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Great Lakes Warehouse Corporation, Petitioner/cross-Respondent v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent/cross-Petitioner
239 F.3d 886
7th Cir.
2001
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Docket

*1 Lujan, conjectural hypothetical.” not (internal 560, 112 S.Ct. WAREHOUSE U.S. GREAT LAKES omitted). Plotkin Corporation,

quotations and citations Petitioner/Cross- injury argues that has Respondent, suffered risk of accidents be- form of increased illegally have unqualified drivers cause NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS licenses; drivers’ obtained commercial BOARD, Respondent/Cross- however, speculative and this risk is too Petitioner. injury-in-fact constitute generalized to If standing purposes. alleged- Plotkin 00-2191, Nos. 00-2226. risk of ly injury from an increased suffers of Appeals, United States Court accident, people using do all Illi- then so Seventh Circuit. judges highways, including the nois argu- at oral this court as mentioned Argued Jan. many necessarily ment. There are out- Decided Feb. affecting unknown influences all as- side pects standing concepts advanced these

by plaintiffs. it

Finally, the BGA claims that has

standing organization, as an from its apart

members, simply by expendi reason of its money in pursuing

ture of time and However, ordinary

alleged expen fraud. organization’s as of an part pur

ditures

pose necessary inju not do constitute

ry-in-fact required standing. The BGA past has been instrumental ad

vancing government reforms Illinois

using investigators attorneys along journalistic litigation techniques and corruption.8 This decision does expose regular techniques

not curtail those good

BGA. It means intentions are enough for federal standing. it

The district court characterized well “plaintiffs it said that are no simply

when bystanders

more than concerned and do standing

not have challenge these ac- require- court.” Were the this standing compromised

ments of to be suit, in this

suggested longer would no jurisdictional concept.

be a useful parties shall bear own costs.

AFFIRMED. information, site, http://www.bettergov.org. 8. For see the BGA web further

FLAUM, Judge. Chief Corporation Warehouse Great Lakes (“GLW”) appeals from National Labor “Board”) (“NLRB” or Relations Board’s *3 the finding that violated National order (“NLRA”) by firing Act Labor Relations promote employee attempting one and a union another soon before claims that its mere drive. GLW violate NLRA and promotion cannot the that it fired the other accor- disciplinary its For the policy. dance with herein, reject reasons stated GLW’s arguments grant and of the enforcement order. NLRB’s Background I. is a warehousing company GLW by the Northern Indiana owned Faur (“Faur”). Corporation In Brothers Octo- ber, 1997, an International affiliate Teamsters, Brotherhood of AFL-CIO was preparing organizing drive GLW. employees Gary and GLW Anderson Vic- tor were known union Oiler prior attempts who had been active unionize GLW.

