*1 legal tion of system our is tarnished
ordering execution of those who guilty.
not be
By examining in- only the evidence and verdict,
ferences favorable to the the ma-
jority willing our bet honor of
system word of witness who has jailhouse
trouble with the truth and a
snitch. I am unwilling gam- take that
ble. 565.035 requires independent A
review. review of the record leaves
substantial doubt guilt. as to Wolfe’s To
vote to affirm the sentence death on the
strength is simply record indefensi-
ble.
Conclusion granted
Dannie Wolfe a new not,
trial. If at least his death sentence
should be set aside under section 565.035 likelihood otherwise he
will be executed for crimes he did
commit. GREEN, al., Appellants,
Calton C. et
v. DISTRICT, R-III
LEBANON SCHOOL al., Respondents.
et al., King, Appellants,
Liston et County District, R-II School al., Respondents.
et
Nos. SC SC 81746. Missouri,
Supreme Court of
En Banc.
March
Rehearing April Denied *2 Turner, Johnson, D.
Craig S. Matthew Nos. SC City, appellants Jefferson SC Bartlett, Nancy matter, Alex Ripperger, preliminary Jeffer- As a expla- certain Moore, City, Stanley Lebanon, son G. helpful nations with respect respondents in No. SC 81758. opinion general. To the extent there exist of calculating methods more Bartlett, Nancy
Alex Ripperger, Jeffer- “ceiling” “lid,” than one Concannon, City, son Stephen *3 “highest levy” Comet uses the term lawful Versailles, County Atty., Pros. respon- to describe that rate above which a school in dents No. SC 81746. levy, district taking into account COVINGTON, ANN K Judge. ceilings all relevant or lids under Missouri levy law. A tax is an amount owed for Green, al., Calton C. et and King, Liston (the each of property valua- $100.00 assessed et al. taxpayers),1 prop- of real owners tion. The state erty charged in auditor with the Lebanon R-III and Morgan Districts, County verifying R-II that a school brought highest School suit district’s challenge levy the lawful year complies levies of the for each with (the schools) 137.073, districts for the RSMo. See 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. The RSMo. The state auditor devel- taxpayers contend that the errone- schools oped a set of forms for the benefit of ously highest determined the highest school districts to the determine levy could without additional voter levy lawful in a purportedly manner con- approval, resulting in a tax rate for each of sistent with both section years at issue that violаted and article section 22. See 15 CSR 40- of section and article RSMoi2 3.100.3The Missouri of Edu- State Board of the Missouri Constitution. publishes separate cation its listing own asked taxpayers the court to declare maximum year amounts for each in unlawful, the schools’ levies in- requested Report the annual the Public Schools junctive relief requiring the schools to re- 161.092(10), Missouri. See section RSMo. funds, turn excessive sought damages. and The remaining facts relevant to this case taxpayers named as additional defen- pleadings, derived from the The tax- county dants various officials within each payers’ petitions rely upon the state audi- school district and certain members of the tor’s taxpayers allege results. The that in сapac- two school boards their individual highest lawful for the Lebanon R~ ities. The circuit court indi- dismissed the III District School should have been: vidually named school board members. 1994, 1995, 1996, in in in summary judg- $2.16 $2.19 $2.20 The circuit court entered 1997, in in and, in and 1998. In those ments favor of the schools in $1.98 $1.99 alternative, years, claim the Lebanon R- sustained the schools’ motions III District to dismiss for failure to state a exceeded the estab- claim. The judgments by imposing in lished limits lev- part following are affirmed and re- 1996; in versed in and the remanded. ies: and causes $2.75 $2.61 1997; appeals Similarly, are consolidated and 1998. because of $2.62 common issues of law and fact. taxpayers allege highest lawful style peti- Supp.1996. 1. The in both cases RSMo 1994 and RSMo Accord- court, ingly, spe- tions as сlass actions. The trial er, howev- references to RSMo will state the plaintiffs certify appropriate, did not a class of in either cific as or no when case, referring any generally. nor does the record indicate that non-parties given were See Rule notice. issue, is, therefore, 52.08(c). 