delivered the opinion of the court,
OPINION
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the thirty (30)-day notice of appeal period, articulated in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) (“Rule 4(a)”), began to run when the appellees filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the final claim between all parties in this actiоn, or when the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all parties in this action had been adjudicated. The Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day period commenced on the date the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal and concluded that the appellаnt’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the thirty-day notice of appeal period commenced on the date that the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all the parties had been adjudicated. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the intermediate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 31, 2000, the appellant, Susan Green, filed a complaint against Leon Moore, ShoLodge, Inc., and ShoLodge Franchise Systems, Inc., the appellees, for an alleged breach of a settlement agreement dated January 29, 1996. Ms. Green, a former employee of ShoLodge, Inc., claimed that the settlement agreement was breached in August 1997 when Leon Moore allegedly referred to her as “a f— ing b-tch” twice in front of co-workers at her new place of employment. 1 The appel-lees filed a motion to dismiss this action claiming it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion with respect to claims it concluded were grounded in tort law and subject to the one-year statute of limitations period for personal injuries. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (2000). However, the trial court refused to dismiss the appellant’s various claims for lost wages and loss of earning capacity which the court held were governed by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-109 (2000).
The appellees filed a motion for permissiоn to appeal the trial court’s ruling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 (“Rule 9”). The interlocutory appeal was granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Subsequently, the appellees sought and were granted permission to appeal by this Court.
On Novembеr 22, 2000, while still appealing the trial court’s original ruling on the motion to dismiss, the appellees filed an answer to the appellant’s complaint and asserted a counterclaim alleging that it was the appellant who breached the 1996 settlement agreement by filing a frivolous lawsuit. The appellees subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the appellant’s claims that the trial court had determined were not barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court substantially granted the appellees’
On September 18, 2001, the appellees filed another mоtion for summary judgment with respect to the appellant’s sole remaining claim for damages. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion and dismissed with prejudice all claims made by Ms. Green against the appellees. Subsequently, on February 5, 2002, the appel-lees filed a written notice with the trial court voluntаrily dismissing their counterclaim against the appellant pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01 (“Rule 41.01”). Because all of the appellant’s claims had been dismissed, the ap-pellees’ counterclaim was the final claim remaining in this action.
On March 18, 2002, the trial court entered an order which confirmed that “аs of February 5, 200[2], 2 all claims of all parties in this action have been adjudicated and this action has therefore been concluded.” Additionally, on March 13, 2002, the appel-lees filed a motion to dismiss their application for permission to appeal in this Court. Citing the trial court’s favorable summary judgment rulings, the appellees claimed that because “the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs claims is final and non-ap-pealable, the [statute of limitations] issue raised in the [appellees’] Application for Permission to Appeal has become moot.” In a per curiam order, this Court, relying on language from the appellees’ mоtion, dismissed the appellees’ application for permission to appeal and implied that the trial court’s dismissal of Ms. Green’s claims was final and non-appealable on February 5, 2002. However, this Court was not faced with the issue of when the Rule 4(a) notice of appeal period commenced. Accordingly, our order was based upon incomplete information, and any language in the order suggesting that the notice of appeal period commenced when the appellees filed their notice of voluntary dismissal on February 5, 2002 is not dispositive of the issue before us.
On April 11, 2002, Ms. Green filed a notice оf appeal. The notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the trial court’s entry of an order indicating that all claims by the parties had been adjudicated. However, it was not filed within thirty days of the appellees’ notice of voluntary dismissal of their counterclaim. The Court of Appeals held that “it is the filing of thе written notice of dismissal, not the entry of the confirmatory order, that triggers the commencement of the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed.” Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed.
We granted the appellant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a) commenced on the date the appellees filed their notice of voluntary dismissal, or rather on the date that the trial court entered an order stating that all claims between the parties had been adjudicated. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that for purposes of filing a notice of appeal under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, the thirty-day appeal period commenced on the date that the trial court entered its order confirming that all claims
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In this case, our review concerns when the thirty-day notice of appeal periоd articulated in Rule 4(a) commenced. Interpretation of Rule 4(a) is a pure question of law, for which the standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the Court of Appeals.
