16 Pa. Super. 26 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1901
Opinion by
The familiar and fundamental principles which apply to the location of original surveys based upon warrants issued from the land office are also, in the main, applicable to the location of lands described in a deed. The controlling factors in location, in the order of their weight and efficiency as evidence, are, (1) the monuments on the ground including corners, lines, etc. The difference between the different kinds of natural monuments and artificial ones, and their value as evidence need not be here discussed. (2) The calls for adjoiners. (3) Courses and distances. Where there are neither monuments applicable
In the present case the plaintiff claimed under a deed dated April 1, 1890, for a lot therein described as follows : “ All that certain lot or piece of ground situated on the southwest corner of Lehigh and Eleventh streets in the city of Easton aforesaid, beginning at the intersection of said Lehigh and Eleventh streets and extending westwardly along said Lehigh street twenty-four feet and, of that width, southwardly along said Eleventh street, one hundred and twelve feet to a ten-foot wide alley, it being lot No. 49 of a certain plan of lots of the estate of James Hess, deceased,” etc. There is no question raised, so far as the evidence shows, as to the starting point — the corner of Lehigh and Eleventh streets. The conveyance is of a strip of ground twenty-four feet in width and 112 feet in depth. No monuments are referred to and there is no call of any kind for an adjoiner. The plaintiff is, therefore, confined to the' width as set forth in her deed. If the adjoining lot had been called for, or if the division fence claimed by her to exist as the common boundary of her lot and that adjoining had been referred to, there would have been ground in either case for the admission of the testimony offered, and for going beyond the width of her lot, as described in her deed. Her lot is described as No. 49, but there is no plot or plan of lots attached to her deed, and no reference to such a plan as having been recorded.
In the deed from James Hess to Nicholas Peil, under which defendant claims his original lob, dated April 1, 1876, it is described as “beginning at the corner of lot No. 34, a distance of 180 feet east from the east side of Elder alley; thence extending along the south side of Lehigh street aforesaid eastwardly twenty feet to a corner of lot No. 32; thence extending, of the same width, southwardly one hundred and twelve feet to a ten-foot wide private alley, it being lot No. 33 of apian of lots recently laid out by the said James Hess,” etc. The same lot was conveyed by Nicholas Peil to the defendant, January 5, 1888. We cannot see that this helps the plaintiff’s case, even if it be admitted that lots Nos. 32 and 49 are identical, for her grantor had an undoubted right to stop one foot short of the common boundary of lots Nos. 32 and 33 and this is what he apparently did.
It has been uniformly held that assessments and the payment of taxes, although not evidence of title, may be shown as evidence more or less efficient as to the question of the claim or possession of the party against whom the assessments have been made and by whom the taxes have been paid. If the evidence afforded by the payment of taxes and assessments for improvements had been admitted in this case, it would have been of no possible benefit to the plaintiff, unless held to be evidence of title, and not merely of claim or possession; but, as it could not be properly so held, was, therefore, we think properly excluded. See Irwin v. Patchen, 164 Pa. 51.
With the corner of Lehigh and Eleventh streets conceded, there is nothing in the deed to the plaintiff which will carry her beyond the twenty-four feet on Lehigh street conveyed to her in her deed. We can see no error, therefore, in the rejection of the evidence, the several offers of which constitute the bulk of the specifications of error complained of, nor can we convict the court below of error in directing the jury to find for the defendant. The plaintiff had failed to show any title to the strip in dispute, and the defendant was, therefore, entitled to a verdict.
Judgment affirmed.