3.During at there were four There no class of regulation versions of relevant and ac- plaintiffs, challenge and the do not forms, companying following effec- with that conclusion. 6, 1992; 30, August tive dates: November issue, 1994; 24, 1996; 30, During 2. at June there two and November effect, versions of the statutes in found in fees, tax, existing license or of an County R-II School base Morgan 1994, broadened, authorized the maximum District should have been: $2.13 1997, on the new base of taxation current $2.19 $2.17 $2.02 subdivi- years, county political In those or other and in each $2.04 County yield the same taxpayers allege reduced sion shall be exceeded the estab- on the gross R-II School District revenue as estimated following lev- by imposing prop- limits valuation of lished If the assessed base. 1996; finally equalized, excluding ies: erty $2.75 in 1997 and 1998.4 The schools as- improve- of new construction $2.55 value amounts, sert, using ments, larger percentage the state board’s increases levy for all of the rele- general price the increase than years was for the Lebanon R- maxi- year, vant previous $3.59 level from the *4 for the Mor- levy applied III District and $3.15 School current mum authorized gan County political R-II School District. county in each or other thereto the yield shall be reduced subdivision taxpayers’ in first At issue the existing prop- gross revenue from same for deter appeal is the method point in adjusted changes general the erty, levy that a mining highest level, been collected as could have price ac may approve, taking into school board levy authorized on the existing at the cur the terms “maximum authorized count value. prior assessed X, in levy,” rent as used article section X, Only last sentence of article section 22(a) Constitution, and of the Missouri 22(a) requires case. It is at issue this ceiling,” as in section “tax rate used au- “maximum adjustments annual to the 137.073.1(3),RSMo.5 cir- levy” current under certain thorized 22(a) X, Missouri Article of the сumstances, finally into account the taking Constitution, portion a the constitution property, valuation of equalized assessed commonly the “Hancock referred to as improve- new construction the value of Amendment,” provides: ments, general and the increase (a) and other subdivi- political Counties authorized cur- level. The maximum price hereby prohibited levying from sions are 22(a) X, article levy under rent tax, fees, license or not authorized at the higher of the amount effect law, self-enforcing provi- charter by November adopted, that section was time this sec- sions of the constitution when by 4,1980, approved amount highest or the increasing adopted tion is or from that date. the voters sincе tax, levy existing of an license or current movants, schools, being fees, above that current authorized establishing right the burden of or charter when this section is bear law ITT summary judgment. Commercial adopted approval without the of the re- Sup Corp. v. Mid-America Marine majority qualified of the voters of Fin. quired 371, 376 county political ply Corp., 854 S.W.2d or other subdivision 1993).6 arti- response taxpayers’ In to the If of the voting thereon. the definition filed, case, filed, be- in each of the cases schools in each a motion 6.The 4. The low, supplemental legal file before failure to state file a a motion to dismiss for containing The mo- additional data. Court They attached to each motion claim. is not are overrulеd because the data Bartlett, tions necessary he in which lists affidavit of Alex before the Court to resolve issue calculated the Missouri levies at this time. years 1980 State Board of Education filed, Although through taxpayers' contend that 5. The schools case, Bartlett’s to exclude in each motion 84.04(d) comply do not with Rules briefs affidavit, suggestions they their attached to 84.04(i). that the briefs This Court concludes five exhib- opposition the schools’ motions substantially comply requirements with the deriving tax rate worksheets its the schools’ the rules. X, schools, claim, ele ating levy their order to obtain $2.75 summary motions for judgment, merely beyond aid certain minimum amounts], contended that the maximum authorized if such tax not ex- rate does question, current сeed the tax rate in subse- effect unadjusted year, quent year. 1980 tax was This is $3.59 District, levied, for the Lebanon R-III may School maximum tax rate that higher rate in effect in that district on ceiling ap- November unless a