OPINION
This is аn appeal by Writ of Error by Great-Ness Professional Services, Inc., Clyde R. Greathouse and Carolyn J. Great-house, appellants, from a summary judgment granted to the First National Bank of Louisville, appellee. The central issue in this appeal is whether the misclassification of the specific ground for summary judgment is sufficient to defeat the summary judgment. We believe that it is; therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.
*917 In 1978, appellant Great-Ness executed a lease сontract with appellee wherein appellant agreed to lease certain equipment for a period of seven years at a fixed lеase rental of $728.91 per month. Appellants Clyde and Carolyn Greathouse personally guaranteed the performance of appellant Great-Ness pursuant to the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. On or about February 10, 1984, appellant GreatNess defaulted in the payments due under the lease agreement. Appellee advised appellants of the default and of appellee’s election to accelerate thе maturity of the monthly payments pursuant to the terms of the lease. Appellee then filed a lawsuit for the breach of the lease agreement and prayed for past due rentals and accеleration of future rents due and owing pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. Appellants filed a pro se answer and paid $2,325.57 toward past-due rentals. Appel-lee then filed a motion for summary judgment alleging as grounds therefor: “This is a suit on a sworn account.” The Motion for Summary Judgment alleged the existencе of a lease agreement; that appellants had defaulted in making payments on the account; that all just and lawful offsets, credits and payments had been allowed; that appellee had made demand upon appellants to pay the balance due and owing; that appellants failed and refused and сontinue to fail and refuse to pay the debt owing; and that there exist no genuine issues as to any material facts relating to the liability of appellants for thе account made the basis of this litigation. Appellee further alleges that appellants Clyde and Carolyn Greathouse had personally guaranteed payment оf the monies due under the lease agreement and prays for a judgment in favor of appellee and against all appellants. The Motion for Summary Judgmеnt is accompanied by the affidavit of Guy Spalding, Corporate Services Officer for appellee. The affidavit alleges that the affiant has reаd the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment and that “the statements contained therein are true and correct.” The remainder of the affidavit alleges the lease agreement, the breach, the monies due, the just and lawful offsets, credits or payments, and the demand for the balance due and owing. Also attached tо the Motion for Summary Judgment is the affidavit of appellee’s attorney, setting forth the amount and the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requested in the Motion for Summary Judgment.
While there is language in the Motion for Summary Judgment and the affidavit regarding the existence of a lease agreement, there is no allegаtion that the specific ground for recovery pursuant to a summary judgment is breach of contract or breach of a lease agreement. To the сontrary, the only allegation of a specific ground for recovery is that on a sworn account.
Appellee’s cause of action against appellants herein is not a suit on a sworn account as a matter of law. In order to qualify as a suit on account pursuant to Rule 185 of the Texas Rules of Civil Prоcedure, the account or liquidated money demand based upon a written contract must involve a claim for goods, wares, merchandise, personal services rendered or labor done or labor or materials furnished. A lawsuit based upon breach of a lease agreement is not a suit based upon а sworn account because there has been no purchase and sale, and title to personal property has not passed from one party to the other.
See Meineke Discount Muffler Shops v. Coldwell Banker Property Management Co.,
Summary judgments exist today in Texas jurisprudence solely because of and pursuant to Rule 166-A of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 166-A is not designed to deprive parties of a trial on the merits on any fact issues, but exists solely as a means of early termination of those lawsuits that clearly involve only questions of law and wherein no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute.
See generally
Hittner,
Summary Judgments in Texas,
*918
35 Baylor L.Rev. 207 (1983). The leading Texas opinion in the area of summary judgments is
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority,
Rule 166-A(c) provides that “[tjhe motion for summary judgmеnt shall state the specific grounds therefor.” The mov-ant must establish his entitlement to a summary judgment on the issues
expressly presented
to the trial court and cannot be granted a judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not specifically addressed in the summary judgment proceeding. Also note cases cited in
Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
We recognize that there is apparently no genuine material fact issue in controversy in this lawsuit, and we recognize further that a properly worded motion for summary judgment, abased upon breach of a lease agreement, will in all probability be granted by the trial court. We are nonetheless faced with a motion for summary judgmеnt alleging as a specific ground therefor
a suit on a sworn account.
While the balance of the Motion for Summary Judgment and the affidavit in support thereof may allude to a causе of action based upon breach of a lease agreement, we cannot infer or imply grounds for granting the motion for summary judgment other than those specific grounds expressly set forth in the motion.
Texas State Investors, Inc. v. Kent Electric Co.,
The facts of this case are similar to those found in
CGM Valve and Gauge Co. v. Energy Valve, Inc.,
Appellants’ point of error is sustained; the judgment is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.