing further. . . .
Green also claims the State commеnted on the exercise of his right to remain silent by referring to this testimony during its closing argument. We cannot consider this portion of Green’s claim, however, because it was not raisеd below in the motion for new trial that was filed by his current appellate counsel. See
Seese v. State,
Thus, we must determine whether the outcome of Green’s trial would have been different if his lawyer had made a different objection to the testimony outlined above. Based on our review of the evidence, we cannot find the trial court clearly erred when it determined that Green failed to show prejudice as a result of his counsel’s failure to object on a different ground. See
Wade v. State,
Judgment affirmed.