tax rate County proved by political voters of the $3.15 subdivi- District, R-II approved by provided a rate sion as in this section. the voters that district 1983. To 137.073,RSMo, ceiling The section tax rate summary judgment against obtain the tax- therefore, applies, political to all subdivi- payers as article option sions but contains an for school claims, however, the schools had the bur- districts: they den to not re- establish contrary other of law to the quired adjustments to make annual notwithstanding, a school district maximum authorized current operating levy pur- for school article section 22.7 The schools failed to poses required for the current un- adjustments establish that annual were not der subsection of section required. a consequence, As did not *5 RSMo, if tax such rate does not exceed meet their burden to show that the maxi- highest subsequent the in tax rate effect levy they mum alleged authorized current year. to-the 1980 tax X, was correct under article section 22. “required” The amount for 1994 under taxpayers’ The other of the 163.021, 1994, section was RSMo $2.75. 137.073, claims invokes section RSMo. Sec “highest subsequent tax in The rate effect 137.037.1(3), 1994, provided tion RSMo year,” any adjust- to the 1980 tax without that: ments, was in the Lebanon R-III $3.59
(3) ceiling,” “Tax rate a tax rate as re- School District $3.15 taxing authority comply County Applying vised the R-II a School District. the provisions plain meaning reading option with of this section or of the for districts, a ceiling when court has determined the tax school a tax rate under rate; that, 137.073, 1994, except provisions other section RSMo was $2.75 1994, 137.073, contrary notwithstanding, law to the a 1994. Section RSMo did not may levy operating require any adjustments school district the annual to the fact, purposes In required for school for the result. $2.75 1994, that, 2 year provided part current of sec- RSMo “no subsection 163.021, [requiring oper- required tion RSMo school district shall be to revise cases, years parties yet tax rate to be levied in the 1994 the had not undertaken 55.27(a) discovery. through Rule authorizes the a into a mо- conversion of motion dismiss summary judgment parties when 7. The trial court stated that the- present judge the trial materials outside insufficiently pleaded computations for their applied pleadings. trial court Rule The they alleged highest as the lawful the amounts 55.27(a) provided did, however, and found that it had ade- levy. allege quate parties during a notice to the confer- highest amounts for the based on pleadings that ence matters outside the state auditor’s assessment and are entitled addition, parties In ac- regarding computa- be considered. put proof on their quiesced of the schools’ treatment mo- tion of those See Fort Zumwalt Sch. amounts. State, 918, summary judg- tions to dismiss as motions for Dist. v. 896 S.W.2d 922-923 1995); by providing Rooney, the triаl ment court materials Gladis v. banc 288, Slitz, pleadings. (Mo.App.1999) (reversing summary outside See Sale v. 998 290 (Mo.App.1999). judgment 162 At the time the failure to state entered based on claim). summary judgment the trial court entered adjust required to they were not purposes for school be- its required the rate for the current did not do so ceiling. low tax rate schools 163.021, under subsection of section schools, years 1997 and 1998. RSMo, if tax rate not exceed the does therefore, did not meet burden to the subsequent tax rate effect highest claims based on section taxpayers’ year.” also section See 137.073, years Supp.1996, for RSMo In both the Lebanon 1997 and 1998. R-II Morgan County R-III and summary judgment Because these imposed levy Neither Districts $2.75. the schools to proceedings the burden is on levy violated section show a matter of law year.8 the 1994 tax The same reason- ing taxpayers’ judg- to the applies summary judgment, entitled 137.073claims for the 1995 and 1996. and the ments must be reversed because the causes remanded. This is Enactment of a amendment alters adjust- prove that annual schools failed amendment, analysis. With that maximum authorized current ments to the 137.073.1(3) option provides: in section required under article levy were not contrary other of law to the 1994,1995, 1996, for the notwithstanding, district 1998, and the schools operating levy pur- for school prove adjustments failed to that annual un- poses required