185 Iowa 1086 | Iowa | 1919
Plaintiffs are the trustees of a Masonic lodge, known as Hesperia Lodge. The defendants are the trustees of an Odd Fellows lodge, known as Gem Lodge. In the year 1901, the two lodges co-operated in building a three-story brick building upon a lot owned by the defendant lodge in the town of Traer. The defendant lodge completed the walls to the top of the second floor. The plaintiff lodge built the third story, including the roof. The agreement under which the two lodges co-operated was informal, and wholly in parol. Most of the persons who purported to represent the respective lodges in the transaction are dead. In order to prove the agreement, therefore, the plaintiff lodge has relied largely upon the circumstances of the erection of the building at the time, and upon the mutual conduct of the parties ever since.
Since the erection of the building, its first floor has at all times been occupied by the post office. The second
The general contention of the plaintiff is that it had obtained from the defendant an irrevocable license to maintain appropriate connections with the steam, water, and sewer systems. This controversy between the parties began in 191(3. At that time, the defendant proposed to improve its basement, and to fit it for renting purposes. It served a notice upon the plaintiff, purporting to revoke its license to maintain its connections in question. It also threatened to remove the pipes. The general contention on the part of the defendant is that the proof offered by the plaintiff is insufficient to show an irrevocable license; that there is no record upon the books of either lodge showing any of the transactions claimed; that the parties who purported to represent the defendant lodge were without authority; that the plaintiff was either a trespasser or a mere licensee, whose license was revocable at any time. It is also contended by the defendant that, in December, 1901, the parties reduced the agreement to writing, and that such writing merged all prior parol agreements, and that the plaintiff is in no position to claim any other rights than the rights proclaimed by such written agreement.
What renders a license irrevocable is well settled, under our cases. Decorah Woolen Mill Co. v. Greer, 49 Iowa 490; Vannest v. Fleming, 79 Iowa 638; Ruthven v. Farmers Co-op. Cr. Co., 140 Iowa 570; Robinson v. Luther, 140 Iowa 723; Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121. That the plaintiff, by building its third story above the building of the defendant, and by thereby building a roof over the entire building, acquired some kind of an irrevocable right, goes without saying. Appellant concedes that it acquired a right of support and of ingress and egress. The real question in dispute is as to what was the scope and extent of the irrevocable right so acquired. For nearly 15 years, the conduct of both parties spoke consistently. There does not appear to have been
“That whereas the first parties by purchase became the owners of the west fifteen (15) feet of Lot Four (4) and the east fifteen (15) feet of Lot Five (5) in Block Thirteen (13), in Traer, Iowa, and whereas the parties to this contract with an dral understanding and agreement between them builded and erected thereon a three-story brick building, the first parties building the first and second stories thereof and the second parties building the third story thereof; and whereas, by the aforesaid oral understanding and agreement on completion of said third-story brick building, the first parties become the absolute owners of the first and second stories thereof, and the second parties become the absolute owners of the third story, thereof.”
The contract proper dealt only with the question of the use and repair of the stairway. It also conferred upon the plaintiff the revocable right to erect upon the rear end of the premises a coalhouse and water-closet. All the transactions between the parties relating to heat, water, and sewers arose after the contract in question.
In October, 1915, these two lodges joined in a contract, ás first party thereto, with one Taylor as second party. By this contract, Taylor, an adjoining property owner, acquired the right to connect with the heating system through the building of the first party. Such contract contains the following in its preamble:
“Whereas, the first parties have installed in their said building a steam heating system consisting of pipes, traps, meter, radiators and other fixtures necessary thereto-, which