*1 No. 30403. Mar. 1977.] [L.A. INC., PROPERTIES,
GREAT LAKES v.
Cross-complainant Appellant, al., et
CITY OF EL SEGUNDO
Cross-defendants Respondents. 17,1977.] No. 30404. Mar.
[L.A. INC., PROPERTIES,
GREAT LAKES
Cross-complainant Appellant, COMPANY,
MC & DEVELOPMENT
Cross-defendant and Respondent.
Counsel Charles V. Pollock, John P. Pollock and & Williams Berwanger, Appellant. Berwanger Cross-complainant *3 General, Assistant Carl Attorney Evelle J. Boronkay, Younger, Attorney Goldman, General, David B. Keeler and R. Attorneys Robert Deputy Jr., Silver, Jamieson, General, Beers, Laurens Ballard John Roger Kontos, Brent Omstein, Winslow, & N. Ornstein William L. Robert M. Hunt, Hall, Jr., R. and Rushforth, W. A. Thomas Phillips Carlyle John Amici Curiae on behalf Frederic P. Sutherland as Cross-complainant and Appellant. Sorensen, Allen, Jr., Leventhal,
Burke, C. & Williams & Mark Rose L. for Cross-defendants Michael D. Leventhal and Kenneth Freeman and Respondents. Morton, Morton, Renwick, Edward S. Lauren R.
Hanna Harold C. & Mitchell, Groman, Brainard, & Arthur & Hillyer Silberberg Knupp, Irwin, F. Irwin and Brown B. as Amici Curiae on behalf Oscar Smith and Cross-defendants Respondents.
Opinion court after this THE In thiscase a COURT.* by hearing granted District, Division decision the Court of Second by Appellate Appeal, Four, herein for the further study problems giving we concluded that After such have opinion presented. study, for the Court Cole correctly Justice prepared by (assigned) Appeal involved, we and treats and the issues and it as adopt disposes deletions and of this court. (with Such appropriate opinion opinion indicated) additions as follows:** Caldecott, Clark, J., Richardson, J., Sullivan, Tobriner, J., J.,† J.,‡ *Before Acting C. Molinari, J.J. used deletions from the [], in this manner are to indicate opinion **Bracketstogether, than (other material the editor’s parallel the Court of enclosing Appeal; brackets indicated, used, citations) insertions or additions this by unless otherwise to denote are 537 P.2d (Estate (1975) Cal.3d court. of McDill by under assignment Court sitting Associate Justice of the Supreme Retired † of the Judicial Council.
Chairman Chairman of the Judicial Council. ‡Assigned by The sole issue these is whether section 27428 of appeals presented the Public Resources of the California Coastal Zone part 1972,1 Conservation ofAct authorizes the award fees to cross-defendants, successful defendants and as well as to successful does, We have concluded that it plaintiffs cross-complainants.
that the orders from herein must be affirmed. appealed consequently here, Inc., Great Lakes was named as a Properties,
Appellant defendant in an action it and others brought against Portuguese Bend Defense Committee. Great Lakes filed cross-complaint against entities, numerous herein. The public private including respondents involved, with which we are not otherwise complaint, sought injunctive *4 relief under the Act The 27425). asked for similar (§ cross-complaint relief, as and well for an award civil in an (§§ 27501) penalties $705 amount million. be in excess demurrers pleaded Respondents’ to the were sustained without leave to amend and the cross-complaint action was Thereafter, dismissed as each each respondent. respondent fees, moved the court to award to section 27428. The pursuant amount of the fees the court to award sought, opposed power them, was to be reasonable. court entered orders stipulated separate fees to C & M and to awarding respondent Development Company cities, and these followed. respondent appeals
Section 27428 in a civil action “Any provides: person a this violation of division or to recover civil brought enjoin [the Act] costs, shall be awarded his including “ fees.” The Act itself defines 27105: ‘Person’ “person” individual, includes and any organization, partnership, corporation, federal, state, and local including any utility agency that the word as used in section government.” argues Appellant “person” 27428 refers We only plaintiffs. disagree.
It is axiomatic in the of a that statute where the clear, its Cal.Jur.2d, should be followed. language (45 plain meaning Statutes, § p.
“ ‘One who contends a of an act must not provision or natural of its applied according customary purport must show either that other some section of the or restricts expands act noted, 1This is hereinafter referred to as Act. legislation Unless otherwise all references are to the Public Resources Code. that the itself is
its
meaning,
repugnant
general purview
acts,
act,
or that the act considered in
with other
materia
pari
matter,
with the
a different
subject
legislative history
imports
ed.