for the current ceiling tax rate required der subsection of section were not adjustments required 137.073,RSMo, less all under section pursuant to article section 22 the 1997 and 1998. Constitution, if Missouri such tax rate The schools contend does not exceed the cannot obtain refunds under subsequent year. effect to the 1980 tax *6 137.073,RSMo, for two reasons not related 137.073.1(3), Supp.1996. Section RSMo merits, the trial neither which added). (emphasis statutory The revised First, contend court reached. the schools that, option specifies in beginning the 1997 that, in order to obtain refunds under sec- year,9 adjust the schools must the $2.75 137.073, RSMo, taxpayers 163.021.2, “required” under section in have filed suit each of the X, according of article question period in the after the schools 22(a) of section the Missouri Constitution. (in July August of each assessed levies or 137.073.1(3),163.021.2, See sections RSMо (on year) the levies became due but before 137.073.3, Supp.1996. Similarly, section Second, year). of each December 31 that Supp.1996, longer no stated that the are not schools contend required school districts shall not be 137.073, to refunds under section entitled revise their the “re- levies below pay did not quired” amount listed in section also protest RSMo. See section their taxes Supp.1996. question; as described section remand, may trial court On RSMo. amendments,
In view of the 1996 there- permitted determine whether refunds are fore, had the on their the schools burden of the as a matter of law for each summary judgment motions to establish assume, briefing RSMo 1994. The 1996 parties or ar- 164.011 without - (S.B.676) gument, that the 1994 law amend- Au- amendment to section 137.073 еffective - - 12, - ing July 28, 137.073 effective 1994 section apply gust 1996 does not to the 1996 tax applies year. Comm’n, to the 1994 tax Beatty year. v. State Tax 912 See 492, 1995). (Mo. & banc S.W.2d 496 n. 1 in this case set their 1996 Both districts 28, August levies before 1996. See sections question and requests whether for refunds took effect. See Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Mahn, (Mo. 443, properly timely asserted. 766 S.W.2d banc 1989). claim, therefore, The schools’ Finally, the schools contend that without merit. are not to a entitled refund on, In point their second relied the tax- for the 1998 tax under either article payers claim trial court erred in X, 137.073, RSMo, or section dismissing the school board members from because Constitutional Amendment Num the suit. 2 permits ber the levies in these cases. The amendment modified articlе dismissal, As one basis 11(b), reads, which now individual school board claimed members official immunity. The doctrine of official
Any tax imposed upon property immunity recognizes “society’s com ... shall not the following exceed annual pelling vigorous interest and effective vote, specified rates [without public requires administration of affairs 11(c) article ... For school ]: who, protect that the law those individuals towns, districts in- formed of cities and face of imperfect information and cluding the city school district of the resources, - limited daily must exercise their seventy-five St. Louis two dollars and judgment public’s best in conducting the on the hundred cents dollars assessed Kanagawa business.” v. State ex rel. valuation. Freeman, (Mo. 831, 685 S.W.2d banc 11(b) аddresses the amount of tax 1985). Under the doctrine of official im that a political subdivision with- munity, public official is not hable to approval. out voter See Three Rivers Jun- public of the for negligence members Statler, College ior Dist. v. 421 S.W.2d strictly performance related to the (Mo. 1967). 238-39 banc Denison, discretionary duties. Green v. apply. The amendment does not districts set the levies 1998 not later public perform purely When officials min September than 1998. See sections duties, however, they may isterial be held 164.011.2, 67.110.1, RSMo. The voters did Kanagawa, hable. at 835. A amendment, however, adopt until discretionary act requires “the exercise of November and the amendment did adaptation reason of means to-an not become effective until December end and discretion in determining how 2(b). XII, 1998. Mo. Const. Art. *7 whether an act doné or course The schools set the 1998 levies and the contrast, In pursued.” Id. ministerial acts official, therefore, levies became before “require