In 2010 Aurora East School District 131 fired Robert Green from his position as a teacher. He asked his union to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agrеement; the union refused. He also asked the union to represent him in a suit against the school district under the Teacher Tenure Act, 105 ILCS 5/24-12; the union said no to that request аs well. Green sued on his own, won, and has been reinstated. This federal suit contends that his union abandoned him because of his race, violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which appliеs to unions as well as to employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c).
The district judge called Green’s evidence “conelusory” without explaining why.
Neither § 2000е-2(c) nor § 2000e-3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory. The former section forbids discriminаtion by any labor organization, and the latter forbids retaliation against a person who has asserted rights under Title VII or supported another person’s assertiоn of rights. The district court did not analyze the language of either section. Nor did it recognize that the application of Title VII to employers does not depend on a statute or contract outside of Title VII. If a person applies for work and is rejected on account of race, the employer hаs not broken a contract or violated any statute (other than Title VII itself), yet no one doubts that the victim can recover under Title VII. And if an employer fires someone on account of race, again it does not matter whether a contract has been broken. Otherwise Title VII would not apply to at-will employmеnt.
Nothing in the text or genesis of Title VII suggests that claims against labor organizations should be treated differently. Labor organizations were included when Title VII was enacted in 1964 in part because some states had laws authorizing (even requiring) employers and unions to discriminate against blacks. Many unions had negotiated collective bargaining agreements under which certain jobs were allocated to white workers and others to black workers, or workers of different races were paid different wages for the same
The earliest decisions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 arose from clashes between state laws favoring or commanding segregation and the new federal prohibition. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
The district court’s approach has a further problem. It would make Title VII pointless. Unless a contract, or some other statute, gave the plaintiff an entitlement, Title VII would do nothing. Yet if a union has, and violates, such a duty, then a remedy may be had under that statute or con tract. Title VII would be otiose, and claims of discrimination against unions would be either unavailing or unnecessary.
Instead of locating its extrinsic-duty requirement in the text or history of Title VII, the district court drew it from Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,
The passage also conflates Title VII with the elements of a hybrid breach-of-contract/duty-of-fair-representation claim against an employer and union under 29 U.S.C. § 185. The list in Greenslade restates the ingredients of a hybrid contract/DFR suit. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes,
When the Supreme Court established the elements of а Title VII prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
If the union would have processed Green’s grievance or represented him under the Tenure Act had he been white — or had he refrained from complaining about other discriminatory episodes — thеn the union violated Title VII. On remand, the district court should allow discovery bearing on those issues and should not be quick to condemn as “eonclusory” or “self-serving” any affidavit Green files in an effort to satisfy his burden. See Payne v. Pauley,
Vacated .and Remanded