115 Wash. 451 | Wash. | 1921
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages to an automobile owned by it, claimed to be due to negligence chargeable to the defendant. The cause was tried to the court without a jury and resulted in findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment sustaining the plaintiff’s right to recover. From this judgment the defendant appeals.
The accident occurred at the intersection of Ninth avenue and Madison street, in the city of Seattle. While not strictly accurate, it may be said that Madison street extends east and west and Ninth avenue north and south. On the fifth day of May, 1919, a Hudson automobile, driven by an employee of the appel
The pivotal point in the case is, which car entered the intersection first? Both cars were traveling at the time at a greater rate of speed than the ordinance permitted. The Hudson car was in the center of the street, while the ordinance required that the car be driven as near the right-hand curb as practicable. Upon the question as to which car entered the intersection first, the evidence is conflicting. The trial court found that the Packard automobile owned by the respondent first entered the intersection. If this be the fact, then the Packard car had the right of way. The fact that it was proceeding at a greater rate of speed than that fixed by the ordinance would not prevent a recovery, providing the driver of the Hudson automobile was guilty of negligence which fproximately caused the accident and that there was no causal connection between the negligence of the driver of the Packard in exceeding the speed limit and the accident. Bullis v. Ball, 98 Wash. 342, 167 Pac. 942; Reed v. Tacoma R. & P. Co., 110 Wash. 334, 188 Pac. 409.
An ordinance of the city of Seattle in effect at the time of the collision, required drivers of automobiles to look out for and give the right of way to vehicles simultaneously approaching a street intersection from the right. The trial court found that the driver of the
While the Packard automobile, in crossing the intersection, was exceeding the speed limit, and the driver thereof was negligent, there is no causal connection between this negligence and the accident. That car having entered the intersection first, the speed of the ear would tend to avoid rather than contribute to the collision. The speed of the Hudson, as well as the failure of the driver to keep as near the right-hand curb as practicable and look out for cars on the right, was what proximately caused the collision.
The judgment will be affirmed.
Parker, O. J., Mitchell, Tolman, and Mount, JJ., concur.