Plаintiff-Appellant Vernon Green brought this § 1983 action alleging, inter alia, unlawful use of excessive force, and malicious prosecution in violation of various constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that a New York Supreme Court determination that Green was a juvenile delinquent who had recklessly endangered the life of Police Officer Phillip Montgomery was entitled to preclu-sive effect. Given the finding of endangerment, the district court held that defendants were — as a matter of law — justified in using deadly force against Green. The distriсt court further ruled that (1) because Green was indicted by a grand jury on the charges that form the basis for his malicious prosecution claim, there was a presumption that his prosecution was supported by probable cause and (2) Green had failed to overcome that presumption. Green appeals, arguing that under New York law he is not barred from relitigating the determination that he recklessly endangered the life of Officer Montgomery, since that determination occurred in a juvenile adjudication. But, in fact, both the question of whether the protections afforded to juveniles in §§ 380.1 and 381.2 of the Family Court Act apply to non-family court juvenile adjudications and the effects of prior state court juvenile adjudications in a later litigation are significant unsettled questions of New York law. As a result, and because all of the issues raised in this appeal turn on whether Green is precluded from challenging the reckless endangerment finding, we certify.
A. BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the district court’s published opinion. See Green v. Montgomery,
The same evening, Green — who had just turned fifteen — along with his brother and some friends, arrived at the parking lot of the Bay Shore Road apartment complex. They pulled up next to a black Jeep Wrаngler. Green then entered the Jeep and began to drive it. At about this time, the officers drove into the lot and blocked the
At this point, the versions of the story diverge. Green claims that without provocation, Troy and Montgomery began firing at him as the Jeep he was driving rolled to a halt. The officers contend instead that as they tried to make an investigatory stop, Green drove the Jeep at Montgomery, causing Montgomery and Troy to shoot.
Green, who was wounded in the head by the officers’ fire, was arrested and indicted by a grand jury for attempted murder in the second degree, attempted assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, grand larceny in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree. Following a bench trial in the Supreme Court of New York, the court found in favor of Green on the charges of attempted murder, assault, and grand larceny, and against Green on the reckless endangerment and criminal possession of stolen property charges. The Supreme Court’s commitment order stated that Green had “been convicted of/adjudicated a Juvenile Delinquent for the crime[ ] of Reckless Endangerment 1st Degree ... in full satisfaction of [the] Indictment.” JtApp. 439.
Green subsequently filed this § 1983 action, alleging the use of excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. His complaint also contained state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecutiоn, negligence, and assault and battery. By stipulation, all the state law claims with the exception of assault and battery were withdrawn.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. Finding that the state court’s determination that Green had recklessly endangered Montgomery’s life precluded relitigation of that issue, the district court held that, as a matter of law, the defendants were justified in using deadly force against Green. As to the other federal claims, the court ruled that Green had failed to overcome the presumption of prоbable cause that arose from his indictment by a grand jury. The court therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Green’s federal claims and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of the remaining state law claims. Green appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to his § 1983 claims for excessive force and malicious prosecution.
B. DISCUSSION
Federal courts give state court judgments the same preclusive effect that they would have in the courts of that state. See Colon v. Coughlin,
i. Excessive Force
In state court, Green was accused, among other things, of reckless endangerment. According to Green’s indictment, he committed that crime when, “on or about November 1, 1988, in Suffolk County, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, [Green] recklessly engaged in conduct which creat
Green does not dispute that a determination that he created a grave risk of death to Montgomery by driving the jeep at him would preclude a finding of excessive use of force on the part of the officers. Instead, he argues that, because the state court proceeding was a juvenile adjudication, its results cannot be used against him to bar a relitigation of whether he in fact drove the jeep at Montgomery. And he offers testimonial evidence contradicting the version of events presented by the police officers (and apparently accepted by the state court).
