69 F. 852 | 4th Cir. | 1895
Lead Opinion
(after stating the facts as above). It is contended on behalf of appellee that jurisdiction of this appeal cannot be entertained, because if the case went to final decree an appeal therefrom "would lie only to the supreme court. Under section 7 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, where, upon a hearing in equity in the circuit court, an injunction is granted or continued by an interlocutory order or decree, “in a cause in which an appeal from a final decree may be taken under the provisions of this act to the circuit court of appeals, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing such injunction to the circuit court of appeals.” By section 5 of that act, appeals or writs of error may be taken directly to the supreme court “in any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue. In such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the supreme court from the court below for decision,” “in any case that involves the construction or application of the constitution of the United States,” or “in any case in which the constitution or law of a state is claimed to be in contravention of the constitution of the United States.”
It was early held, in McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118, that the act gave to a party to. a suit in the circuit court, where the
In view of these and other cases, we are of opinion that, where the jurisdiction is not in issue, but the question of the constitutionality of a state law is raised, and must necessarily be decided in the disposition of the case, there the case on final decree should be taken directly to the supreme court. But, where the jurisdiction depends on the existence of a federal question, which is controverted, the jurisdiction sustained, and the case goes to decree on the merits, the defendant may take the whole cast; to the circuit court of appeals. Whether that court, if the conclusion were reached that the constitutional question was controlling in the premises, should remand the ease to the circuit court, or may certify the question to the supreme court, we are not called upon to determine. Here the jurisdiction of the circuit court rested on the existence of -a federal question, namely, the validity of the state laws, challenged as in contravention of the constitution and laws of the United States; but, conceding the jurisdiction, the question arose on the threshold whether the case made or attempted to be made was one of equitable cognizance, and we think that, upon the final decree, an appeal would lie to this court, whether the bill were dismissed on final hearing on that ground or otherwise. The motion to dismiss will therefore be overruled.
The jurisprudence of the United States has always recognized the distinction between common law and equity as, under the constitution, matter of substance as well as of form and procedure. And the distinction has been steadily maintained, although both jurisdictions are vested in the same courts. Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 481, 484; Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 6 Wall. 134; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 883, 977; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202, 205, 14 Sup. Ct. 75. It is well settled that a court of chancery Is conversant only with matters of property and the maintenance
Similar views have been repeatedly expressed by state tribunals of high authority. Thus, in Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, the supreme court of Illinois say:
“The question, then, is, whether the assertion and protection of political rights, as judicial power is apportioned in this state between courts of law and courts of chancery, are a proper matter of chancery jurisdiction. Wc would not be understood as holding that political rights are not a matter of judicial solicitude and protection, and that the appropriate judicial tribunal will not, in proper cases, give them prompt and efficient protection, but we think they do not come within the proper cognizance of courts of equity.”
In re Sawyer, Georgia v. Stanton, Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237, Dickey v. Reed, Id. 261, Harris v. Schryock, 82 Ill. 119, and many other cases are cited, and the court continues:
“Other authorities of similar import might be referred to, but the foregoing are amply sufficient to show that, wherever the established distinctions between equitable and common-law jurisdiction are observed, as they are in this state, courts of equity have no authority or jurisdiction to interpose for the protection of rights which are merely political, and where no civil or property right is involved. In all such cases the remedy, if there is one, must be sought in a court of lav»7. The extraordinary jurisdiction of courts of chancery cannot, therefore, be invoked to protect the right of a citizen to vote or to be voted for at an election, or his right to be a candidate for or to be elected to any office; nor can it be invoked for the purpose of restraining the holding of an election, or of directing or controlling the mode in which, or of determining the rules of law in pursuance of which, an election shall be held. These matters involve in themselves no property rights, but pertain solely to the political administration of government. If a public officer, charged with political administration, has disobeyed or threatens to disobey the mandate of the law, whether in respect to calling- or conducting an election, or otherwise, the party injured or threatened 'with injury in his political rights is not without remedy. But his remedy must bo sought in a court of law, and not in a court of chancery.”