Doyle v. Frost,
ANALYSIS
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) (“Rule 3(a)”) states that a final judgment in a civil actiоn “entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is appealable as of right.” However, Rule 3(a) also states that “[ejxcept as otherwise permitted in Rule 9 and in Rule 54.02 Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief аre involved in an action, any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appeal-able. ...” (Emphasis added). Hence, until the appellees’ counterclaim was adjudicated, Ms. Green was unable to appeal the unfavorable rulings of the trial court against her. However, once all claims between the parties had been adjudicated, Rule 4(a) states that the notice of appeal “shall be filed with and received by the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment appealed from.... ” Thus, this case turns on whether “the date of entry of the judgment appealed from” was February 5, 2002 (the date the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal) or March 13, 2002 (the date the trial court entered its order confirming that all claims between the parties in this actions were adjudicated).
The appellees contend that the thirty-day appeal period commenced on February 5, 2002, the date they filed the notice of voluntary dismissal. In support of their argument, the appellees cite to the case of
Rickets v. Sexton,
Additionally, the appellees cite as authority the case of
Parker v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
Conversely, Ms. Green argues that the thirty-day period commenced on March 13, 2002, the date the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims betwеen the parties in the action had been adjudicated. In support of her argument, the appellant cites to the case of
Evans v. Perkey,
In Rickets the [C]ourt was concerned with the right of a party to take a voluntary nonsuit and the lack of the power of the court to deprive him of that right. We construe the Rickets [Cjourt to be saying that the plaintiff in that case had done all that was required to be done when he gave written notice of his intention to take a nonsuit. It was not necessary for the court to grant permission or enter an order permitting it to be done. However, we do not find the [CJourt to be saying that a judgment or decree need not be entered for final adjudication of the case.
Evans,
Additionally, the appellant cites the case of
Montgomery v. Nichols,
After considering the issue and the cases cited by both sides, none of which are directly on point, we are of the opinion that the reasoning and decision reachеd in
Evans
and its progeny are persuasive. The language in
Rickets
which arguably suggests that filing a notice of voluntary dismissal constitutes an adjudication for purposes of commencing the Rule 4(a) thirty-day appeal period is non-binding dicta.
Rickets
stands for the proposition that, except in very limited circumstances,
Additionally, we acknowledge that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 (“Rule 58”) states:
Entry of a judgment or an order of final disposition is effective when a judgment containing one of the following is marked on the face by the clerk as filed for entry:
(1) the signatures of the judge and all parties or counsel, or
(2) the signatures of the judge and one party or counsel with a certificate of counsel that a copy of the proposed order has been served on all other parties or counsel, or
(3) the signature of the judge and a certificate of the clerk that a copy has bеen served on all other parties or counsel.
We note that by the plain language of Rule 58, the signature of the judge is mandatory to effectuate a judgment or order of final disposition. Furthermore, the original Advisory Commission Comment to Rule 58 states that the rule was “designed to make uniform across the State the procedure for the entry of judgment and to make certain the effective date of judgment.” Therefore, we hold that the thirty-day notice of appeal period articulated in Rule 4(a) commenced when the trial court entered its signed order confirming that all claims between the parties had been adjudicated on March 13, 2002.
CONCLUSION
We are of the opinion that the thirty-day notice of appeal period articulated in Rule 4(a) commenced when the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between the parties in this action had been adjudicated on March 13, 2002. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the intermediate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellees, Leon Moore, ShoLodge, Inc., and ShoLodge Franchise Systems, Inc.
Notes
. Given that the instant case is procedural in nature, the underlying facts of the appellant’s complaint and the appellees’ counterclaim are irrelevant.
. The trial court’s order of March 13, 2002 erroneously noted "February 5, 2001” as the date that the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal of their counterclaim. This was merely a typographical error, as there is no dispute in the record that the appellees' written notice of voluntary dismissal was filed on February 5, 2002. Additionally, neither party has raised the issue of whether the trial court had the authority to issue a retroactive order. Therefore, that issue is not before us for review.
. August 31, 1981 was more than one year after August 29, 1980. However, the plaintiff was allowed to re-file on August 31, 1981, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01, because August 29, 1981 fell on a weekend.