In support of his position, Green points to two provisions of the Family Court Act. Section 380.1 states that, “[e]xcept where specifically required by statute, no person shall be required to divulge information pertaining to the arrest of the respondent or any subsequent proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 380.1(3) (McKinney 1999). Section 381.2 provides that “[njeither the fact that a person was before the family court under this article for a hearing nor any confession, admission or statement made by him to the court or to any officer thereof in any stage of the proceeding is admissible as evidence against him or his interests in any other court.” Id. § 381.2(1). But New York law on the effect of a juvenile adjudication in a situation such as this, in which the former juvenile defendant has brought the suit that puts into play issues previously decided at his statе juvenile proceedings, is nowhere near as clear as Green would have us believe.
Green relies heavily on the case of Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jason B.,
The district court in the case before us implicitly distinguished Jason B., howevеr, and held that, by bringing a § 1983 suit based upon factual matters decided in the state proceeding, Green had — unlike the juvenile in Jason B. — implicitly waived his right not to have that juvenile proceeding used against him. In support of its distinction, the district court noted a series of exceptions to the rule that juvenile proceedings may not subsequently be used against the interests of the juvenile defendant.
The district court’s reading of New York law, however, is no less clouded by uncertainty than the interpretation that Green urges us to accept. As an initial matter, the district court’s reliance on the statutory exception — for adult sentencing — to the juvenile privilege is misplaced. Section 380.1 states that “[e]xcept where specifically required by statute, no person shall be required to divulge information pertaining to the arrest of the respondent or any subsequent proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 380.1(3) (emphasis added). But § 381.2 of the Family Court Act supplies the requisite specific statutory exception with respect to adult sentencing. Accordingly, the use of juvenile records in adult sentencing does not help us decide whether a non-stotutory exception also exists that would allow courts to look into the juvenile records of plaintiffs in subsequent civil suits.
Similarly, Johnson provides only a weak foundation fjpr the district court’s position. While Johnson does indeed say that the record of a juvenile proceeding may be used to impeach the subsequent testimony of the juvenile on specific issues, Johnson is just one case from one New York Supreme Court. Other, similar, cases appear to say the opposite. See, e.g., Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert’s Roman Catholic Church Soc’y,
Finally, although the New York cases are clear that a party otherwise protected by a § 160.50 sealing of records can waive that protection by commencing a civil action and placing protected information into issue, see Kalogris,
Moreover, while a few New Yоrk cases can be read to support the district court’s position, no authoritative New York case does so squarely. Thus, in Taylor — a case involving “infant plaintiffs” who had been acquitted in a prior criminal proceeding and who subsequently sued the Transit Authority for false arrest and malicious prosecution — the Appellate Division ordered the plaintiffs to authorize the defendants to unseal the records of the criminal proceeding, because “[t]he material concerning the arrest and prosecution of the infant plaintiffs is clearly relevant to the issues raised by the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.” Taylor,
Similarly, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bongiorno,
The matter before us is, moreover, complicated by the fact that New York law is also unsettled as to whether the original state court determination that Green had committed reckless endangerment can properly be deemed a juvenile adjudication. Unlike the juveniles in Taylor, Green was adjudicatéd a “Juvenile Delinquent.” But his case was triеd in the New York Supreme Court and was not removed to Family Court, even after Green’s acquittal of the attempted murder and assault charges. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law §§ 310.85, 330.25. And, perhaps significantly, on several occasions the state court,
ii. Qualified Immunity
We are therefore in substantial doubt on whether the district court’s decision was correct under New York law. Appellees argue, however, that we can avoid reaching the state law question because, regardless of the district court’s collateral estoppel findings, the appellees were entitled to a summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. This argument is unavailing. A qualified immunity defense is established only if (1) the officers’ actions did not violate clearly established lаw, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that their actions did not violate such law. See Salim v. Proulx,
Nor, under the same circumstances, could the second basis for qualified immunity apply as a matter of law. “The objective reasonableness test is met if ‘officers of reasonable competence could disagree’ on the legality of the defendants’] actions.” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