Sands,
Construction
(4th
Statutes
(2A
Statutory
meaning.’
Sutherland,
Construction,
46.01,
v.T.
1973)
49.)”
Statutory
{Leroy
p.
Bd.
12 Cal.3d
at
Workmen’s
Comp.
p.
Appeals
761,
In Inc. Cal.Rptr. Dooley Cal.App.2d There a statute to made here was a contention identical that rejected. a to “. . . shall award that the court prevailing party provided . . .” The was that fee . reasonable attorney’s argument “prevailing claimant defendant. and not meant prevailing party” really prevailing and included of the section was clear The court held that the language as well as defendants plaintiffs. from reason to find a depart compelling
Appellant purports the Act. It is clear of the statute purposes by pointing a is statute in true that an consideration the interpretation important of that statute ex rel. S. F. etc. objective purpose (e.g., People Bay 533, 543, Com. Town 69 Cal.2d Emeryville P.2d In 790]). the Act the initiative enacting by process forth a set that (§ 27001) people finding necessary preserve natural resources the California coastline. out that Act that individuals seek to
Appellant points provides may enforce its relief without provisions by suing injunctive posting bond 27425) and for civil (§ 27426). It that (§ by suing argues fees to successful interpret allowing attorneys’ defendants would frustrate the private plaintiffs encouraging enforce Act. The is not own argument persuasive. appellant’s words, the Act “. . . assures those wish to persons compel will not be burdened with the substantial they compliance [it] financial cost of to utilize their financial resources to having personal if finance a lawsuit But it is added.) inherent (Italics they prevail.” scheme that if Act do not things private persons suing will burdened their own prevail, inevitably financially fees and the investment of their time and efforts in attorneys’ the action. prosecuting
It is that the added burden of purely speculative urge having pay fee will deter efforts enforce the Act. This is true in of the clear and nature the- particularly light mandatory Section 27428 “shall” be language. says any person his awarded costs and “shall” is used sense 15). (§ mandatory fact that the Act expresses policy encourage protection coastline cannot detract this' from clear language. *6 are
There statutes which allow the fees to many recovery attorneys’ successful under circumstances and are in plaintiffs varying phrased Each of to the statutes referred in footnote allows the ways.2 varying Code, Ins. 2(E.g., § “... the court allow to the may reasonable plaintiff attorney Proc., fee § ..Code Civ. “If the recovers he shall be allowed plaintiff judgment, as costs ($100) one hundred dollars to cover counsel fees .... If the action is dismissed or the defendant recovers he shall be judgment, ($100) allowed one hundred dollars to Proc., cover counsel fees 118.1], ..Code Civ. 117j § fees to be attorney’s § paid [now Code, 1747.60, by unsuccessful defendant to on small § claims Civ. plaintiff appeal; (c) subd. “The cardholder shall be entitled to recover reasonable fees attorney’s [credit] ..”; Code, 1812.62, . Civ. for § dance studio be entered judgment buyer [of lessons] Civ; fees”; Code, for treble (Unruh damages “plus attorney’s § 1811.1 Act)—“Reasonable and’ shall fees costs be attorney’s awarded to the in prevailing party on action a contract or account installment to the subject of this provisions chapter seller, of whether such is instituted regardless action the or holder Where the buyer. to described certain fees variously attorneys’ persons recovery in circumstances, the the State of California each expresses policy Act the The also which the statute field in expresses the operates. policy in the state, shows that the statute but it of the enacting People clearly victor, if the be he defendant would be thwarted not feel that did policy recover fees. is allowed to attorneys’ plaintifi", in a fees be Allowing any person paid civil action under the Act also serves the brought preventing purpose No such frivolous embodied in the Act litigation. encourages policy lawsuits.[3] are
The orders from affirmed. appealed
TOBRINER, C. I dissent. Acting J.