performed certain duties to be effective date of the amendment. If the facts, ‘upon given prescribed of in a imposed school district an unlawful levy manner, in obedience to mandate of the later constitutional amend- legal authority, regard to an without ratify ment did not the earlier unlawful tax employee’s judgment opinion own or con rate. cerning propriety of the act to be Jungerman City performed.’” Ray The schools contend that the amend- (Mо. 1996). town, apply ment because the taxes for the 925 205 banc does S.W.2d payable public on December Determination of whether a official’s amendment, however, discretionary 1998. The affects acts are or rests ministerial only and concerns of the tax the facts of the setting upon Kanagawa, case. rate; making it does not affect or concern the at 836. In a determi nation, Although weigh of tax. as “the payment taxes be- courts factors such duties, came the effective date of nature of the official’s the extent to payable after amendment, policymaking it or the does not serve to val- which the acts involve professional expertise idate a tax rate set befоre the amendment exercise of and clerk, assessor, judgment, likely and the consequences Every county collector officer, withholding immunity.” or knowing- Id. or other who refuses duty enjoined ly neglects perform any taxpayers The assert by, on him or consents in or connives at board are responsible only members laws any relating evasion of the “setting ceiling revising a tax rate and it assessment, taxes, levy and collection of year.” each claim They the board whereby any proceedings required by members setting exercise no discretion in hindered, or prevented laws or the highest lawful for each school any property unlawfully exempted is district because section RSMo and upon from taxation or is entered the tax article provide di specific value, than list at less its full cash is rection to the board members this re offense, neglect liable for each or refus- gard. al, bond, individually and on his official The are correct insofar as for double the amount of the loss They their claim ignore, extends. howev- damage thereby. caused er, important other activities which assert subsection board engage selecting members “specifically waives any immunity public ultimately rate that set for the regard illegal officials with tax levies.” process district. It is the entire of The entirety argument of their is: “As the selecting upon which this Respondent School Board Members are Court focuses in determining whether the ‘other officers’'who neglected perform board members are entitled to official im- imposed upon duties them the Missouri munity, merely not determining act of Constitution with regard and statute to tax levy. lawful levies, they any immunity cannot assert Viewing levy-setting process as a im- Section 139.300.1waives - whole the selection of the operating levy munity.” - for the district it is evident that legal no fail develop their as- prevents mandate the board members sertion. It stands without reference to exercising judgment from regarding the authority any legal analy- devoid of levy rate ultimately that is Only set. more, sis. pro- Without this Court cannot determination of the highest levy, meaningful appellate vide Mis- review. pursuant Wilson, souri Ass’n Counties v. 22(a), article is prescribed by that, Beyond law. thе board members trial properly court dismissed the individu- must exercise discretion in setting levy. al school board members suits. Board members are no obligation conclusion, In schools were enti- levy the maximum ceiling setting rate. In summary tled to judgments because the rate, the levy they must exercise some prove adjust- schools failed to that annual degree of reason and judgment deciding required ments were not maximum needs, how to determine district’s *8 X, levy, authorized current under article proceed they how to once ascertain those 22(a) 1994,1995,1996, section for the needs. Their discretionary. actions are and and because the schools consequence, they As a rightly claimed the adjustments failed prove that annuаl protection of the doctrine of immu- official required ceiling were not to the tax rate nity. 137.073,RSMo, under section that analysis contend even 1997 and 1998. As the 22(a) if the immunity applies, X, doctrine of official requirements of article section and 137.073, RSMo, reveals, section RSMo waives that section the two immunity. Subsection 1 of section 139.300 serve two related but different 22(a) provides: X, purposes. pro- Article section vides proceedings for a maximum authorized based for consistent with this opin- adjustments on to the rate ion. levied on No