In Hardesty v. Taft, 23 Md. 513, where application was made for-an injunction to prevent the use of a register of voters prepared for a certain county, the court of appeals of Maryland observed:
“On this branch of the inquiry, it seems to the court very clear that a court of equity cannot be invoked to prevent the performance of political*859 duties like those committed to the officers of registration under the law. The willful, fraudulent, or corrupt refusal of a vote by judges of election, or ¡i like denial of registration by the officer appointed to register votes, which is the same thing, can be adequately compensated for in damages at Law. Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 484. The writ of injunction will not be awarded in doubtful or new cases not coming within well-established principles of equity. Bonaparte v. Railroad Co., Baldw. 218, Fed. Cas. No. 1,617. Each voter has a separate and distinct remedy for the willfully improper deprivation of his vote; and the joinder of others, like circumstanced or injured, a a complainants in equity, on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, will not avail to afford equitable relief. To interfere in the mode asked for by the complainants would be to stop a popular election in one portion of the state, and thus arrest, as to it, the wheels of government. For irregularities in the conduce of an election, for receiving illegal or rejecting legal votes, and l'or the correction of consequences resulting therefrom, the law provides appropriate remedies and modes of procedure. Buch matters are not the subjects of equitable jurisdiction.”
Tlie general doctrine as to public officials is thus stated by the New York court of appeals in People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 393:
“A court of equity exercises its peculiar jurisdiction over public officers to control their action only to prevent a breach of trust affecting public franchises, or some illegal act under color or claim of right affecting injuriously the property rights of individuals. A court of equity has, as such, no supervisory power or jurisdiction over public officials or public bodies, and only takes cognizance of actions against or concerning them when a case is made coming within one of the acknowledged heads of equity jurisdiction.”
Nor will equity interfere by injunction to restrain persons from exercising the functions of public offices, on the ground of the illegality of the law under which their appointments were made, but will leave that question to be determined by a legal forum. The doctrine is clearly established that courts of equity will not thus interfere to determine questions concerning the appointment or election of public officers or their title to office, such questions being of a purely legal nature and cognizable only by courts of law. High, Inj. (3d Ed.) § 131.2 et seq., and cases cited. And see Hagner v. Heyberger, 7 Watts & S. 104; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Smith v. Myers, 109 Ind. 1, 9 N. E. 692; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio St. 271; Kemp v. Ventulett, 58 Ga. 419. The rule is not otherwise in South Carolina. The supreme court of that state has decided upon a similar application for a like injunction, made, as would appear, by this same complainant, that the relief asked “is not the appropriate remedy for the grievance set out.” Ex parte Mills, 41 S. C. 554, 19 S. E. 749.
Tested by these principles, this bill of complaint cannot be maintained, for it seeks on behalf of individuals to restrain the exercise of governmental powers, and asserts no threatened infringement of rights of property or civil rights, and no recognized ground of equity interposition. No discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is charged, or pointed out as deducible on the face of the acts in question. No specific application to the defendant as supervisor to register complainant is alleged, but it is said that complainant has failed to register because, in spite of repeated and persistent efforts to that end, he found himself unable
This being so, we are clearly of opinion that no ground of equitable cognizance exists, and, although the appeal is from interlocutory orders, yet, as we entertain no doubt that such a bill cannot be maintained, we áre constrained, in reversing these orders, to remand the cause with a direction to dismiss the bill. And it is so ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). This case was heard by the chief justice, Judge SEYMOUR, and myself, on Friday last, the 7th inst. We thought it was of a character to call for an early decision, and it was determined, after adjournment on Friday, that the decision should be announced to-day, and a decree entered. The case was exhaustively argued at the bar, and nothing can be gained by awaiting a further time for the examination of briefs. We are of opinion that the preliminary injunction which was granted in the case ought to be dissolved and the bill dismissed. A decree to that effect, prepared by the chief justice, will be entered at once. The opinion of the court on the important questions presented by the record will be prepared by the chief justice, and filed and reported as soon as practicable. I have thought that, in the meantime, it was due to the public, and might not be improper in me, to present at once some of the considerations which have led me to the opinion that the injunction of the circuit court below should not have been granted. I therefore submit what follows. I have had no opportunity of presenting it to the other judges who sat with me, and am solely responsible for the views expressed.
