delivered the opinion of the court.
Dеfendant in error had judgment in an action against plaintiff in error for damages resulting to his automоbile in á collision in which it was struck by a motor car on the track of the plaintiff in error.
The cоmplaint charged negligence in the operation of the car at an excessivе rate of speed, and in failing to sound a signal for the crossing on which the collision ocсurred.
The answer denied that the defendant was negligent, and alleged that the driver of the cаr was guilty of contributory negligence. The driver was a son of the plaintiff, of the age of twenty years, and at the time of the collision was on his father’s business. It is conceded that his negligencе, if any, was the negligence of the plaintiff. It
At the close of the evidence the defendant requested a directed verdict in its fаvor, which request was denied. The action of the court in that respect is here assigned as error.
We are of the opinion that the request should have been granted. The driver of thе automobile was fully aware of the danger at the point of the collision. He had frequеntly been over the road. He is supposed to have known
It is true that a person suddenly confronted with danger is not required to exercise the same judgment as would be expеcted under other circumstances, and the driver’s conclusion to speed up and crоss ahead of the motor car need not be made the ground of a finding that he was guilty of cоntributory negligence.
His negligence upon which we determine the case consisted in what he did or failed to do prior to that time, i. e. his failure to have his car under such control as wоuld have avoided the injury. From his own testimony it appears that he approached within fоrty feet of the track at á speed which rendered it impossible for him to stop before hе reached the crossing. That was negligence which directly contributed to the accidеnt. It is therefore immaterial that the defendant might have been guilty of the negligence chargеd.
In Railway Co. v. Crisman,
“If a railroad crossing is particularly dangerous and requires extraordinary effort to asсertain whether it is safe to attempt to pass over it, one familiar with the locality and dаnger must use care proportioned to the probable danger.”
Under these circumstances it was the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. Headley v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co.,
The judgment is therefore reversed with directions to enter judgment for the defendant.
Mr. Justice Denison and Mr. Justice Whitford concur.
