261 F. 275 | 6th Cir. | 1919
Libelant sued for injuries received ' while a member of the crew of respondent’s steamer engaged in commercial navigation of the Great Lakes. The case, including the facts stipulated for purposes of this review, may be thus sufficiently summarized :
Libelant had been employed under a maritime contract, signing regular articles as a seaman, and shipping at a Lake Erie port for a round
In the earlier decisions in the United States the extent of the indemnity was not always clearly or completely defined as respects either wages or maintenance and cure. In Harden v. Gordon (1823) 2 Mason, 540, Fed. Cas. No. 6,047, Mr. Justice Story held that by the maritime law the expense of curing a sick seaman in the course of the voyage is a charge on the ship. In Reed v. Canfield (1832) 1 Sumn. 195, Fed. Cas. No. 11,641, the same justice again held an injured seaman entitled to be cured at the ship’s expense, but it does not clearly appear whether cure was to be extended beyond the end of the voyage. In Nevitt v.
“In the absence of misconduct or neglect on the part of the officers, the obligation of the vessel to provide for a disabled or sick seaman should only be coextensive in duration to that of the seaman to the vessel.” '
In the City of Alexandria (D. C. 1883) 17 Fed. 390, Judge Addison Brown, upon a consideration of the continental codes and numerous decisions, announced the conclusion, as summarized in the headnote, that—
“By the maritime law, ancient and modern, a seaman, in case of any accident received in the service of the ship, is entitled to medical care, nursing, and attendance, and to cure, so far as cure is possible, at the expense of the ship, and to wages to the end of the voyage, and no more;”
The case did not involve the question of cure. In The Natchez, 73 Fed. 267, 19 C. C. A. 500, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seems t.o have held that the right to wages terminated with the voyage. These references, which by no means exhaust the subject, are sufficient by way of illustration for present purposes.
In The Osceola (1902) 189 U. S. 158, 175, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 487 (47 L. Ed. 760), Mr. Justice Brown, upon an elaborate review of the English and American authorities, announced the proposition, among others, that—
“Tho vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.”
In view of the words “at least,” and considering other decisions, libelant contends that there is no settled rule as to, the period of wage recovery, and thus that courts of admiralty should, “in the exercise of a sound discretion, give or withhold damages according to principles of equity and justice, considering all the circumstances of the case.” Respondent insists that under well-settled rules recovery after the termination of the voyage is absolutely forbidden. The District Court, without expressing “final or definite opinion * * * as to the period during which a lake seaman is entitled to wages after an injury,” concluded that an award of three months’ wages was reasonable “in view of all the circumstances.” We are accordingly urged to declare the applicable rule.
The phrase “at least,” in the extract quoted from the opinion in the Osceola Case, was doubtless meant to apply both to liability for maintenance and cure (see The Bouker No. 2 [C. C. A. 2] 241 Fed. at page 833, 154 C. C. A. 533) and to wages; but it was not, in our opinion, intended to suggest that wages beyond the termination of the voyage
Since the Osceola decision it has been held in seveial cases that an unfulfilled obligation to furnish cure and maintenance extends beyond the termination of, the voyage. See The Mars (C. C. A. 3) 149 Fed. 729, 79 C. C. A. 435; The Bouker No. 2, supra, 241 Fed. 831, 154 C. C. A. 533; The Henry B. Fiske (Dodge, D. J.) 141 Fed. 188. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has, also since the decision in the Osceola Case, held the shipowner liable for wages during a 4Vz months’ disability after discharge from the ship, on account of the latter’s failure to provide proper medical attention. No. Alaska Co. v. Larsen, 220 Fed. 93, 135 C. C. A. 661. And in The M. E Luckenbach (D. C.) 174 Fed. 265, affirmed (C. C. A. 4) 178 Fed. 1004, 101 C. C. A. 663, the seaman was likewise held entitled to recover damages for the ship’s failure to perform its duty with respect to medical aid. And see The Fullerton (C. C. A. 9) 167 Fed. 1, 92 C. C. A. 463.
But; so far as we have seen, the decision in The Osceola has not been distinctly construed as extending to liability for wages beyond the termination of the voyage, except in case of the fault of the ship in the performance of some duty, or unless the seaman’s contract extended beyond the end of the voyage.
Our conclusion is that, upon the record presented, libelant’s right to wages is, as mauer of law, confined to the end of the voyage, and that the award below was in this respect unwarranted. We do not decide what the rule would be had the contract of employment extended beyond the end of the voyage.
The decree of the District Court is accordingly reversed, with directions to enter a new decree in favor of libelant for $130, plus interest thereon. In view of the nature of this case, no costs will be awarded in this court. Respondent, in fact, does not so ask.
At Cleveland his finger was dressed at the Marine Hospital, presumably without expense to libelant.
In The J. F. Card (D. C. 1890) 43 Fed. 92, Mr. Justice Brown (then District Judge) included in his award wages to the end of the seaman’s contract, viz. about 14 days after the accident. In McCarron v. Dominion Co. (D. C.) 134 Fed. 762, decided since the case of The Osceola, Judge Lowell held that the seaman injured in the service of the ship is entitled to wages for the term of Ms shipment, where that extends beyond the termination of the voyage.
We have not overlooked the fact that in Dougherty v. Thompson, etc., Co. (D. C., McPherson, C. J.) 211 Fed. 224, 227, the award may have included something for wages after the end of the voyage.