57 Neb. 391 | Neb. | 1899
In this case, an appeal from an order granting a perpetual injunction, there is a motion to dismiss the appeal, based on the ground that the order appealed from was made in A’acation and is therefore void. It is said that the October term of the district court of Douglas county was adjourned October 3, 1898, until November 1, 1898, and that the decree was rendered -October 4, during the
In what has been said it has not been the intention to convey any inference whatever as to what would be the rights of litigants who, relying on the order of adjournment, had absented themselves for want of notice of the reconvention of the court, or of those who might, although with notice, be unprepared for a trial thus brought on prior to the time on wrhich they might perhaps rely as the earliest when trial could be demanded. This record does not disclose that there was any surprise. Both parties were present and no objection appears to going to trial at the time trial- was had.
We are thus brought to the merits of the appeal. The case was a proceeding in foreclosure. A decree was rendered, a stay taken, the land then sold, the sale con; firmed, and an appeal taken by the defendant from the order of confirmation. By this court the order of confirmation was affirmed. A mandate was.sent to the district court commanding the enforcement of the order. A deed was issued to the purchaser, who demanded possession, and possession was refused. The purchaser then instituted an action in forcible entry and detainer for the recovery of possession of the property. The defendant then filed in the original case a supplemental petition, asking an injunction to restrain the purchaser from prosecuting the forcible entry and detainer case and from interfering with defendant’s possession. It is the order making a temporary injunction of that character perpetual that is appealed from.
We are not favored with a brief in defense of the order of the district court, and we are decidedly of the opinion that it is entirely indefensible. The supplemental petition, aside from reciting the proceedings in the case, alleges that the cause is still pending in the district court to carry out the mandate; that the plaintiff has filed “a pretended deed,” dated and executed 'while the order of confii-mation was superseded by the former appeal; that
It may further be remarked that the only evidence the defendant offered to prove the averments of the supplemental petition was that somewhat remarkable document itself. A pleading in a cause is not competent evidence to prove the facts therein averred.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, the perpetual and the temporary injunctions both dissolved, and the supplemental petition dismissed.
Reversed.