On October warehouse distribu- manager posi- tion An|erson foreman, open tion of which had been approximately four Anderson de- months. clined, him manager and if he asked refusing job “because of the un- replied ion?” Anderson that he could not manager responded comment. The “be prepared Anderson should and changes” away. walked On October budding, Anderson leaving officials, management he met three includ- ing the owner of Faur. The owner asked him he why job, had refused the foreman and Anderson said he “couldn’t talk why about it.” then The owner asked and other not talk to her could (argued), J. Walter Liszka Wessels & concerns, seeking about their rather than Pautsch, IL, for Chicago, Petitioner. incurring and at- representation Labor Kinney, Elizabeth National Rela- unresponsive tendant dues. Anderson was Board, IL, Respondent. Chicago, golf and and the conversation turned negative changes in FLAUM, other matters. No Judge, Before Chief COFFEY, pay Judges. working Anderson’s conditions took POSNER Circuit facts, Relying refused the and he on these after he General place March, voluntarily resigned NLRB charged Counsel of the with various An violations NLRA. admin- Oiler, driver, a forklift was fired (“ALJ”) judge istrative law found that repeated written receiving after company NLRA, violated had a warnings company for errors. The 158(a)(1), ways, namely to U.S.C. three disciplinary policy, known progressive Oiler, warning fourth requiring by: with the Anderson threatening unspecified employee’s On termination. October retaliation, coercively interrogating manager the warehouse distribution regarding sympathies, Anderson his union warning first for an inci- issued offering to induce him to *4 1 by on when truck loaded dent October a abandon the union. A transgres- fourth pallet prod- left without a of ordered Oiler 8(a)(3), 158(a)(3), § sion was of 29 U.S.C. warning Oiler his second uct. received by ALJ found GLW violated pay one-day suspension a without firing supporting Oiler for the union. The unloading October 28 for more around findings Board affirmed the regard- ALJ’s product necessary than on eases Octo- violations, ing these four that emphasizing 21. third was issued on warning ber The promotion was to Anderson 30 he mislabelled four hun- October when immediately before the cam- 20; cases on October Oi- product dred paign and fact that posi- this foreman given three-day suspension ler was a with- had tion been vacant for four months. by manager. out The fourth and pay petitions for review of two of the warning presented final was to on Board’s findings GLW violated the putting expi- November 7 for the incorrect in offering promote NLRA to Anderson date cases on ration on of cheese October by firing Oiler. Management presented Oiler with the voluntarily being option resigning and II. Discussion given a severance in return for package signing pre- a settlement offer and release affirm We will the Board’s deci by a pared company. given Oiler was if findings supported by sion its factual are off week to consider this but substantial evidence and its conclusions rejected it 14 and im- on November was have reasonable basis in the law. See mediately fired. Contractors, NLRB, Dilling Inc. Mech. v. ap- more

GLW been lenient (7th Cir.1997). 521, 523-24 This oth- plication disciplinary policy of its requires pro standard that the Board employees by giving only single er warn- duce relevant evidence sufficient for a rea ing multiple mistakes. Barbara Pala to con person accept sonable the Board’s received a second for errors oc- warning Corp. See v. clusion. Universal Camera curring days, on three different which was NLRB, 456, 474, 477, 95 340 U.S. 71 S.Ct. by warning followed a third which also (1951). However, 456 re cursory L.Ed. er- days covered three different worth of insufficient, take ac view and we into eventually was rors. When Pala forced record, including count whole evidence resign, warning her final written stated contrary Dill position. to the Board’s See averaging she had been two mistakes 107 ing, F.3d at Cole, employee, a week. Another Sharon given warning initial was mistakes A. Uncontested Violations occurring days. Campbell on also two Jim has not the Board’s contested given warning an initial for mistakes was 8(a)(1) findings it violated day prior.” on a particular made “and by interrogating Anderson and NLRA warning that he had made numerous noted making of retaliation unspecified threats complained and a customer had errors to fore when he declined performance, yet Campbell about his Therefore, summarily only single man. enforce warning. ceived 890 self-organization issues the exercise of regarding these the Board’s order NLRB, Ill. 30 determining rights. Carry whether substantial See Cos. v.