vember unless the grant voters LIMBAUGH, WHITE, HOLSTEIN approval See Zumwalt otherwise. Fort BENTON, JJ., concur; PRICE, C.J., and State, Sch. Dist. v. filed; opinion concurs in separate computation under WOLFF, J., in separate concurs 22(a) opinion X, article section establishes the filed. maximum that “could amount have been existing collected at the authorized on PRICE, Jr., WILLIAM RAY Chief value.” Mo. assessed Const. Justice, concurring. 22(a) added). X, (emphasis Art. section I respects majority concur in all with ceiling The tax rate Judge I opinion by Covington. authored RSMo, meanwhile, is the amount by Judge am persuaded also Wolff that “produce from all taxable property concerning there issues significant exist substantially ... the same amount of tax taxpayers’ prop- whether the claims were revenue was produced previous as reluctant, I am erly timely and asserted. (em year....” RSMo however, those to address issues absent added). phasis Although formulas briefing аrgument by parties. and used to the two tax compute ceilings rate variables, some of the involve same WOLFF, Judge, MICHAEL A. 137.073, RSMo, X, and article sec concurring. 22(a) two may establish distinct ceil The taxpayers whose lawsuits were dis- (dif 137.073.4(1),
ings. See section pleading missed the trial court at the ferentiating two tax rate between distinct stage appeal. if have But even 137.037.4(2), won ceiling computations); section taxpayers ultimately prevail on (providing computation of multi Amendment theory, Hancock that does not ple ceilings tax re “separately” rate they they mean that and the class seek to quiring the use of the “calculation that represent property will be entitled to tax produces tax ceiling”). the lowеst rate refunds. 137.073.4(2), RSMo, Pursuant to section required school districts are to utilize refunds, be eligible To for tax the tax- ceiling the lowest tax rate as the payers’ timely must be filed under lawsuits leg in the district. Under the the statutory scheme. The issue of timeli- scheme, computing separate islative tax - - eligibility ness and hence of refunds pursuant ceiling major open principal issue left will not violate terms of article opinion, parties, to be addressed the section are remanded to the trial these cases 137.073, RSMo, rate ceiling will be court. only used if it lower than required remedy Whether have by article section 22. statute, is dependent upon refunds not on remand, parties may put On regard, In that constitution. the issue necessary. deеm proof additional of timeliness is critical. When a school then The trial determine for court rate, district and there is no sets its question each of the high- the five rate, legal challenging taxes are est lawful determine whether receives aid collected and the district proven have the schools If, upon an amount based rate. *9 in excess of assessed a later, challenge to the rates is a levy. required, are successful and refunds retrospectively part
The
are affirmed in
aid would need to be
com-
judgments
puted.
impact of such after-the-fact
and the causes remanded
The
reversed
716,
Dist.,
969 S.W.2d
devastating to indi- Louis Sewer
adjustments would be
1998).
(Mo.
ways are:
The two
banc
school districts.
vidual
injunction
First,
an
taxpayers may seek
interpret
It well to
and enforce
tax until its
collection of a
enjoin
to
constitution,
but it is
requirements of
determined.
constitutionality
finally
disrupt
another matter
settled
quite
increas-
Second, if
subdivision
political
a
years after a constitutional
expectations
of article
a tax
violation
es
purportedly occurred. See
violation has
a
22(a),
that tax
and collects
County,
v.
Hammerschmidt
Boone
final,
judicial opinion approv-
appellate,
(Mo.
1994) (Holstein,
98, 105
banc
of the increase without
ing the collection
J., concurring).
right
constitutional
approval,
voter
Ordinarily we should not address issues
22(a),
by article
established
by
parties.
open
left
briefed
only by timely action
may be enforced
for,
being paid
are
at
But these lawsuits
of the
a refund of the amount
to seek
part,
least in
with school district funds that
constitutionally-imposed increase.
educating
spent
otherwise be
added).
(emphasis
Id. at 718-19
Addressing the ultimate
schoolchildren.