In section 27428 as attorney general” requiring “private construing defendants, fees incurred successful plaintiffs pay attorneys which the cardinal majority ignore principle statutory interpretation, to effectuate the mandates statutes be construed legislative purpose read the enactment. of section Although underlying isolation, is is equally susceptible majority’s interpretation, are to be awarded fees susceptible actions to enforce the act. statute who have brought only persons is con- not When is ambiguous statutory language unambiguous. with the strued in accompanying provisions conjunction to the section’s manifest view encouraging private actions, it the section becomes clear that enforcement attorney general fee award be should only authorizing interpreted the 1972 actions under enforcement successfully prosecute persons conclusion, fail heed coastal act. reaching contrary majority inert ... are not wise admonition that Justice Frankfurter’s “[statutes which the full amount to that he tendered to plaintiff defendant in his answer alleges court, entitled, the amount so for the plaintiff, he was and thereupon deposits true, deemed to'be tendered, then defendant is found to allegation .the Code, 2983.4; 'article”; the Rees- § Civ. meaning within prevailing party 1811.1.) Act—similar Civ. Vehicle Sales and Finance Motor Levering *7 was 27428, of 1972 coastal legislation, the other with all along provisions 3[Section 1, 1977, which the 1972 to a of legislation pursuant effective January repealed (See Pub. Resources a five-year of the act after period. called for the expiration an has effect on that this any action has contended 27650.) repeal No to this party an action final fully litigated judgment prior relating fee award that section 27428 that the 1972 legislation contemplated section’s We agree repeal. of fees under these attorneys' the award govern would circumstances.] 159 of exercises in are instruments literary They composition. government, and in them ‘the is a more aid construing general purpose important ” than which formal down.’ meaning any grammar logic may lay 255, v. States U.S. 260-261 359 L.Ed.2d (United (1959) Shirey [3 793-794, S.Ct. before us should issue
Analysis statutory interpretation properly believe, I in its section 27428 begin, by placing legislative proper setting. Section the 1972 Coastal Zone Conserva- adopted part initiative, tion Act measure initiative sponsored by coalition environmentalist after the state had organizations Legislature repeatedly failed to bills that would have for the adopt. proposed provided of a and conserva- preparation long-range plan development govern tion of Adams, California’s coastal (See precious generally 'region. 20—A Citizens' L.Rev. Proposition Campaign Syracuse In State Court 12 Cal.3d (Veta) (1974) Superior of California P,2d we 1281], summarized Cal.Rptr. briefly initiative: Act that the declares operation “The coastal zone is a valuable resource to all of the that its belonging people, state, is a concern to the citizens permanent protection paramount that in order to this valuable resource protect necessary study zone, the coastal for its prepare long- comprehensive plan orderly, conservation and and insure that range management, any development which occurs in the area permit during study planning period will be consistent with the of the Act. . . . objectives Among [Citation.] of the coastal zone are the avoidance objectives of irreversible plan and irretrievable commitments of coastal zone resources. [Citation.] order assure that the the Act are not purposes impaired during in which the is in formulation, those who seek period plan process are, within the area with certain perform development permit seek exceptions, from the Commission.” also required (See permit Brown v. Court 15 Cal.3d Superior
P.2d 1137].) other
Recognizing policing on-going development activities California’s coastline along to ensure lengthy compliance the act was certain to substantial for the limited staff of pose problems task, officials with that the draftsmen of the public charged coastal initiative, their cue from similar contained in earlier taking provisions *8 included in environmental civil
federal legislation,1 protection rights 27425- §§ of Resources (Pub. initiative a series the provisions the role of citizens in the aid aimed at 27428) enlisting public-minded enforce- the in critically important attorney general,” help “private restrictions, these sec- ment effort.2 traditional “standing” Eliminating a to maintain an action authorized tions enjoin “any person” explicitly civil of the state to recover act or to suit on behalf violation bring (Id., 27425, The also act. sections §§ in the bond normally imposed specifically suspended requirement the need to remove such an (id., actions 27425), injunction recognizing economic if citizens interest who would barrier organizations, public actions, to be no rewards from such were reap monetary encouraged in role the act. play major enforcing in this included as one
