Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA KELLY A. GREEN, :
: Plаintiff, : Civil Action No.: 06-0366 (RMU) :
v. : Re Document No.: 30
:
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF :
LABOR AND CONGRESS OF :
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS et al. , :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION D ENYING THE P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR R ELIEF U PON R ECONSIDERATION I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se plaintiff’s motion for relief upon reconsideration of this court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiff now claims that the defendants made false rеpresentations constituting fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). Because the plaintiff fails to provide any evidence to support his claim, and does not addrеss how these alleged misrepresentations interfered with his ability to present his case fully and fairly, the court denies his motion.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In May 2005, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the D.C. Officе of Human Rights asserting that his employer, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”), had wrongfully discharged him from his job as a cook/server. Compl. ¶¶¶ 2, 6, 40. The administrative complaint alleged discrimination and retaliation by the AFL-CIO and Mark Zobrisky, the plaintiff’s supervisor, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights *2 Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq ., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq . Compl. ¶ 6.
According to the defеndants, the plaintiff was terminated from his position for allegedly failing to comply with the AFL-CIO’s absence reporting requirements. Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute (“Defs.’ Statement”) ¶ 12. The plaintiff, however, maintains that he complied with all relevant absence reporting guidelines. See generally Compl.; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement Parts I & II.
The plaintiff’s employment was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the AFL-CIO and Local 25, a local union. [1] Defs.’ Statement ¶ 4. The CBA provided for a grievance prоcedure culminating in final and binding arbitration as the exclusive method for resolving disputes between the AFL-CIO and members of Local 25. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Karla Garland, AFL-CIO Executive Assistаnt to the Secretary-Treasurer (“Garland Decl.”), Ex. 1. Thus, along with filing a formal complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights, the plaintiff also filed a grievance under the CBA, which gave rise to an аrbitration proceeding. Defs.’ Statement ¶ 13; see generally Pl.’s Compl.
During the arbitration, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in October 2005, which awarded the plaintiff $10,365 in exchange for his releasing the AFL-CIO and its employees “from all claims of any nature – including but not limited to such for loss of wages, gratuities or fringe benefits – that relate to or arise out of his employmеnt with or separation from the [AFL-CIO].” Defs.’ Statement ¶ 14; Garland Decl., Ex. 5 (“settlement agreement”). The settlement agreement further stated that it constituted the “full and complete settlеment of all claims which were or could have been brought pursuant to any statutory or common law with *3 regard to the [plaintiff’s] separation from employment with the [AFL-CIO] or that сould have been brought under the [CBA].” Id. ¶ 4.
Despite entering into this agreement, the plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in this
court alleging that the defendants violated Title VII and the ADA, breaсhed their employment
contract with the plaintiff and Local 25, negligently and intentionally inflicted emotional distress
on the plaintiff and wrongfully terminated him.
See
Compl. ¶¶ 36-60. The parties then filеd
cross-motions for summary judgment.
See
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. In
its September 2009 memorandum opinion, the court concluded that under the terms of the
settlement agreement, the plaintiff had “validly waived his right to bring the claims in his
complaint.” Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2009) at 8. The court thus granted summary judgment to the
defendants, and denied the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.
Id.
at 10. The plaintiff
appealed this holding in May 2010, but the Circuit affirmed this court.
Green v. Am. Fed’n of
Labor and Cong. of Indus. Org. et al.
,
In September 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). See generally Pl.’s Mot. With that motion now ripe for review, the court turns to the relevant legal standards and to the parties’ arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
1. Legal Standard for Relief Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
In its discretion, the court may relieve a party from an otherwise final judgment pursuant
to any one of six reasons set forth in Rule 60(b). F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(b);
Lepkowski v. Dep’t of
Treasury
,
A party proceeding under one of the first three reasons must file his Rule 60(b) motion within one year after the judgment at issue. F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(c)(1). A party relying on one of the remaining three reasons may file his Rule 60(b) motion within a reasonable time. Id . The *5 party seeking relief from a judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies the prerequisites for such relief. McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. , 298 F.3d 586, 592 (6th Cir. 2002).
2. The Court Dеnies the Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief Upon Reconsideration The plaintiff’s current motion bids the court to vacate its September 2010 final judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants and denying the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. See Mem. Op. (Sept. 28, 2009) at 10. The plaintiff invokes Rule 60(b)(3), asserting that he should be relieved from the final judgment because the defendants falsely reprеsented to the court that the plaintiff was discharged for just cause. Pl’s Mot. for Relief at 57. Arguing that this constitutes “fraudulent misrepresentation” under Rule 60(b)(3), the plaintiff demands that such fraud requires the court to reconsider prior rulings. See generally Pl.’s Mot.; Pl.’s Reply. The defendants, however, contend that the plaintiff’s motion seeks to relitigate claims that were unsuccessfully raised in this court and on appeal, and that he fails to identify any fraud that prevented him from presenting his case before the court.
It is well-settled that the party seeking relief from a judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies the prerequisites for such relief. See, e.g., McCurry ex rel.
Turner
,
Furthermore, even in the remote possibility that the plaintiff were to establish that frаud
or misrepresentation had occurred, the plaintiff does not indicate how such fraud would have
prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case before the court. The court’s previous
order hinged on the fact that the plaintiff had signed a settlement agreement releasing the
defendants of any liability associated with his termination. Thus, the court concludes that in the
absence of providing any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by the defendants,
and by failing to show that such alleged fraud prevented the plaintiff from fully and fairly
presenting his or her case, there is no basis under Rule 60(b)(3) to vacate the final judgment in
this matter.
See McRae v. District of Columbia
,
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion for relief upon reconsideration. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 12 th day of September, 2011.
RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge
Notes
[1] Local 25 is “a Local Union originally affiliated with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, now known as UNITE-HERE.” Defs.’ Statement ¶ 4.