without Cir.1994). (7th findings. the Board’s The evidence F.3d Labs., Inc., 99 Champion NLRB sparse, See was to the Board rather presented Cir.1996). These viola- F.3d under it was sufficient the deferential but case, from the do not disappear standard to substantial evidence may sup- as evidence that rather remain Board’s conclusion that the offer is- findings on contested the Board’s port with Anderson’s attempt to interfere NLRB, Corp. v. sues. See Marine U.S. moving man to unionize him to a right (7th Cir.1991) (en F.2d 1314-15 position. important The most agement banc). findings facts are the Board’s uncontested pro after Anderson declined the B. Promotion Offer manag motion warehouse distribution pro of the NLRA Section interrogated him and then er threatened with, re employers interfering hibits from In unspecified reprisals. him with addi ex straining coercing employees tion, the Board’s other evidence buttressed form, join, of their or assist rights ercise talk position. unwilling Anderson *5 in activities organizations engage labor why any about union-related reasons as to purpose bargaining or for of collective suggests he turned down the protection. 29 U.S.C. other mutual aid or Labs., Champion he felt See coerced. 158(a)(1). § to man Offers timing 99 F.3d 8(a)(1) § if positions can violate agement supports also the Board’s determination. or reasonably these tend to interfere with position open The foreman been employees exercising right coerce months, until soon yet four GLW waited § 7 of the self-organization granted by drive, in which before NLRA, § 157. NLRB v. 29 U.S.C. See key supporter, Anderson would be union (7th Co., 750, Henry 416 F.2d 753 Colder promotion to to offer the Anderson. While Terminals, Cir.1969); see also Matson coer timing alone is not sufficient to show (D.C.Cir. NLRB, 300, v. 114 F.3d 302 Inc. interference, or it is a factor cion relevant 1997); Supply Medo generally see Photo may the Board to consider and 685-86, NLRB, 678, 64 Corp. 321 U.S. if strengthen the Board’s conclusion other 830, (1944) (holding L.Ed. 1007 S.Ct. 88 pres indicia of coercion or interference are that offers of benefits union NLRB, Tribune Chicago ent. See Co. v. violate that induce them to leave the union (7th Cir.1992). 712, 962 F.2d 717-18 8(a)(1)). § determine coer We whether present by or exam cion interference Termination C. all circum ining the relevant facts and 8(a)(3) Shelby NLRB v. Mem’l prevents stances. See em Section (7th Cir.1993). 550, Ass’n, Hosp. 1 F.3d 559 discriminating from the tenure of ployer or employment any or term condition of Substantial evidence employment encourage discourage or position. argues the Board’s GLW membership organization. 29 any labor qualified position, Anderson was 158(a)(3). employer An violates U.S.C. specific promises no threats or section if anti-union animus was this repeatedly him. were made to GLW also motivating substantial factor change in Anderson’s stresses that no company’s discharge an em decision working place took after he de conditions ployee. See Vulcan Basement Water clined the and thus its offer promotion, NLRB, 677, 219 684 proofing Ill. v. F.3d However, cannot be considered coercive. Cir.2000). (7th establish that a termi To test is whether interference or section, this the General occurred, nation violates only wheth actually coercion a by of the NLRB must show Counsel employer’s reasonably er the action tended (1) that: preponderance to interfere with or coerce 891 employee engaged protect- policy requires separate warning activities for ev (2) NLRA; employer knew error, ed ery the General produced Counsel involvement in these ac- employee’s evidence, above, described that other em (3) tivities; employer harbored animus ployees less identified with the union were (4) activities; and a causal toward those given warnings that multiple covered mis employer’s connection exists between the However, days.1 takes made on different animus and the decision to terminate. See given warning Oiler was for each error id; Cos., Carry 30 F.3d at 927. If the having rather than errors on different succeeds, General Counsel then the em- days combined into a single warning as ployer finding can still avoid the of a viola- Pala, Cole, occurred with Campbell. tion if it a preponderance demonstrates Disparate disciplinary treatment of union discharge the evidence that its decision supporters supports a finding that GLW unprotected on based conduct and by firing violated Oiler. See that it would have fired the Tortilleria, Inc., NLRB Rey v. Del 787 gardless protected of his or her activities. (7th 1118, Cir.1986); F.2d 1124 NLRB v. Cos., Carry See 30 F.3d at 927. Co., Laughlin Bliss & Steel finding The Board’s of a violation (7th Cir.1985). Finally, the timing of supported by substantial evidence. discharge, though it cannot alone be argues the Board has not violation, Vulcan, the basis for a see shown anti-union animus because GLW F.3d at further supports the Board’s knew for over a decade that was a Star, NLRB, finding. See Jet Inc. v. supporter and would have fired him Cir.2000). F.3d 676-77 While long ago punish if it had wanted to him for might have known of Oiler’s union his union activities. GLW also contends *6 sympathies years, for it him fired soon permitting resign that Oiler to and extend organizing before an drive. Sufficient evi ing package a severance that it shows presented dence was for the Board to con claims, lacked animus. GLW further both clude that terminated order to attack the causal connection and to es likely to remove someone who would be a defense, tablish its affirmative that its dis attempt leader in this at unionization. ciplinary policy mandatory was and Oiler committing admitted all four of the viola III. Conclusion However, tions which led to his dismissal. violation, promotion though as with the the summary The Board is entitled to en- evidence is from overwhelming, far forcement of the two NLRA uncontested record contains enough support for the Substantial, violations. though relatively Board’s conclusion. Anti-union animus modest, the Board’s oth- contempora could be demonstrated findings er two which we will not disturb interrogation neous uncontested and given the deferential standard of review. reprisal against threats of Anderson re Deny Therefore, petition GLW’s garding his union activism. In establish review and Enforce the Board’s order in ing defeating the causal connection and full. defense, GLW’s affirmative the General Counsel addition relied on the fact that POSNER, Judge, concurring. Circuit other who un employees, were not ardent join opinion, sep- I the court’s and write supporters, ion were not harsh treated as arately only flag possible to two issues for ly disciplinary policy. under GLW’s Though GLW claims that the text of its future consideration either the Labor argument, 1. At oral to claimed usual deviations related produced evidence before the ALJ that the a or lack thereof. Because this union briefs, disciplinary policy normally strictly argument presented en was not in GLW’s Ludwig, forced and that the more lenient treatments it is waived. See Berens v. 1998). some received were rare and un Cir. case, enforcing but them or, performance appropriate in an Board not, supporters potent would be a reviewing against a court. union this is discouraging unionization. But method of relies, regard to Board with type evidence that to this downside Anderson, the to whom the com- argument I have to is an for the pointed promotion management a to pany against an resolving close cases Board’s rank, principle that on the conventional of discrimination. Oiler’s a inference in- a is one method of offering case, gravity and given close number a cam- terfering with union mistakes, Oiler, company but the has failed with to the em- paign, regard items, be argue to that close cases should re- wrong ployee shipping fired equally principle company for the sake on the conventional solved favor impose uniformly workers, can discipline might to failure of other workers who discrimination un- against be evidence ceive treatment were it lenient role supporter. principles Both have a ion fear lenience toward a company’s cases, in unfair play practices labor happened worker who not to be union caution, played a role to be as it is supporter would be used as evidence (fatally) compa- Board neither the nor unfair practice. labor ny recognizes. potent is as as The idea that the carrot stick, is that it “coer- therefore supporter pro- to offer union