Section was “private provisions for its The of the act. principal purpose attorney general” segment drafted, is, think, the initiative was clear. At the time inclusion I quite had demonstrated attorney general concept experience private was when available no recovery defray monetary potential inhibited from citizens were extensive costs seriously litigation, private were interest” actions if they inevitably required instituting “public As the Court bear their own fees. United States Supreme 400, in Park U.S. observed Newman v. Piggie Enterprises 1263, 1265-1266, “If were L.Ed.2d 88 S.Ct. successful plaintiffs 964]: fees, forced to bear their own few [private routinely interest to advance the would by position public .in general] the federal courts.” (See King generally invoking injunctive power Plater, in Environmental Fees Public Interest & Counsel Right 1See, 1964, 204(b), Act of Code section Civil United States e.g., Rights Air section 2000a-3(b); States Code Clean Act Amendments of section United I857h-2; section Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of section 105(g), Act of 33 United States Code section Noise Control United 1415(g); States Code section 4911. in environment 2The of the role “citizen suits” protecting importance played in a annual the United States Council on Environmental recognized report recent has been the most striking legal development step-up Quality: “Perhaps In the face of citizen interest’ to halt environment. degradation ‘public litigation a tide decisions that environmental ignored against of administrative history impacts law, thát control citizens concluded delays developing pollution legislative not The citizen has litigation only challenged must use the courts cure neglect. undesirable, it has which were environmentally actions specific government private under environmental court of what is of Federal agencies definition required speeded 155-156.) Ann. (U.S. Council Envir. 2d. Quality, Rep. pp. statutes.” on protection
161 27; Note, 41 Tenn.L.Rev. (1973) Litigation Awarding Attorney Expert (1973) Witness Fees in Environmental 58 Cornell L.Rev. 1222.) Litigation To this section 27428 was drafted to that overcome guarantee problem, who an action either to successfully any prosecuted enjoin person of the act to recover violation civil to the state) penalties (payable of the act could recover his fees who violation from attorneys party was found to have violated the act. The cases and numerous prior academic commentaries that have discussed the question uniformly that section 27428’s main was “to agree encourage private to enforce the act.” Gas and Elec. (Sanders Co. (1975) plaintiffs Pacific 661, see, 415]; & Jones Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. e.g., Klittgaard v. San Coast Com. (1975) Diego Regional Cal.App.3d Miller, 650]; Coastal Act—Citizen Suits and Enforcing 236, 240-241; Fees 49 State Bar J. Comment, Coastal Attorney’s Controls in Wave the Future? (1974) Harv.J.Legis. California: 476; Note, the Seashore: the Coastal Saving Management Planning for Zone L.J. Hastings do not that majority deny principal purpose underlying
section 27428 was to facilitate suits, but “private attorney general” reason that in of the statute, light the trial “plain court’s language” conclusion that the section accords fees to defen- attorneys prevailing dants as well as to is irrefutable. The prevailing plaintiffs majority that section 27428 that emphasize provides simply “[a]ny person in a court action a violation of this prevails division or brought enjoin to recover civil costs, shall be awarded his including fees” and that (italics added), 1972 coastal attorneys act itself contains a broad definition of the term which does not limit “person” that term to Inasmuch as the “plaintiffs.”3 respondent corporation cities are section, act’s definitional clearly “persons” that, conclude read majority “literally,” unambiguously authorizes the fee awards rendered in the instant case.
This conclusion is flawed First, in number of I cannot respects. agree of section isolation, even when read language the trial court’s conclusion. “unambiguously” supports Although is to the trial court’s susceptible interpretation, section’s wording equally susceptible “ 3Section of the 1972coastal legislation, ‘Person’ provides: includes individual,
any organization, partnership corporation, including any utility federal, state and agency local government.” action awarded to fees are to be “any person *10 or to recover of this a violation division he enjoin brought has] [which civil penalties....”
Moreover, that our cases have made clear statutory long provision but must “be construed in a vacuum cannot be interpreted of which it is a of law to the whole (Stafford part....” system reference P,2d 799 Board (1954) etc. Retirement Cal.2d L.A. with its statutory provisions, accompanying read When conjunction not indicate 27428’s does that section “plain language” becomes clear both and fees for to authorize intent attorneys plaintiffs legislative defendants. read “Any in sequence, provide:
Sections relief action for maintain an declaratory equitable person an No bond shall of this division. for required restrain violation action, added.) this section.” (Italics “Any person may maintain 27500 and civil for provided recovery penalties the Sections action in a action civil added.) 27501.” (Italics “Any person or to recover of this division civil a violation to enjoin -brought costs, (Italics feés.” his including attorneys be awarded shall context, the section In this added.)4 “any person” terminology the of sections to refer to identical language “any person” clearly appears 27426, i.e., who have been broad granted standing persons of. or for institute actions recovery the injunctive relief rights I Thus, as a these related w;hole, viewing statutory penalties. provisions Great of section 27428 that the supports statutory language believe intended to authorize attorneys contention Lakes’ provision in actions instituted pursuant fees prevail only plaintiffs and 27426. sections that in entitled it is persons this' significant designating regard, fees, 27428 utilized “any the draftsmen attorneys recover than 27425 and sections rather phrase