X of the state
23 of article
Section
may
remedy
of timeliness and
here
issues
constitution, a
the Hancock Amend-
part of
helpful
bringing
these actions to
be
ment,
bring
standing to
gives taxpayers
and correct conclusion after
swift
of the Hancock
interpretation”
“actions for
trial
remanded to the
court.
provision
Amendment and includes
If,
appears,1 plaintiffs’
as it
lawsuits
Except for
attorneys’ fees.”
“reasonable
were not filed before the taxes became
fees,
attorneys’
provision relating
-
-
payable
December 31 of the tax
Hancock
provision of the
the enforcement
A
review
refunds are not available.
brief
Amendment,
23,
is not a consent
statutory
of the Hancock Amendment and
Zumwalt,
money judgment. Fort
suit for
support
will
this conclusion.
scheme
lows a
by making
complaint
a formal
with the
pending,
is
a tax-
When such
county.
prosecuting attorney of the
If the
payer
pending
does not know of the
who
an action
prosecutor
bring
fails
within
may in fact
tax
challenge
pay the
without
filing
of
of
days
complaint,
ten
the
the
the
But,
protest.
pendency
the
of the action
taxpayer may bring a class action under
authority on
puts
taxing
the
notice of the
that section.
to its tax rate
on behalf
challenge
brought
Accordingly,
taxpayers.
of all
the statute
contemplated by
The civil action
the
ordinarily
required,
would
waives what
be
injunctive
only
statute is
for
relief. As
i.e.,
timely protest by the
tax-
a
individual
provides:
section 137.073.9
payer.
action,
action,
any
If in
a class
including
a
the tax
require
timely challenge
To
requiring
the court issues an
a
order
rate,
under
before the taxes
the rate are
taxing
tax
authority to revise the
rates
due,
only interpretation
the
consistent
provided
enjoins
as
in this
or
a
levy
with
role of school district
the
taxing authority
the collection
of
financ-
respect
rates with
to school district
tax because
its
to revise the
of
failure
formula,
ing. The state’s foundation aid
seсtion,
rate
in this
levy
provided
as
of
of
bases the amount
or her taxes
taxpayer paying his
upon
aid that
district receives
the
state
an improper
applied
when
rate is
has
rate, specifically that
school district’s tax
erroneously
part,
his or
taxes in
paid
her
“operat-
that is
component of the rate
the
paid
whether or not
taxes
Thus,
ing levy
purposes.”
for
school
provided in section
protest as
calculating
state in
rate used
paid
RSMo. The
the taxes
erro-
prior
rate used
state aid is
for
neously
in the
is the difference
amount
assessments;
i.e.,
year’s property tax
produced by
original
and the
took effect
31 when
December
produced
levy.
amount
the revised
duе. For the districts involved
taxes were
or
collector of tax-
township
county
litigation,
higher
this
city
or
in any
es
the collector
taxes
higher
for school
purposes,
shall refund the amount of the tax erro-
amount of
aid.
neously
taxing authority
re-
paid.
nor
chapter
chapter
Neither
fusing
pro-
revise
rate of
recognizes that
district
tax rates
vided
this
shall make
available
revised,
subject
or be
to revision
be
all
necessary
to the collector
funds
effect,
gone
have
unless there
subsection,
make refunds under
challenge
protest
an action
added).
(emphasis
becoming
effective.
rates
163.031.6.2,
aid for-
the foundation
contemplated
The class action
section Section
mula,
adjustment
рrovides
recognizes
to the mem-
and makes
137.073.8
notice
only by
“payment
“at
received
current
publication
bers of the class
...
prior years
protested taxes due
least once each week for four consecutive
any protested
amount of
taxes
general
circula- minus the
newspaper
weeks
in the
for which
county
where the civil due
current
published
during the
protest
in other counties
notice of
was received
action is commenced and
timely chal-
taxing
year_”
Absent a
jurisdiction
of a
authori-
current
within
making an
refunds,
lenge,
there is
procedure
If
action were for
no
ty.”
