Case Information
*1 Before HARTZ , McKAY , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
This matter is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. Appellant Marvin
Green was a postmaster with the U.S. Postal Service. He sued the Postmaster General
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., claiming five
acts of retaliation against him for making employment-discrimination claims: a letter
notifying him to attend an investigative interview, the investigative interview itself, a
threat of criminal charges, an alleged constructive discharge, and his placement on unpaid
*2
leave (an emergency placement). In
Green v. Donahoe
,
In
Green v. Brennan
,
The Government argues that Green resigned on December 16, 2009— when he signed the settlement agreement—and that his claim is therefore still time barred. Green argues that he did not resign until February 9, 2010—when he submitted his retirement paperwork—and that his claim is therefore timely.
Id.
We agree with Mr. Green. The settlement agreement did not constitute a definitive notice of resignation because it provided that Mr. Green could still choose to continue his employment with the Postal Service by reporting for duty in Wyoming. He did not give such notice until submitting retirement paperwork on February 9, 2010. We therefore vacate that portion of our prior opinion holding the constructive-discharge claim untimely, and reinstate the remainder of the opinion.
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims based on the investigative- interview letter, the investigative interview itself, and the threat of criminal charges. We REVERSE summary judgment for the Postmaster General on the constructive-discharge and emergency-placement claims, and we REMAND for proceedings consistent with our prior decision as modified by the Supreme Court.
Entered for the Court Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge
Notes
[*] After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