person” which or Statutes contemplate “prevailing party.” “any party” common- fees defendants plaintiffs by prevailing recovery attorneys Civ. (see, e.g., utilize party” “prevailing terminology ly 1811.1, if the draftsmen had intended 2984.4), actually §§ and defen- both fees plaintiffs authorize recovery “The simply: provisions statutory intervening provision, reads only 4Section at law.” remedies other shall be in addition available of this article dants, such written the statute in terms. would have probably does not fees to the Because section 27428 accord “prevailing Kalico, Inc. v. reliance on Dooley party,” majority’s case construing Cal.App.2d 799]—a mis- which utilized su.ch language—is clearly specifically placed.5 even if a literal of section 27428 the trial
Finally, reading supported court’s interpretation, respondents’ suggestion legislative pur- *11 of the must to such literal flies in the provision give reading pose way of face a cardinal of construction principle statutory recognized long by this court. As we have on occasions: “The fundarfiental many explained rule of construction is that the court should ascertain the intent statutory of the as to so effectuate the of the law.” Base Legislature purpose {Select 640, Materials v. Board 51 Cal.2d 645 (1959) P.2d 672]; Equal. [335 of Toll 43, Cal. v. 40 Kuchel Cal.2d 53 P.2d (1952) Authority 4]; Bridge [251 v. Raisin 796, Proration Zone No. 1 24 802 Cal.2d P.2d Dickey (1944) [151 505, 157 A.L.R. “Once a 324].) intent has been particular legislative ‘ ascertained, it must be effect “even not be given though ’ consistent with the letter of strict the statute.” . . . [Citations omitted] ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute not to ought if it is intention of prevail opposed legislature apparent statute; and if the words are flexible to admit some other of sufficiently construction it be is to to effectuate that intention. intent adopted letter, will, over the and the if letter so read as possible, ’ ” conform to the of the act.” v. Board Mammoth spirit {Friends of 247, 761, Cal.3d 259 502 (1972) P.2d Supervisors 1049].) [104
As considered of the already explained, light general purposes the 1972 coastal initiative and the related it is clear statutory provisions, that section 27428 and to facilitate adopted encourage private citizen enforcement suits under the act. Sanders v. Gas (See, e.g., Pacific 5The Kalico decision that a which suggests for the provides but denies such recovery fees by prevailing recovery by plaintiffs, prevailing defendants, (198 would serious at raise constitutional questions. Cal.App.2d p. California, however, it been has clear for well over that such half-century legislative as it is differentiation is so “based some difference constitutionally long permissible upon relation” bearing just legislative to a permissible (Engebretson purpose. 30, (1910) 880]; (1954) v. 158 Cal. 32-33 P. see also Co. Gay Beyerbach v. Juno Oil [109 11, Atchison, 1]; (1899) Cal.2d & Fe R. Co. v. P.2d Santa Matthews Topeka, U.S. 96 L.Ed. 19 S.Ct. standard is met here and clearly That neither nor the contend that Great Lakes’ respondents majority suggested interpretation 27428 would raise constitutional any question. Co., Jones, 673; Elec. & Inc. v.
& supra, Cal.App.3d Klittgaard Com., 99, 109.) San Coast As a Diego Regional supra, Cal.App.3d observed, however, number of have the inevitable conse- commentators deter, of the would be to quence majority’s interpretation perhaps actions, eliminate,” such “effectively private attorney general private would lack such citizens not economic incentive to suits only pursue but would face the fee a sizeable liability—in prospect attorney Comment, addition to their own should lose. fee—if (See Coastal Controls in Wave the Future? Harv.J.Le- California: 463, 476; Miller, Suits and the Coastal Act—Citizens gis. Enforcing Thus, Fees 49 State since the Bar J. 342-343.)6 Attorneys at statute leads to results variance clearly majority’s interpretation section, establish with the intent in cases legislative past adopting “ must be of a such ‘Certainly rejected. should be so as to the will statute never construed nullify the law to had to cause conflict legislature, apparent ” Zone No. in view lawmakers.’ v. Raisin Proration {Dickey 802; see, 24 Cal.2d East Co. Bay supra, Garbage Washington e.g., *12 P.2d Sanitation Co. Cal.2d Township I believe that trial court erred in Accordingly, interpreting I would to an fee award. according respondents right attorneys the trial reverse court orders. *
Sullivan, J.,* concurred. 27428 would not that their of section suggest proposed interpretation 6Respondents from the defendants the statute’s but would purpose, merely protect undermine principal however,, confine its reach to frivolous Section does not threat of lawsuits. fees, a trial court but frivolous actions or discretion to award withhold grant all fees in situations that a trial court “shall” award rather provides were the statute. if adopted, encompassed Accordingly, respondents’ faith would inevitably who act in the attorney general” plaintiffs highest good “private face prospect large attorney liability ultimately of a if claim should the ominous fee their be rejected. * assignment by Retired Associate Justice Court sitting Supreme of the Judicial Council. Chairman