adjustment of
rate or
of the class had an
after-the-fact
which
members
interest,
for school
monetary
operating levy
of the district
identifiable
individual
Leggett, 813 S.W.2d
purposes.
re-
See Buck v.
notice to the class members
1991);
West
Horizons
process.
as a matter of due
Eisen
quired
*11
Leachman,
rate,
Properties
prior
548 S.W.2d
of
to its use in the state
(Mo.
formula.
school aid
banc
noted, finality in state aid to schools
As
Finality in taxation is essential to local
aid is
is embodied
the statutes. State
government.
budgets
“Government
are
large part
on the tax monies
based
prepared on an annual cash basis. There-
by
generated
local school districts. Sec-
fore, in
statutory
the absence of a
limita-
163.031.6,
Supp.1999.
Errone-
RSMo
may
tion on the
taxpayer
time which a
payments
ous state aid
to school districts
unconstitutional,
file suit to declare a tax
may only
by adjustments
corrected
be
governments
subject
would be
to substan-
163.091,
following year.
Section
RSMo
tial liabilities from refunds
uncon-
of those
1994.
aid
are final
payments
State
stitutional taxes.” Community Fed. Sav.
paid,
are
penalties
which
Revenue,
&
Ass’n v.
Loan
Director
of
adjustments
paid
and other
are to be
1988) (citations
794, 797
year.
the next school
Section
omitted). School districts
an arm of
may
Supp.1999.4
penalties
ei-
government,
Hughes v. Civil Service
by
ther be
paid
district or withheld
Louis,
City
Comm’n
St.
of
following year’s
from the
state aid. See
(Mo.App.1976),
deny
and to
them
163.021.5-7,
also Section
RSMo Supp.1999
the same level
finality
of taxation would (prohibiting
limiting
state aid in the
contrary
statutory
be
to the
scheme.
following year for failure to comply with
Moreover
the extent that an after-the-
preceding year).
statutes
fact financial burden
causes
school dis-
Challenging
Property
Lawsuits
Tax
trict
to lapse under section
Rates
district’s financial
may impose
distress
Section 137.073.8
taxpayer
authorizes a
added burden on
taxpayers.
the state’s
bring
a class action to force a revision of
This result would
contrary
pur-
be
to the
tax rate
provides
attorneys’
pose of the Hancock Amendment. Fort
bringing
fees
other costs in
the action.
Zumwalt,
shall any any money receive interest on by him or
erroneously paid pursuant her pro-
to this The section subsection.” also nothing
vides that law “shall be require taxing authority
construed erroneously paid
refund any tax
during year preceding the third tax year.” current tax Missouri, Respondent, STATE of not, however, do These sections autho- refunds, rize an action for an only for GRAHAM, Appellant. Mark E. injunction revising or order the tax rate. sеction, just of this part quoted, last No. SC sets a limit judicial time for when the Missouri, Supreme Court of completed. action is to be It is not a En Banc. limitations, statute of nor it enable does lawsuits to be commenced after the 21, 2000. March Taxes question. erroneously subject collected are not to refund without
specific statutory authority, and the stat- specific
ute can does set a limitation.
Community Savings Federal Loan &
Ass’n, 752 S.W.2d at not construe
We should these subsec- authority bringing
tions as class actions
for refunds after the have been taxes
set, collected, and used the determi-
nation school aid. of state The statute action, attorneys’
authorizes a class successful, if
fees the action is making gov- scheme for sure that local correct rates. The fil-
ernments set
ing of a class reheves individual having to file timely pro-
tests before the December 31 due date. action authorized statute class read as an invitation for not be
litigants challenge tax rate decisions for a tax period rate has been place class wide relief to obtain refund
and attorney fees.
Conclusion principal opinion provides impor- setting
tant on the of school clarification open decision rates. Our leaves remand, remedy, on
whether