cive” him, management as it is to

motion fire pro- unsound. Most workers welcome a

motion, company prac- and so a that has a promoting get

tice of SNODDERLY, Kathy Bill R. Snodder unit, out of the bargaining group them ly, Snodderly, Derick a mi whether of workers vote on to union- nor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, unit, will actually ize the increase the ex- pected being supporter. income of a union eager company buy The more is to off R.U.F.F. DRUG ENFORCEMENT *7 supporters, support- the more union FORCE, TASK Board of Commission therefore, likely, be. ers there will So County, IN, ers Board of Union tactic of discouraging such a unionization Shelby County, IN, Commissioners Board should to backfire hesitate al., Defendants-Appellees. et to infer such motive from No. 99-3688. promotion. stick, carrot; Oiler received the Appeals, United States Court of nonuniformity but the use evidence of Seventh Circuit. imposition discipline Sept. Argued inference to discrimination has downside that, nor again, neither the Board the com- Decided Feb. If a pany recognizes. compa- this case ny legal le- exercising risks trouble

nience enforcement its work

rules, it will have incentive to enforce in a

those rules uniform and therefore manner. will

harsh Lenience be out. may

Workers as whole suffer. It does discriminatory

not follow evidence of inadmissible,

enforcement be be- should having strict rules on attendance or

cause

Case Details

Case Name: Great Lakes Warehouse Corporation, Petitioner/cross-Respondent v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent/cross-Petitioner
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Feb 7, 2001
Citation: 239 F.3d 886
Docket Number: 00-2191, 00-2226
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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