This bill is brought by the complainant, on his own behalf, and "on behalf of other citizens of the county of Richland, in the state of South Carolina, and the United States,” circumstanced like himself. It sets out that he is 26 years of age, and that he is entitled to be registered as a citizen and voter. It describes, by quotation, in considerable detail, sundry provisions of the registration laws of
There is nothing in the record to show that the complainant is a man of color, or that those for whom he sues are colored persons. The bill contains no allegation that the provisions of law complained of were devised against the complainaht, or those for whom he sues, on account of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude. There is nothing in the averments of the bill from which it may naturally, or must necessarily, be inferred that the complainant, and those for whom he sues, are citizens of color. There are no averments in the bill which show that the case falls within the purview of the fifteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. Nor does the bill contain any allegations which raise a federal question under that clause of the fourteenth amendment which forbids a state “to deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.” It charges that the effect of the provisions of the registration acts complained of is to give unequal facilities of registration to different classes of citizens, but it does not point out how this is so. It leaves the discrimination as to the privilege of registering, if there be discrimination, to inference, and to research in sources other than its own averments. It charges that the provisions of law complained of discriminate, but does not describe the manner of discrimination, or define the classes affected pro or con, nor does it show that the law complained of, in discriminating between classes, as to the privilege of registering granted by them, violate that clause in the fourteenth amendment which forbids a state “to deny to any person within it, the equal protection of the laws.” It confounds privilege with protection. The bill has no reference to a federal election, in setting out complainant’s case. The gravamen of the bill contemplates only a state election to be held for members of the state convention called to convene in August next. It is not shown that any federal election is to be held in the state of South Carolina before November, 1896. To the bill thus described, and to the orders of injunction granted by the court below in pursuance of its prayers, several objections are urged, in behalf of the state of South Carolina. In what follows I shall consider but one of these.
I regret that I cannot concur in the ruling of the circuit court rendered on circuit in this case, in which it was held that the court had jurisdiction to restrain a county supervisor of registration in the performance of his duties under the election laws of South Carolina. The division of our government into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments is a distinguishing feature of our American polity, and it is essential to its existence that each of these departments shall be independent of the other. This is fundamental and organic. It would be just as dangerous to its stability for the judicial department to override the others as for the executive or legislative department to do so. Hence, while the right of the judiciary to pass upon the constitutionality of laws is undoubted, it has that right simply as an incident to its protection of private rights. It has not that right as a
In the one at bar the person enjoined from the performance of duties was an officer of the executive department of the government, and he was enjoined as an officer, and not as a citizen, from performing political functions. The duties which he was discharging were political,—exclusively political,—and did not appertain to him as a private citizen. I think the teaching of the cases I have cited is clear that a court cannot, by injunction, prohibit a public officer generally from discharging political duties imposed by law7. If the law be vicious, the remedy must be sought elsewhere than in the courts. Probably the homely way of getting rid of a bad law, recommended by Gen. Grant, is the best, viz. by enforcing it rigidly. I do not think that the fact was so; but let it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the duties of the registration officer who was enjoined in this case were entirely ministerial, affording no room for discretion. Yet they were strictly political. They dealt with that prime subject in a republic,—the elective franchise. The duties were prescribed by legislation, and the performance of them was an executive act. For the court to enjoin an executive officer generally from discharging those duties was for the judiciary to invade the province of both the other two independent departments at once. It was, so far as the injunction operated, a nullification of legislation, and a prohibition of the performance of important executive duties.
So far as the rights of the individual complainant in the bill were concerned it may have been competent for the court to grant individual relief. The supreme court of the United States the other day granted relief from the payment of an income tax to tbe individual complainant in the suit before it, but it went no further. On the authority of Mississippi v. Johnson, supra, we may assume that it would not have entertained a bill for enjoining internal revenue officers of the government from collecting income taxes generally. The judicial power covered the right to grant individual relief, but did not extend to the general power of repealing the