in. Malicious Prosecution
The state law collateral estоppel issue is, moreover, also decisive with respect to the propriety of summary judgment on Green’s malicious prosecution claim. In order to establish such a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that the, defendant maliciously commenced or continued against the plaintiff a criminal proceeding that ended in the plaintiffs favor, and that there was no probable cause for the proceeding.” Marshall v. Sullivan,
Under New York law, the fact,that a grand jury indicts a person of a ¿rime creates a presumption of probable cause for the purposes of defending' against a malicious prosecution claim. See Marshall,
As with the other issues in this case, the sufficiency of Green’s evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning his allegation that the indictment for his more serious crimes was undertaken in bad faith turns on whether his assertions concerning reckless behavior are barred by collateral estoppel. If Green is allowed to relitigate the state court determination that he actеd recklessly, then he can properly question whether the police officers’ use of force was reasonable. And if there is a genuine question as to the officers’ reasonableness, then it is possible for Green to adduce evidence that the more serious charges of which he was acquitted were brought against him in order to protect the police officers from liability for excessive force. If, instead, we were to hold that it is settled (by collateral estop-pel) that Green had recklessly endangered Montgomery, then it stands to reason that Green cannot colorably argue that the charges were brought against him as an attempt to justify a use of force that needed no justification. In other words, the theory that the charges were brought to justify (after the fact) an otherwise unreasonable use of force cannot be squared with the conclusion that, as a matter of law, that use of force was reasonable.
C. CERTIFICATION
Among the factors justifying certification are the absence of authoritative state court interpretations of the state statute, the importance of the issue to the state and the likelihood that the question will recur, and the capacity of certification to resolve the litigation. The resolution of all the federal questions at issue in this appeal depends on two related prior state-law questions that are unsettled and that will determine whether Green is collaterally estopped from relitigating .whether he recklessly endangered Officer Montgomery on the night he was shot.
Local Rule § 0.27 permits us nos-tra sponte to certify to the state’s highest court any “unsettled and significant question of state law that will control the outcome of a case pending before this Court.” Local Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit § 0.27; see also N.Y. Comp.Codes, R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.17(a) (1999) (permitting certification to the New York Court of Appeals of “determinative questions of New York law ... for which there is no controlling precedent of the Court of Appeals”). Because, applying these rules, we believe certification is appropriate in this case, we certify the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals:
(1) Is the New York Supreme Court’s commitment order stating that Green was “convicted ofiadjudicated a Juvenile Delinquent for the crime[ ] of Reckless Endangerment 1st Degree” to be treated as the equivalent of a Family Court adjudication of juvenile delinquency for the purpose of §§ 380.1 and 381.2 of the Family Court Act?
(2) By bringing a § 1983 suit that places into question issues that were necessarily resolved by the Supreme Court in its decision that Green recklessly endangered Officer Montgomery, hаs Green waived any and all rights under New York state law not to have those determinations held against him, with the result that he can be collaterally estopped from relitigating the Supreme Court’s findings?
The manner in which we have framed these questions is in no way meant to restrict the Court of Appeals from considering any state law issues it might wish to resolve in connection with this appeal.
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CERTIFICATE
The foregoing is hereby certified to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York pursuant to Local Rule § 0.27 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs, tit. 22, § 500.17(b), as ordered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Notes
. "Youthful offender” status is a status akin to "juvenile delinquent.” See People v. Jeffery B.,
. The district court relied on this presumption in granting summary judgment on Green’s malicious prosecution claims. But federal law of probable cause—not stale law—should determine whether a plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. We have held, however, that the New York presumption of probable cause, if unrebutted, is sufficient to block a Bivens claim for malicious prosecution, see Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 104-05 (2d Cir.1994), which is alsо governed by a federal probable-cause standard. In other words, we have adopted the New York presumption as the federal standard.
. Appellees argue that Heck v. Humphrey,